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Chapter 1. Introduction 2
Introduction
Novel technologies have changed and continue to change modern life. The pervasive
use of industrial chemicals, advances in human medicine and the rises of biotechnology
and nanotechnology are just some prominent examples which have changed human life
on many levels and provide enormous benefits to society. At the same time, novel
technologies often involve unknown risks – a fact to which the victims of the morning
sickness drug thalidomide1 or the early use of X-radiation can testify. In the risks and
benefits of novel technologies lies a tension that society has to resolve one way or the
other.
When agents bear both the full risks and benefits of their actions, the tension between
risks and benefits is not societal in nature – it is rather one to be addressed by individual
decision-making. In contrast, when the risks fall on other agents, as is often the case, the
problem of risk externalities emerges. The traditional law and economics approach to
such problems is to analyze the incentives that the relevant agents face, the information
they possess and the transaction costs involved under different legal institutions. Law
and economics sees legal matters through the lens of resource allocation and one of its
central tenets is that institutional evolution is towards efficiency. On this basis, law and
economics derives positive and normative conclusions about behavior and institutional
design. While law and economics scholars acknowledge the existence and relevance of
other rationals for legal rules, involving notions of justice, fairness, responsibility, equity
and morality, these rationals are not the subject of investigation in law and economics
(Calabresi 1970).
The law and economics approach has proven fruitful for understanding and describing the
structure of legal institutions. Coase (1960) observed that in the absence of transaction
costs the only relevant institution for resolving problems of allocation is property rights.
With that observation in mind, it is not surprising that other means to decide on legal
entitlements usually only arise in settings in which transaction costs are not trivial
(Calabresi 1968, Calabresi and Melamed 1972). The economic role of these other means
is to decide on legal entitlements in a way such that the same outcome emerge as it
would in the absence of transaction costs. A classic example of substantial, and usually
prohibitive, transaction costs are risk externalities. For example, the driver of a car
cannot in any meaningful sense negotiate ex-ante with pedestrians about how much
and how fast she drives. Liability is one of the two main instruments for regulating
risk externalities and, as the reader will find out, the instrument that will be the main
1Thalidomide was first marketed in Germany under the trade-name Contergan. It turned out that,
when taken during pregnancy, the drug causes birth defects.
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subject of this dissertation.2 In the following, I will therefore briefly outline the basic
approach and findings in the law and economics analysis of liability rules.
There are two basic types of liability rules, strict liability and negligence rules. Strict
liability always holds the injurer liable for the harm she causes. In contrast, negligence
only holds the injurer liable if she was negligent, i.e. if she did not conform to a cer-
tain behavioral standard. The economic purpose of liability is to reduce total accident
costs. The total costs of accidents consist of both the direct costs of accidents and the
precaution costs (or care costs) incurred in order to avoid accidents (Calabresi 1970).
The implication is that the optimal number of accidents is not zero and that there is a
finite socially optimal level of precaution. When the behavioral standard is defined in
terms of the socially optimal level of precaution, both rules incentivize the injurer to
take socially optimal care (Calabresi 1970, Posner 1972, Brown 1973).3
There are two parts to this dissertation. The first part examines the relationship be-
tween liability rules and novel technologies from a general perspective. The second part
concentrates on a specific novel technology, solar geoengineering. I will introduce the
relevant context for each part’s contributions in sequence, starting with the first part.
The analysis of liability rules is usually undertaken in static settings. Novel technologies,
by their very nature, elude a static analysis and characterization. In contrast, their
novelty introduces a dynamic relationship between liability regimes and the technologies
they govern. Law and economics has investigated this dynamic relationship mainly from
two related angles. The first is an innovation perspective, where innovation can either
refer to innovation in safety technology or to product innovation. With respect to the
former, Endres and Bertram (2006) analyze the relationship between liability rules and
endogenous investments in care costs reducing technology. Endres and Friehe (2011)
study the incentives for the diffusion of such a technology. Parchomovsky and Stein
(2008) highlight the disincentive on the innovation and adoption of care cost reducing
technologies originating from the role of custom in determining negligence in court. This
literature mainly finds that strict liability provides optimal incentives, while negligence
does not. With regard to product innovation, there is an empirical literature which
concludes that high liability costs are detrimental to product innovation (Viscusi and
Moore 1993, Finkelstein 2004). Immordino et al. (2011) employ a model in which
investment into product innovation can produce either safe or harmful innovation and
in which risk information is private. They find that both direct and liability regulation
reduce investment in product innovation as regulation becomes more stringent. The
2Direct regulation is the other. While some risks are usually governed by direct regulation, other
risks are usually governed by liability. Shavell (1984a, 1984b) analyzes the use of direct regulation and
liability along four dimensions, drawing conclusions about the settings in which each is usually applied.
3In general, both injurer and victim may be able to reduce accident risks by taking precautions.
Whether liability rules should financially burden the injurer or victim in specific settings then becomes
a question of identifying the ’least cost avoider’. However, such settings are not examined in the articles
contained in this dissertation.
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bigger picture suggests that stringent liability regimes impede product innovation, but
not the innovation and diffusion of safety technology.
Learning about uncertain risks is the second angle from which law and economics has
investigated the dynamic relationship between liability regimes and novel technologies:
Risks emerging from novel technologies are uncertain and poorly understood. Shaping
the incentives for the potential use of novel technologies, liability regimes influence if and
how novel technologies are adopted. Consequently, a dynamic interaction arises between
how liability regimes govern novel technologies and the learning that takes place about
novel technologies’ potential risks. The classic approach in the literature is to consider
a learning opportunity before the technology might be used (Shavell 1992, Ben-Shahar
1998). The classic result is that when injurers can acquire perfect information at a fixed
cost, strict liability provides adequate incentives. A recent contribution by Baumann and
Friehe (2016) employed a learning-by-doing mechanism. They find that strict liability
is not necessarily optimal anymore in such a setting. The first part of this dissertation
(article 1) contributes to this literature on the relationship between liability regimes and
learning. Its main contribution is the introduction of a learning mechanism operating
at the post-market stage that can explain the widespread use of exemptions for harm
from novel risks found in the US, the EU and beyond.4
The second part of this dissertation investigates the relationship between liability and
a specific novel technology – solar geoengineering. In order to provide for the proper
context, I will first give a brief general introduction to the topic. Climate change poses
substantial risks to many aspects of human life (IPCC 2014), but mitigation efforts have
so far been insufficient for meaningfully curbing future climate change risks. In that
respect, the 2015 Paris Agreement was widely celebrated as a significant step into the
right direction. However, an initial assessment yields a warming of 2.6°C to 3.1°C in
2100, based on the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions submitted by the
participating States (Rogelj et al. 2016). Furthermore, since the climate response is
uncertain, ”it is also possible that substantially higher temperatures will materialize
with compelling likelihoods” (Rogelj et al. 2016). The perils of such ’catastrophic’
climate change, when temperature increases realize at the upper end of the probability
range, have been the subject of substantial discussion (Weitzman 2009, Nordhaus 2011,
Pindyck 2011, Weitzman 2014).
In the face of these bleak prospects, discussions about geoengineering have gained more
and more traction. Geoengineering is often defined as the ”deliberately large-scale ma-
nipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change”
(Shepherd 2009). Geoengineering approaches fall into two categories, carbon dioxide
removal (CDR) and solar geoengineering (SG). CDR methods aim at lowering atmo-
spheric greenhouse gas concentrations. While CDR methods are very likely to play an
important role in climate policy, they are in many respects similar to mitigation efforts
4A more detailed summary of the article follows later on.
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(Klepper and Rickels 2012) and not the subject of this dissertation. SG methods aim
at reducing the amount of solar radiation absorbed by the earth. SG methods have the
potential to quickly (Keith et al. 2010) and substantially (IPCC 2013) change global
temperatures. ’Stratospheric aerosol injection’ is the most widely discussed SG method
(Keith 2013). Although SG methods have not been developed yet, observations fol-
lowing volcanic eruptions, e.g. Mount Pinatubo in 1991, confirm that the method of
stratospheric aerosol injection works in principle (Crutzen 2006).
Potential risks from SG are a widespread concern, one of the most prominent being
that SG changes the hydrological circle (Trenberth and Dai 2007, Robock et al. 2008,
Kravitz et al. 2013). Among the relevant implications are reduced precipitation and an
increased potential for droughts in some regions (Trenberth and Dai 2007, Robock et
al. 2009). Furthermore, the method of stratospheric aerosol injection is known to lead
to ozone depletion (Tilmes et al. 2008, Keith et al. 2010, Pitari et al. 2014). Generally,
unanticipated risks from SG are a serious concern (Keith et al. 2010) and there remain
large gaps in knowledge regarding the effects of SG (MacMartin et al. 2016). As is
the case with other novel technologies, there is the potential that some risks remain
unanticipated, irrespective of the amount of research prior to potential use, rendering
any large-scale solar geoengineering deployment inextricably connected to the potential
of unanticipated risks and side effects.
In light of these substantial risks, governance is an overarching topic in the SG literature
(Barrett 2008, Shepherd 2009, Rayner et al. 2013, Parker 2014, Pasztor 2017). Liability
regimes, specifically, have received considerable attention in the debate. Horton et al.
(2014) propose liability regimes as a potential means of SG governance, drawing com-
parisons to the Space Liability Convention5 which they invoke as a successful precedent
for such a regime. Saxler et al. (2015) discuss the suitability of existing international
liability regimes for governing SG. They conclude that existing international liability
treaties do not cover SG, but that these treaties can offer valuable guidance to a SG
regime. Lastly, they reference international customary law as a potential legal source for
SG liability governance. Reynolds (2015) analyzes liability as an instrument specifically
for governing large-scale SG field research from a mainly economic perspective, taking
into account the public good character of such research. A common point of concern in
the literature is causation. All three studies cited in this paragraph stress that establish-
ing the causal link between a SG intervention and a potentially ensuing harm presents a
major challenge to any SG liability regime: Due to the stochastic nature of the climate
system, the traditional legal ’but for’ test of deterministic causation is infeasible (Allen
et al. 2007). Legal attribution based on probabilistic notions appears to be the only
possible option. However, this approach presents a considerable challenge from a legal
perspective (Saxler et al. 2015).
5The convention’s full name is ’Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects’. More information can be retrieved from http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/
spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html.
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The substantial risks of SG are exacerbated by the unique incentive structure underlying
potential SG deployment. On the one hand SG methods are likely to be very cheap and
can probably be implemented by a single actor (Barrett 2008). On the other hand they
have regionally diverging impacts (Ban-Weiss and Caldeira 2010, Ricke et al. 2010).
The combination of these two factors gives rise to what Weitzman (2015) coined the
free-driver incentive structure: In absence of governance, the agent or region with the
strongest preferences for SG determines the amount of SG deployed, with detrimental
effects on all other agents or regions. However, only the last units of SG are a cost to
all other agents. Since SG represents technologies which aim at curbing climate change
risks, the initial units of SG provided by the ’free-driver’ benefit at least a decent number
of other agents. This implies that SG provision by a free-driver is both a ’good’ and
a ’bad’ to at least some of the agents. From a law and economics perspective, such a
setting provides for an interesting research opportunity: It is far from clear how one
should interpret the concept of harm in such a setting. Since the concept of harm is
usually taken for granted in law and economics, this setting presents a challenge to the
existing law and economics literature.
A literature quantitatively examining the extent of regional differences in SG impacts is
of general relevance to SG liability, and more generally, to SG governance. Moreno-Cruz
et al. (2012) developed the Residual Climate Response (RCR) model for assessing such
regional differences which was subsequently used in the literature (Kravitz et al. 2014,
Yu et al. 2015). The common finding is that regional differences in temperature are small
to moderate, while regional differences in precipitation are substantial. However, Heyen
et al. (2015) criticize the common assumption of these studies that regional climate
preferences are determined by a historic climate, showing that regional differences may
also be substantial for temperatures when relaxing that assumption. The literature is
relevant to SG liability and SG governance for two reasons. Firstly, the RCR model can
be used for numerically investigating strategic SG settings: Ricke et al. (2013) employ
the RCR model in order to construct a ’coalition game’, based on the strategic incentives
to build coalitions, when SG deployment requires a minimum amount of international
power. Secondly, the literature may give more structure to the governance problem
beyond the free-driver characterization in identifying specific ways and dimensions in
which regional SG impacts are heterogeneous: A well-established result from climate
science is that SG undercompensates for climate change driven temperature increases at
high latitudes, while overcompensating at low-latitudes (Ban-Weiss and Caldeira 2010,
Ricke et al. 2010).
The second part of this dissertation (articles 2, 3 and 4) contributes to various aspects
important to SG liability. Article 2 examines the challenge of causation in climate
litigation in an interdisciplinary research effort. In particular, article 2 takes into account
the incentive structure of evidence production in a SG liability trial and its repercussions
for overcoming the challenge of causation. Article 3 provides an analytical model of SG
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liability, considering the unique SG incentive structure. Article 4 extends the Regional
Climate Response model, introducing climate preferences diverging from historic climate
conditions. In that, article 4 sheds further light on structural dimensions of regional SG
disagreement, contributing to the structural understanding of SG governance problems.
The two parts of the dissertation jointly contribute to the law and economics of novel
technologies. The first part contributes to the general understanding of the relationship
between novel technologies and liability rules in that it furthers the understanding of
learning about novel and uncertain risks in liability contexts (article 1).6 The second
part concerns the specific novel technology of solar geoengineering. In providing a model
of SG liability, which takes into account the unique incentive structure of the setting, it
contributes to the law and economic literature on liability rules (article 3). Beyond that,
it extends the understanding of the structure of regional SG disagreement, providing
valuable input for the analysis of SG liability and SG governance (article 4). Lastly,
it provides an analysis of the challenge of causation in the specific context of climate
litigation (article 2).7 This article links the the two parts of the dissertation, in that it
takes up an issue of general importance in the liability law (more specifically, the tort
law) of novel risks and analyzes it in the specific context of climate litigation.
Synopsis
The first article ”Experimentation, Torts, and the Value of Information” (with
Timo Goeschl) focuses on the relationship between liability regimes and experiential
learning at the post-market about the potential risks emerging from novel technologies.
The article is motivated by a startling observation. Legal rules usually provide for
exemptions for harm arising from novel, uncertain or unknowable risks. Such ’state-of-
the art defenses’ are ”in principle available in all but a very small number of jurisdictions”
in the world (Reimann 2003). However, the classic economics of tort law arrives at
different conclusions, finding that strict liability provides optimal incentives when tort
law deals with uncertain risks (Shavell 1992, Ben-Shahar 1998). The article’s main
contribution is to deliver an economic rationale for the exemptions tort law provides for
novel and uncertain risk.
The rationale rests on two assumptions. The first assumption is that experiential learn-
ing about uncertain risks at the post-market stage is essential. This sort of learning is
public and creates information spillovers to other potential injurers. The assumption
is contrary to the classic literature on uncertain risks (Shavell 1992, Ben-Shahar 1998)
where injurers can ex-ante privately acquire perfect information about the risk. Our
notion of learning has more in common with models in which the injurer’s care choice in
6Joint with Timo Goeschl.
7Joint with Martin Carrier, Timo Goeschl, Johannes Lenhard, Henrike Martin, Ulrike Niemeier,
Alexander Proelß, Hauke Schmidt.
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period 1 determines learning about the true care-harm technology for a second period
(Baumann and Friehe 2016). Here, strict liability can be inferior to a negligence rule
that employs a dynamically optimal due care level, given the presence of other potential
injurers. In our setting, injurers are firms that market products and learning occurs
about the risk properties of a novel technology underlying those products. Since the
products are based on the same novel technology, they share their risk characteristics.
For the proper understanding of the article, some information on the relationship be-
tween strict liability, negligence and decisions on bringing a product to the market is
helpful. When marketing-decisions are relevant, strict liability incentivizes the right
number of firms to go to the market, while negligence, or any rule providing for exemp-
tions from liability, incentivize marketing from too many firms from a static perspective
(Shavell 1980, Polinsky 1980). The simple reason is that exemptions lead to the firm
not internalizing the full total accident costs.
The second assumption is that learning depends on the cumulative market experience
with products based on the novel technology. This assumption connects learning about
novel risks at the post-market stage to the existing exemptions from liability for such
risks. We contend that the role of these exemptions is to offer firms that market products
based on novel technologies a form of discount on the expected harm. This ’experimen-
tation discount’ induces marketing beyond the static optimum, thereby supporting ex-
perimentation with the novel technology. Experimentation produces public and socially
valuable information on the risk characteristics of the technology. In this, our charac-
terization of the learning environment differs from the existing literature on uncertain
risks (Shavell 1992, Ben-Shahar 1998, Baumann and Friehe 2016) that focuses on the
care level and does not consider the relationship between the marketing-decision and
learning. In that bringing the novel technology to the market entails a positive infor-
mation externality for other firms considering to market a product based on the novel
technology, it is this exact link that enables us to give an explanation for the exemptions
tort law provides for novel and uncertain risks.
The article’s second contribution is of methodological nature. The article is the first
to formalize the post-market learning mechanism in a tort context. Based on the two
assumptions just outlined, we provide a framework in which the broader issues of reg-
ulation can be explored when learning at the post-market stage about uncertain risks
is relevant. For example, the framework can be connected to the literature on private
pre-market learning about uncertain risks (Shavell 1992, Ben-Shahar 1998).
We find that when liability regimes can be tailored to the specific novel technology at
hand, the social optimum can be implemented. However, the exemptions provided for
uncertain risks are general rules and not technology-specific. When the experimentation
discount cannot be tailored to specific novel technologies, which seems to be the more
realistic assumption, the choice of the discount has to trade off too little and too much
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experimentation across different novel technologies. Optimal experimentation for an
individual novel technology is determined by the prior probability that the technology is
hazardous, the information rate from marketing products based on the novel technology
and firms’ static benefits from marketing.
Lastly, the article is tightly linked to the literature on tort law and innovation. We
offer a new mechanism to support the longstanding claim that strict tort regimes can
cause innovative and novel products to be withheld from the market (Burk and Boczar
1993, Viscusi and Moore 1993, Finkelstein 2004) and the first one to explain this claim
with specific reference to state-of-the-art defenses and unknowable risks (Connolly 1965,
O’Reilly 1987, Fondazione Rosselli 2004).
The second article ”Establishing Causation in Climate Litigation: Admissibility
and Reliability” (with Martin Carrier, Timo Goeschl, Johannes Lenhard, Henrike
Martin, Ulrike Niemeier, Alexander Proelß, Hauke Schmidt) deals with the challenge
of causation in climate litigation. A key challenge in climate litigation is to establish
a causal link between a climate alteration, be it through greenhouse gas emissions or
solar geoengineering, and an adverse event, usually an extreme weather event. The
issue of causation is of preeminent concern in the climate litigation literature (Horton
et al. 2014, Reynolds 2015, Saxler et al. 2015, Marjanac et al. 2017). When the causal
link between action and effect cannot be correctly established in trials, liability regimes
are not able to provide correct incentives to the relevant agents and liability loses its
economic function. Establishing causation is not only a challenge in climate litigation,
but in litigation concerning novel technologies and risks – by the very nature of novel
risks and technologies – generally. This article thus connects article 1 and article 3, by
considering an issue of general importance in the tort law of novel risks and analyzing
it in the specific context of climate litigation.
Before I proceed to the paper’s contributions, I provide some background on the issue
at hand: Due to the inherent stochasticity of the climate system, attributing a single
extreme event to human intervention into the climate system with certainty is impos-
sible (Allen et al. 2007). The traditional legal ’but for’ test of deterministic necessary
causation is therefore not suitable here. However, attribution science may provide a
possibility to overcome that challenge (Allen 2003, Horton et al. 2014, Marjanac et al.
2017). Attribution science is concerned with making quantitative statements about the
relationship between human influence on the climate and the probability of occurrence
of specific extreme events (NAS 2016). However, in order to be considered by a court,
evidence based on attribution science must be legally admissible, otherwise it is excluded
from the trial, denying it a role in resolving causation. The specific type of attribution
science evidence we consider in this article are so-called Fraction of Attributable Risk
(FAR) estimates. We focus on FAR estimates, since they are the statistical equivalent
to the traditional ’but for’ test (Hannart et al. 2016).
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Against this background, the paper makes two contributions. The first is to demonstrate
that evidence not only needs to be legally admissible, but also needs to be epistemologi-
cally reliable for resolving the challenge of causation. Otherwise the causal link between
action (human climate alteration) and effect (extreme event) will typically not be cor-
rectly established in a trial. We show that rules on scientific evidence need to strike a
balance between, on the one hand, the admissibility of FAR evidence and, on the other,
maintaining the epistemological quality, i.e. the reliability, of FAR evidence. This means
that FAR can only be an effectual tool for resolving questions of causation if and to the
extent to which evidentiary standards used by courts adequately accommodate the type
of scientific evidence that FAR estimates represent. In highlighting the need to strike
this balance in rules of scientific evidence, the present paper contributes to an emerging
literature that assesses the potential of attribution science for solving the problem of
causation in climate litigation (Lusk 2017, Marjanac and Patton 2018).
The second contribution of the paper is to apply the first contribution to a specific pro-
posal for how to accommodate scientific evidence in evidentiary standards by modifying
an existing set of admissibility criteria. We use as the object of this application the
Daubert standard. This standard offers a set of specific criteria for admissibility and
applies to the United States, a jurisdiction in which climate liability suits already were
launched. We find that the five Daubert criteria would, unmodified, exclude all FAR
estimates on the basis of one criterion (’testability ’) and be inapplicable to FAR esti-
mates on another (’error rate’). A simple elimination of these two criteria would ensure
that FAR estimates are principally admissible, but would also allow parties to introduce
unreliable FAR estimates. We argue, however, that a modified set of criteria, includ-
ing criteria directly aiming at the reliability of the FAR estimates, would be capable of
leading to both admissible and reliable FAR estimates.
The third article ”A Model of Solar Geoengineering Liability” investigates the
incentives that liability regimes provide in the context of solar geoengineering (SG).
Although liability has been widely discussed as a potential instrument of SG governance
(Horton et al. 2014, Saxler et. al 2015, Reynolds 2015), an analytical examination of SG
liability is missing. In the light of the unique SG incentive structure, such an analysis
fills an important research gap.
The article’s first contribution is to provide an analytical, game-theoretic model of SG
liability. The key feature setting SG apart from more traditional domains of liability is
that it constitutes, following Weitzman’s terminology (Weitzman 2015), a public good-
or-bad. A public good-or-bad is a public good which benefits agents at some levels
and harms the same agents at other levels: Studies focusing on two of the most impor-
tant climate metrics, mean temperature and mean precipitation, suggest that moderate
amounts of SG would benefit most regions of the world (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012,
Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015) and that SG would only start to be detrimental to
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those regions’ welfare if provided beyond those moderate amounts. The public good-or-
bad characteristic impacts on the incentives a liability regime provides in two ways. The
first one is via the definition of harm, i.e. the question of which SG impacts have to be
compensated for. The second one is via the liability standards, i.e. the question of the
circumstances under which harm from SG has to be compensated for. Consequently, a
liability regime in the model consists of a definition of harm and a liability standard.
The reference point against which harm is measured or should be measured is not self-
evident for a public good-or-bad. One possibility is to use the victim’s position in a world
without any SG as reference point. I call this the absolute definition of harm. A second
possibility is to use the victim’s preferred provision level as reference point, a world in
which SG is not provided beyond the victim’s optimum. I call this the marginal definition
of harm. In contrast, in traditional liability settings the two definitions coincide. I
consider the two standard types of liability rules, strict liability and negligence. Strict
liability can be defined as in standard liability setting. In contrast, negligence uses a
behavioral standard in order to determine whether to assign liability. The traditional
economic interpretation of the negligence standard is that it balances the marginal costs
with the marginal benefits of avoiding harm. In a one-victim-one-injurer setting, there
is only one way to trade off marginal costs and benefits from avoiding harm. However,
the public good-or-bad SG constitutes a multiple-victim-third-party-beneficiary setting,
raising the question of whose costs and whose benefits are or should be traded off by
a negligence standard. I identify three ways of trading off the costs and benefits in
the SG setting, giving rise to the benefit-harm negligence standard, the aggregate harm
negligence standard and the individual harm negligence standard.
The performance of a liability regime is determined by its ability to account for both
the negative externality (the public bad aspect) and the positive externality (the public
good aspect) arising from SG provision. I find that only the combination of the marginal
definition of harm with the benefit-harm negligence standard is able to do so. This
liability regime is able to implement the socially optimal amount of SG. Liability regimes
arising from other combinations exhibit biases. These biases may be towards SG levels
too high, too low or of ambiguous direction, depending on the liability regime.
The second contribution of the article is derived from a numerical implementation of the
liability model. In estimating welfare in both the free-driver outcome (Weitzman 2015)
in absence of governance and in the presence of liability regimes, the article contributes
to the literature on the regional differences of SG impacts. For the implementation, I use
the Residual Climate Response (RCR) model (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012). The climate
model data stems from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (Kravitz et
al. 2011). I find that the extent of the free-driver problem depends on the metric chosen:
For a metric of mean temperature there is only moderate SG overprovison in the free-
driver outcome and SG is capable of reducing regional climate damages effectively even
in the absence of liability regimes. In contrast, there is drastic overprovision for a metric
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of mean precipitation in the free-driver outcome, implying a substantially lower climate
welfare than in the absence of any SG. However, when governed by any liability regime,
equilibrium SG is also welfare-enhancing in case of the mean precipitation metric. I
furthermore find that the choice of the definition of harm is more consequential than
the choice of the liability standard for the performance of a liability regime with the
marginal definition of harm outperforming the absolute definition of harm.
The fourth article ”Diverging Regional Climate Preferences and the Assess-
ment of Solar Geoengineering” introduces the possibility of regions having diverging
preferences from historic climate conditions into the assessment of regional differences
in SG impacts. The article is motivated by a shortcoming of the regional SG impact
literature. The literature assumes that regions have climate preferences corresponding
to some historic climate, e.g. 1990 or preindustrial climate conditions. Heyen et al.
(2015) criticize that assumption and show by an illustrative example that diverging cli-
mate preferences have the potential to substantially alter the assessment of regional SG
impacts. The article is related to article 3 in that it helps to overcome a shortcoming in
the assessment literature that affects the contribution of the numerical implementation
in article 3.
The first contribution of this article is to formally extend the RCR model (Moreno-
Cruz et al. 2012) by allowing regions to have temperature preferences diverging from
historic climate conditions. The article delivers the theoretical insight that the impact
of diverging preferences can be split into two components. The first component changes
the optimal, welfare maximizing, SG level, but does not affect regional disagreement
over the SG level. The second component leaves the optimal SG level unaffected, but
changes regional disagreement over SG. This decomposition helps in understanding how
specific diverging preferences affect globally optimal SG and the disagreement over SG
by different regions. I propose three different aspects of SG performance for evaluation.
The first is relative effectiveness in damage compensation. This aspect measures in
percent by how much optimal SG can reduce climate damages on the regional level.
The second aspect measures the maximum climate welfare in terms of the minimum
damage level that SG can implement. The third one measures the gross value of SG in
terms of the maximum damage reduction it can achieve.
A numerical implementation in which high-latitude regions prefer higher temperatures
and low-latitude regions prefer lower temperatures yields two main results. Firstly, it
shows that the performance of optimal SG relative to the absence of diverging prefer-
ences depends on the aspect of SG performance one is interested in. The presence of
diverging preferences may change SG performance in either direction and the direction
generally depends on which of the three aspects of SG performance is considered. Sec-
ondly, the results from the implementation suggest two welfare implications. The first
is that the maximum climate welfare that SG can implement may increase with the
introduction of diverging temperature preferences. However, such a positive change in
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maximum climate welfare only occurs when diverging temperature preferences are small
in magnitude compared to the average climate change induced warming. The second
implication is that the maximum climate welfare is often higher than climate welfare
in the historic climate, i.e. in the climate before CO2 driven temperature changes set
in. These implications demonstrate that diverging climate preferences do not necessar-
ily lower SG performance, at least when optimal SG can be implemented. I argue that
these implications are likely to emerge more generally in scenarios in which high-latitude
regions prefer higher temperatures and low-latitude regions prefer lower temperatures.
Outlook
Since the four articles contained in this dissertation draw separate conclusions regarding
their specific research questions, I do not include a separate concluding section at the
end of this dissertation. In lieu I will briefly summarize the four articles’ contribution in
the following and provide a short outlook regarding potential future research questions
emerging from this dissertation.
The first part of the dissertation examines the relationship between liability rules and
novel technologies from a general perspective. Specifically, it investigates the interaction
between public learning about novel risks at the post-market stage and liability rules. Its
core result is that the positive information externality emerging from public post-market
learning can justify exemptions from liability for harm caused by novel and uncertain
risks, thereby providing an economic rationale for existing exemptions for such risks.
The second part of this dissertation has its focus on one specific novel technology, so-
lar geoengineering (SG). The three articles in the second part either examine incentive
structures relevant to SG liability or provide valuable input for understanding strategic
aspects of SG. The second article provides an analysis of the challenge of causation in
the specific context of climate litigation. By examining the incentive structure of evi-
dence production, it draws conclusions about the characteristics that legal standards of
evidence production need to have in order to enable attribution science to play a role
in solving the problem of causation in climate litigation. The third article delivers an
analytical model of SG liability and illuminates how the unique SG incentive structure
translates into settings of SG liability. The fourth article contributes to understanding
the structure of regional SG disagreement by extending the Residual Climate Response
model (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012) to settings in which regions have diverging climate
preferences. In that better knowledge regarding the structure of regional SG disagree-
ment helps to better understand the incentives that individual agents or regions have in
strategic SG settings, it also contributes to understanding strategic aspects of SG and
SG incentive structures.
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This dissertation gives rise to potential future research along several dimensions. Firstly,
integrating the possibility of diverging climate preferences into strategic SG settings
promises further insights both into the structure of the strategic aspects in these set-
tings, as well as into the ensuing consequences for climate welfare. At least three relevant
settings come to mind in which the presence of diverging preferences could have a dis-
cernible effect. The first and simplest is the free-driver incentive structure in absence
of governance. In the second type of settings, some form of governance is present, e.g.
liability. A third type of setting is ’coalition games’ (Ricke et al. 2013). In these settings,
there is no governance, but a minimum amount of international power is required for
deploying SG.
The other two dimensions revolve around issues of learning: Secondly, the central theme
of the first part, learning about novel risks, is clearly of great importance in the context
of SG as well. There is literature on the intertemporal aspects of SG technology develop-
ment (Goeschl et al. 2013) and on the intertemporal aspects of optimal decision-making
regarding research into potential SG side effects (Quaas et al. 2017) in the face of uncer-
tain climate sensitivity and uncertain future abatement choices. This literature focuses
on intergenerational aspects, thus abstracting from intragenerational heterogeneity in
SG impacts and preferences. However, there may well be conflict about the develop-
ment of SG stemming from intragenerational heterogeneity (Heyen 2016) and the same
may apply to SG risk research. Introducing intragenerational heterogeneity into that
literature could lead to far-reaching insights into the intertemporal aspects of SG incen-
tive structures and SG governance, as well as into the strategic aspects of intertemporal
decision-making on SG.
Lastly, learning from risk research is a complement to the post-market learning setting
considered in the first article of this dissertation. Learning about risks from novel tech-
nologies usually takes place in part by pre-market learning from testing (Shavell 1992,
Ben-Shahar 1998) and in part by post-market learning from experience. Bringing to-
gether these two stages of learning about novels risks is likely to reveal new insights.
In particular, the question of the optimal point in time for switching from pre-market
to post-market learning and its interaction with liability regulation, as well as with
instruments of direct regulation, is an important and exciting topic for further research.
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2.1 Introduction
Nanotechnology, biotechnology, novel chemicals – novel technologies and their applica-
tions shape and transform life in modern society. While promising significant benefits to
society, their introduction also creates novel and uncertain risks to consumers, workers,
third parties or the environment. Liability regimes aim at providing adequate incentives
for optimally balancing expected harm, precaution expenditures, and benefits from risky
activities. In contrast to well-introduced products and technologies with abundant ex-
periential information, society by definition still has to learn about the nature and scope
of novel and uncertain risks. Beyond their usual static incentive effects, liability regimes
influence whether and how such novel products and technologies are introduced, thereby
entailing dynamic learning effects regarding the novel and uncertain risks in question.
The injurer’s information about a risk that has materialized into harm occupies a pre-
eminent role in tort law: Questions of foreseeability, of how to deal with unknowable
risks and whether to grant state-of-the-art defenses1 for such risks are ubiquitous. In
the aftermath of the introduction of strict products liability in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts in the US, various legal commentators strongly argued for state-of-the-art
defenses and against liability for unknowable risks (Connolly 1965, Byrne 1973, Robb
1982, Murray 1982). Subsequently, several states enacted state-of-the-art provisions
and courts rejected strict products liability for unknowable risks (Owen 2010).2 This
trend culminated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, limiting in-
jurers’ liability to ”foreseeable risks of harm”. In Europe, both the European Products
Liability Directive 85/374/EEC and the European Environmental Liability Directive
2004/35/CE provide state-of-the-art defenses. The state-of-the-art defense is ”in prin-
ciple available in all but a very small number of jurisdictions” in the world (Reimann
2003). In contrast, the classic analysis of liability rules in the context of uncertain risks
finds that strict liability implements the social optimum (Shavell 1992). Why is it then
that most of modern law shields injurers, at least to some extent, from liability for novel
and uncertain risks?
In this paper we provide an economic rationale for this phenomenon. Our theory rests
on two assumptions. The first assumption is that experiential learning about uncertain
risks at the post-market stage is essential. This sort of learning is public and creates
information spillovers to other potential injurers. The assumption is contrary to the
1By a state-of-the-art defense, we mean an affirmative defense which refers to the scientific knowledge
at the time when an activity was carried out or a product marketed, not an industry standard for care
as it is sometimes understood.
2A turning point was the New Jersey Supreme Court decisions taken in Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp. (an asbestos case) and Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories (a drug side effects case) in
1982 and 1984, respectively. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the defendants motion to strike
a state-of-the-art defense in the former as irrelevant in a strict liability case. Only two years later, the
same court held in the latter case that there is only ”a duty to warn [...] based on reasonably obtainable
or available knowledge”. Owen (2010) covers the fascinating story of the rise and fall of strict products
liability in the US in depth.
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classic literature on uncertain risks (Shavell 1992, Ben-Shahar 1998). There, injurers
can ex-ante privately acquire perfect information about the risk. In such a setting,
learning does not affect other potential injurers and strict liability is always first best.
Our notion of learning has more in common with models in which the injurer’s care
choice in period 1 determines learning about the true care-harm technology for a second
period (Baumann and Friehe 2016). Here, strict liability can be inferior to a negligence
rule that employs a dynamically optimal due care level, given the presence of other
potential injurers. In our setting, injurers are firms that market products and learning
occurs of the risk properties of a novel technology.
The second assumption is that learning depends on the cumulative market experience
with the novel technology. This assumption connects learning about novel risks at
the post-market stage to existing exemptions from liability for such risks. We contend
that the role of these exemptions is to offer firms that market products based on novel
technologies a form of discount on the expected harm. This ’experimentation discount’
induces marketing beyond the static optimum, thereby supporting experimentation with
the novel technology. Experimentation produces public and socially valuable information
on the risk characteristics of the technology. The cost of information production via
experimentation is excessive marketing, implying excessive exposure of other parties to
the potential risk, from a static perspective. In this, our characterization of the learning
environment differs from the existing literature on uncertain risks (Shavell 1992, Ben-
Shahar 1998, Baumann and Friehe 2016) that focuses on the care level and does not
consider the relationship between the marketing-decision and learning.
The absence of formal models that capture the importance of actual market experience
for learning about novel and uncertain risks contrasts with the legal literature that
informally acknowledged this link already at the time of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts: Kessler (1967) submitted that ”[s]ufficient user experience is indispensable to
research and making the supplier a guarantor of safety without such research may be
regarded as too burdensome.”, a view that was adopted and cited by the US Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in case on side effects of the drug ’Aralen’ (Lydia Basko
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., and Winthrop Laboratories, 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969)). A
similar stance has been taken by the US Court of Appeals of California in a warning
case on the same drug (Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Civ. No. 27014,
Court of Appeals of California, 1971 ).
The contribution of this paper is threefold: Firstly, we deliver an economic rationale
for the exemptions tort law provides for novel and uncertain risks. Secondly, by doing
so, this paper is the first to formalize the post-market learning mechanism in a tort
context. Thirdly, we provide a framework in which the broader issues of regulation
can be explored when learning at the post-market about uncertain risks is relevant and
which can be connected to the literature on private pre-market learning about uncertain
risks.
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The framework that this paper provides has three main building blocks, an information
structure, a market structure, and a tort law structure. The information structure in
our model builds on Shavell’s (1992) two-period model of private learning: There is a
novel technology which is hazardous with probability p and safe with probability 1− p
(Shavell 1992). Firms can market products and applications of this novel technology.
The technology’s risk is generic: Either all applications are hazardous or none is. In
case the novel technology is hazardous, there is a standard harm function h(x) which
depends on care x (which can be thought of as pre-market testing and post-market mon-
itoring) and is the same for all applications. For reasons of tractability, we first-order
approximate the relationship between cumulative market experience in period 1 and
the societal value of information from learning for period 2 is chosen with a piecewise
linear function: The value of information linearly increases with the cumulative market
experience until a threshold is reached at which information is perfect. The slope of the
value of information, i.e. the rate at which marketing the technology produces informa-
tion, determines the full information threshold, which marks the passage from additional
marketing being informationally productive to it being informationally unproductive.
The market structure in the model is purposefully simplified and willfully disregards
strategic learning between firms (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien et al. 1992,
Amir 1996): Each firm has developed exactly one application of the novel technology
and faces a binary marketing-decision in each period. Different applications belong to
different markets and do not interact. The private benefits from marketing are heteroge-
neous across firms and are net of any direct costs. A firm’s marketing-decision depends
on the relative size of its private benefits compared to care costs and expected liability
payments.
The tort law structure is captured in a single parameter, the experimentation discount,
that we formally introduce at the beginning of section 2.2. The concept follows Landes
and Posner (1985): Under a strict liability regime, the experimentation discount is zero
and the firm has to bear the full total accident costs. We contrast this with experimen-
tation regimes for which the experimentation discount is positive and a firm’s expected
exposure to liability is therefore smaller than expected harm, leading to experimentation
with the novel technology. The largest experimentation discount possible is afforded to
by standard negligence. Possible experimentation discounts form a continuum, reflecting
differences in existing regimes at least along two dimensions – the scope of the exemption
granted and the burden of proof. An example for a high experimentation discount is
product liability in the Restatement (Third) of Torts (all unforeseeable harm excluded,
burden of proof lies on plaintiff). An example for a low experimentation discount is the
European Products Liability Directive (state of scientific knowledge must have precluded
discovering the defect, burden of proof on defendant) (Howells and Mildred 1997).3
3For example, provisions in US states range from placing the burden of proof that the harm was
foreseeable, through rebuttable presumptions of nondefectiveness for products confirming to the state of
the art, to affirmative state-of-the-art defenses which place the burden of proof on the defendant (Owen
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Nanotechnology provides an illustration of our setting: One prominent class of nan-
otechnology are carbon nanotubes (CNT), other classes are nanowires and semiconduc-
tor nanocrystals. CNTs correspond to the novel technology in our model. CNTs have
potential applications in areas as different as cancer diagnosis and treatment, recharge-
able batteries, automotive parts, microelectronics and sporting goods (Ji et al. 2010,
De Volder et al. 2013). These potential applications offer very different private benefits
to firms developing and marketing them. At the same time they share common but
uncertain risks, for example asbestos-like pathogenicity (Poland et al. 2008, Kostarelos
2008).
Strict liability implements the static optimum and is first-best if and only if optimal
experimentation is zero. In case optimal experimentation is strictly positive, but not
larger than experimentation implemented by standard negligence, there is an experi-
mentation discount implementing optimal experimentation. When liability regimes can
be tailored to the specific novel technology at hand, the social optimum can then be
implemented. However, the exemptions provided for uncertain risks are general rules
and not technology-specific. Courts have to adhere to those general rules, such that the
first-best does not seem to be viable in the real world.
When the experimentation discount can not be tailored to specific novel technologies,
the choice of the discount has to trade off too little and too much experimentation
across different novel technologies. Comparatively narrow experimentation regimes, like
the European Products Liability Directive, choose differently than regimes with higher
experimentation discounts, like the one given by the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability. For a given technology, there is a (possibly empty) range of exper-
imentation discounts which are superior to strict liability. In case the discount is too
large, too many firms are incentivized to market and the costs of experimentation are
larger than its value. In case the discount is too small, too little firms market – in the
absence of marketing in the static optimum potentially even none.
Three factors determine the model: the prior probability that the technology is haz-
ardous, the information rate from marketing applications of the novel technology and
the difference between the sizes of the largest private benefits and the total accident
costs, the ’initial net benefits’. Positive initial net benefits imply positive marketing
in the static optimum, negative ones set the initial marginal costs of experimentation.
We make three main observations regarding how these factors: Firstly, optimal exper-
imentation is positive in case static marketing is positive, but not necessarily if static
marketing is zero. The reason is that the initial marginal costs of experimentation are
zero in the former case, but not in the latter. Secondly, optimal experimentation is the
most valuable and the largest when the initial net benefits are zero, since the marginal
2010). Similarly, there are also increments in the potential scope of the exemptions, e.g. the European
Liability Directive demands that harm arising from an activity must have been ”not considered likely
to cause environmental damage according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge” in order to
shield an injurer from liability.
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costs of experimentation are lowest and value of information maximal. In contrast, the
maximum experimentation discount for an experimentation regime to be superior to
strict liability is in general not largest when the initial net benefits are zero. The rea-
son is that the initial net benefits not only determine the costs of experimentation, but
also the amount of experimentation in case the experimentation discount is not a choice
variable. Thirdly, a larger information rate increases the maximum experimentation
discount in case static marketing is zero, but may increase or decrease the maximum
experimentation discount in case static marketing is positive: The reason is that a higher
information rate not only increases the marginal value of experimentation, but also in-
creases the share of the value of information realized by a positive amount of statically
optimal marketing.
Besides the literature on tort law and learning (Shavell 1992, Ben-Shahar 1998, Bau-
mann and Friehe 2016), this paper is tightly linked to the literature on tort law and
innovation. Immordino et al. (2011) provided an explanation for the claim that strict
tort law is detrimental to product innovation (Burk and Boczar 1993, Viscusi and Moore
1993, Finkelstein 2004). In their model a single innovator is perfectly and privately in-
formed about her innovation’s risk characteristics after innovation, but before marketing
(which takes place for every innovation). In this setting harsher regulation, be it ex-ante
or ex-post, reduces innovation by a general deterrence effect, because the innovator only
learns the product’s risk characteristics once R&D is over. We provide an alternative
mechanism. In our model the firm is itself not perfectly informed about the product’s
risk characteristics before marketing. The decisive step here is not the innovation, but
actually bringing the product to the market. Experimentation regimes lead to exper-
imentative marketing of products. This experimentation is informationally productive
and leads to other products with the same risk characteristics being marketed later on,
in case the underlying novel technology proves to be safe. Our mechanism gives an ex-
planation for why specifically liability exemptions referring to the informational status
like state-of-the-art defenses (Connolly 1965, O’Reilly 1987, Fondazione Rosselli 2004)
are discussed as advancing product innovation.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model. In section 2.3
the concepts of the value of information and the cost of experimentation are introduced.
On this basis we then examine the socially optimal behavior. Section 2.4 analyzes
the relative and absolute performance of strict liability and experimentation regimes. In
section 2.5 we discuss extensions and the the impact of our information modeling choices
on our results. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 The Model
A novel technology with multiple potential applications (e.g. carbon nanotubes) is at
the center of our model. Different firms can independently market the novel technology’s
potential applications with each firm having developed exactly one application. These
applications sell on different markets and are neither substitutes nor complements. The
technology might be hazardous. From prior scientific laboratory research, a common
and public societal belief regarding the likelihood of the technology being hazardous has
emerged, but further information cannot be deduced from research. Only experience
with the technology at the post-market stage can eliminate the uncertainty regarding
the risk. With probability p the technology is hazardous, with probability 1 − p it is
safe. All agents share this prior.
The technology’s potential hazard is generic: In case the technology is actually haz-
ardous, marketing a specific application is associated with expected harm h(x) to other
parties. The harm function is the same for all applications. Expected harm can be
reduced by investment into precautions, the care level x. We employ the usual assump-
tions h′(x) < 0 and h′′(x) > 0. There is a unit continuum of firms and firms’ private
benefits from bringing their application to the market are heterogeneous: Firm n derives
a private benefit b(n) = 1− n from marketing their application.
There are two periods. Firms decide whether to market their application in period 1
and, if so, choose the amount of care. In period 2 firms can revisit their decisions: They
can e.g. market their application if they had not done so in period 1 or they can retract
their application. The marketing of applications in period 1 implies experience with the
technology which leads to public learning about whether the technology is hazardous. If
society learns about the true state of the world, firms can base their decisions in period
2 on this knowledge. The total value from this advantage in decision-making to society
is the value of perfect information (VOPI). This VOPI is an upper bound on the public
value of information derived from experience with the technology at the post-market
stage.
For reasons of tractability, we linearly approximate the analytical relationship between
the amount of applications marketed in period 1 and the public value of information
produced.4 The parameter characterizing the relationship is the full information thresh-
old ninfo: If at least ninfo firms market their application in period 1, uncertainty is
resolved and society learns about the true state of the world for sure. If n < ninfo firms
market their application, uncertainty is resolved with probability nninfo and with proba-
bility 1− nninfo no learning takes place. The expected value of information is therefore a
piecewise linear function with positive slope up to ninfo and a zero slope beyond ninfo.
4For further discussion, we refer the reader to the penultimate section of this paper.
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We characterize liability regimes by the concept of the experimentation discount. De-
pending on the liability regime, firms marketing an application involving uncertain risks
do not have to bear all of the expected harm. The experimentation discount D summa-
rizes, in a single parameter, the reduction in liability-related costs a non-negligent firm is
afforded to under a specific regime. Given the experimentation discount, a non-negligent
firm’s total accident payments (care costs plus expected liability) are
(1−D) · (x∗ + ph(x∗)).
The experimentation discount identifies a liability regime and lies between zero and
one, where a discount of zero is equivalent to strict liability.5 We will refer to liability
regimes with a strictly positive experimentation discount as experimentation regimes.
We restrict our attention to the non-trivial situation in which technologies known to be
hazardous (p = 1) incur higher accident costs x+ h(x) than the benefits of any of their
application b(n) generate.
In our model, both the initial firm’s private benefits from marketing and the number
of firms (and applications) are normalized to one. We will show in section 2.5 that an
extension of the model to allowing for different levels of private benefits from marketing
to firms or to allowing for different numbers of firms and applications does not extend
the model in substance. This implies that the findings in our model easily generalize to
different levels of private benefits and different numbers of applications of firms: It will
turn out that all costs and benefits can be interpreted as a fraction of the initial firm’s
private benefits and that the number of firms can be interpreted as a share of firms.
2.3 Social Optimum
We first examine socially optimal behavior in the second period. Afterwards, we in-
troduce the value of information and the costs of experimentation in order to discuss
socially optimal behavior in the first period.
5On a deeper level, two components jointly determine the experimentation discount. The first is the
liability regime in force, which allows non-negligent firms to escape liability in a share d of cases. The
second is the share f of expected harm in total accident costs in equilibrium f = ph(x
∗)
x∗+ph(x∗) . Using d
and f , we can rewrite the total accident payments as
x∗ + (1− d) · ph(x∗) = (1− d · f) · (x∗ + ph(x∗)).
The experimentation discount D is then nothing else but the product D = d · f . This implies that
standard negligence (d = 1) corresponds to to an experimentation discount of f . Obviously, f is en-
dogenously determined by expected harm ph(x) and determines the maximum experimentation discount
feasible for a given novel technology.
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2.3.1 The Static Benchmark and Social Optimum in Period 2
We first discuss the static benchmark in which only expected payoffs for the current
period are of interest and potential future gains from learning are disregarded. The
results of this discussion correspond to those of the standard liability model (Shavell
1980), but show how these known results translate into our setting of a continuum of
firms.
Total expected accident costs for each firm are
x+ p · h(x).
The statically optimal care level x∗S is the same for all firms and fulfills
1 + p · h′(xS) = 0.
The socially optimal marketing-decision from a static point of view depends on the firms’
private benefits b(n) and the total expected accident costs. The private benefits curve
b(n) less the total accident costs x∗S + p · h(x∗S) gives the static net benefits curve
B(n) = b(n)− x∗S − p · h(x∗S) = 1− x∗S − p · h(x∗S)− n.
Firms’ applications should be marketed from a static perspective where the static net
benefits curve is positive. The initial firm’s static net benefits from marketing determine
whether any marketing at all is optimal from a static point of view, and if so, how much
of it. From now on we denote
BSOC ≡ 1− x∗S − p · h(x∗S)
and refer, slightly inaccurate but succinctly, to BSOC as the ’initial net benefits’ from
marketing. The initial net benefits are the initial firm’s private benefits less the total
accident costs. Since the maximum private benefits are normalized to one, the initial
net benefits can be expressed in terms of the total accident costs and vice versa:
1−BSOC = x∗S + ph(x∗S).
In case the initial net benefits are negative, even the initial firm’s private benefits are
smaller than the total accident costs and no firm’s application should be marketed from
a static perspective. In case the initial net benefits are positive, the first BSOC firms
should market from a static perspective, since those firms’ private benefits exceed the
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total accident costs. The amount of marketing in the social optimum is therefore
n∗S =
BSOC if BSOC ≥ 00 if BSOC < 0
If the novel technology is known to be hazardous (p = 1), the initial net benefits are
negative and firms should not market, since we assume b(n) < x+ h(x) for all firms. In
contrast, if the technology is known to be safe (p = 0), there is no negative externality
and all firms should market.
There is no learning opportunity in period 2. The static benchmark therefore fully
describes socially optimal behavior in the second period. Note, that socially optimal
behavior in period 2 depends on the state of information p inherited from period 1.
Lemma 1.
The social optimum in period 2 is characterized by statically optimal behavior x∗S and
n∗S.
2.3.2 The Value and the Cost of Experimentation
The rationale for society to undertake experimentation is the value of information from
learning the real state of the world. Experimentation is the difference between actual
marketing and statically optimal marketing.
nexp = n− n∗S
The value of information captures the informational benefit from all marketing, includ-
ing marketing which would have been undertaken for static reasons alone. The value
of experimentation is restricted to the informational benefits of pure experimentation.
We now introduce the value of information and then derive on this basis the value of
experimentation. We then turn towards the costs of experimentation.
Since the choice of care does not influence whether information is revealed or not in
our model, dynamically optimal care is always identical to statically optimal care. The
social optimum in period 1 is therefore fully described by the optimal amount of exper-
imentation, since experimentation determines the total amount of marketing.
2.3.2.1 The Value of Information
Society’s value to learning p’s true value, the value of perfect information (VOPI), equals
the expected welfare difference between optimal behavior under resolved and unresolved
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uncertainty in period 2. It is derived from better decision-making in period 2. This
value is therefore created in period 1, but materializes in period 2. Since the social
planner can always induce socially optimal behavior in period 2 by implementing strict
liability (see section 2.4), this value is simply the expected difference in welfare between
socially optimal behavior under perfect information and socially optimal behavior under
uncertainty.
After information has been revealed, there are two possible states in period 2: Either, the
technology is hazardous and no firm should market their application or the technology is
safe and all firms should market. In the first case welfare is zero, in the second case wel-
fare is 12 . Under uncertainty, welfare given socially optimal behavior is
1
2 max[0, BSOC ]
2.
Taking into account the respective ex-ante probabilities of the technology being haz-
ardous or safe, the expected value of perfect information is
VOPI =
[
p · 0 + (1− p) · 1
2
]
− 1
2
max [0, BSOC ]
2 =
12(1− p)− 12B2SOC if BSOC ≥ 01
2(1− p) if BSOC < 0
The VOPI arises from better decisions regarding whether to market applications and
the choice of care levels compared to making these decisions under uncertainty. It is the
expected difference between welfare after information has been revealed and welfare in
the no information baseline. All else being equal, the VOPI gets smaller as welfare in the
no information baseline gets larger, i.e. the more positive the initial net benefits from
marketing become. Any change in the non-positive domain of the initial net benefits does
not change the VOPI, since it does not change welfare in the no information baseline.
The smaller the prior probability of the technology being hazardous, the larger the prior
expectation of receiving favorable information. This effect increases the VOPI. However,
a change in the prior implies an indirect change in expected harm and the optimal care
level. This changes the initial net benefits – the smaller p, the larger BSOC . For non-
negative initial net benefits, a smaller prior therefore not necessarily increases the VOPI.
Whether this is the case or not depends on the exact harm function in place and is in
general ambiguous. In discussing the effects of the prior, we will from now on only
consider the direct effect. The direction of the indirect effect follows from the discussion
of the initial net benefits. When both effects point into the same direction the net effect
is evident, if they point into opposing directions, the net effect is ambiguous and depends
on the harm function.
The probability of learning the true state of the world increases linearly in the amount
of marketing. The marginal value of information from marketing the novel technology’s
applications is therefore constant and with at least ninfo firms marketing the full value
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of perfect information is appropriated. The value of information is
VOI =

n
ninfo
·VOPI if n < ninfo
VOPI if n ≥ ninfo
The marginal value of information is the product of the VOPI and the information rate,
i.e. the inverse of the full information threshold:
rinfo =
1
ninfo
.
The higher the VOPI, the larger the expected value of what can be learned. The
higher the information rate, the faster learning occurs and the faster the full VOPI is
appropriated, so that further marketing then does not deliver any further information.
2.3.2.2 The Value of Experimentation
The value of experimentation is the value of the information generated by experimenta-
tion on top of the information which would have been generated in the static optimum.
In case there is not any marketing in the static optimum there is no difference between
the value of information and the value of experimentation. However, in case there is
marketing in the static optimum, the value of information generated by the first n∗S
firms has to be subtracted from the value of information in order to obtain the value of
experimentation.
0 n∗S ninfo n
∗
S + nexp 1
0 n∗S n
∗
S + nexp ninfo 1
Figure 2.1: Comparison of the value of information and the value of experimentation
for positive marketing in the static optimum. The dashed line represents the value
of information generated by all marketing, the solid line the value of experimentation.
The difference is the value of information which would have been generated in the static
optimum.
The value of experimentation is linear in the amount of marketing as long as the total
amount of marketing is below the full information threshold. In case the total amount
of marketing is above the full information threshold, some of the experimentation is
superfluous and does not yield any informational benefit. There are then three options.
If even marketing in the static optimum is larger than the full information threshold,
there is no value of experimentation. If marketing in the static optimum is zero the value
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of experimentation is the entire VOPI. And, lastly, if static marketing is in between, the
value of experimentation is the fraction of the VOPI which is realized by experimentation
– as opposed to the marketing which would have taken place in the static optimum
anyways.
If the total amount of marketing is above the full information threshold, all informational
value which can be potentially derived from experimentation is realized. The value of
experimentation then equals the maximum value of experimentation (MVOE) in this
setting.
Lemma 2.
1. The relationship between the value of experimentation and the value of information
is
VOE = max
[
0,
(
1− max[BSOC , 0]
ninfo
)]
·VOI
2. i) If total marketing is smaller than the full information threshold (n < ninfo),
the value of experimentation is
VOE =
nexp
ninfo
·VOPI
ii) If total marketing is larger than the full information threshold (n ≥ ninfo),
the value of experimentation is
VOE = VOPI ·

1 if BSOC < 0
1− BSOCninfo if 0 ≤ BSOC < ninfo
0 if BSOC ≥ ninfo
This constitutes the maximum value of experimentation.
The marginal value of experimentation equals the marginal value of information: It is
the information rate times the VOPI, if total marketing is below the full information
threshold and zero if total marketing is above the full information threshold. The max-
imum value of experimentation depends on the VOPI and the fraction of marketing
below the full information threshold which is not covered by marketing in the static
optimum. This means that an increase in the information rate reduces the value of
experimentation, if marketing in the static optimum is positive and total marketing is
larger than the full information threshold. The reason is that in this case more of what
can be learned is already learned under static marketing, leaving less information to be
acquired by experimentation.
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2.3.2.3 The Cost of Experimentation
The cost of experimentation is the welfare society has to give up in order to create
additional information from experimentation. This is the expected static loss in period
1 implied by the deviation from statically optimal marketing.
Figure 2.2: The costs of experimentation. The expected total accident costs per firm
marketing is the difference between the private benefits and the static net benefits. The
cost of experimentation from n > n∗S firms marketing is the static loss from doing so
(the hatched area). Left: BSOC ≤ 0, therefore n∗S = 0. The marginal costs of experi-
mentation can be decomposed into the constant part −BSOC and a linearly increasing
part. Right: BSOC > 0, therefore n
∗
S = BSOC . The marginal costs of experimentation
solely consists of the linearly increasing part.
In case the statically optimal number of firms is positive, the difference between static
societal benefits and costs from the marginal firm marketing their application is zero.
Therefore, the marginal loss related to the first firm experimenting is zero. The marginal
loss increases linearly, since the subsequent firms’ private benefit decreases linearly. If
the statically optimal number of firms is zero, even the expected societal value from the
first firm marketing is negative. Therefore, the first unit of experimentation involves a
strictly positive static loss, which then also increases linearly.
Lemma 3. The cost of experimentation is
COE =
12 · n2exp if BSOC ≥ 0−BSOC · nexp + 12 · n2exp if BSOC < 0
The costs of experimentation to society are convex in the amount of marketing, since
firms are heterogeneous in their private benefits. The initial net benefits BSOC determine
the marginal costs of experimentation: If they are non-negative, the initial marginal
costs of experimentation are zero and the marginal costs of experimentation curves are
the same for all non-negative initial net benefits. However, if they are negative, the
initial marginal costs of experimentation are positive, shifting the marginal costs of
experimentation curve upwards. The more negative the initial net benefits, the larger
the (initial) marginal costs of experimentation.
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2.3.3 Dynamic Social Optimum in Period 1
Dynamic considerations may render some experimentation optimal in period 1. Some
experimentation is optimal if the initial marginal benefits of experimentation are larger
than its initial marginal costs. This can be expressed in a minimum information rate
for some experimentation to be optimal. However, if marketing in the static optimum
is positive, there also exists a maximum information rate for experimentation to be
optimal, since all information may be gathered due to marketing in the static optimum.
If the initial net benefit are non-negative, the initial marginal costs of experimentation
are zero. Except for the case that marketing in the static optimum exceeds the full
information threshold, the marginal benefits from the first unit of experimentation are
strictly positive and some experimentation is then always optimal. If the initial net
benefits are negative, the initial marginal costs of experimentation are strictly positive.
Some experimentation is then optimal if and only if the initial marginal benefit of ex-
perimentation, the information rate times the VOPI, is larger than the initial marginal
costs of experimentation, i.e. the initial marginal static loss −BSOC . For negative initial
net benefits, an increase in the initial net benefits therefore lowers the minimum infor-
mation rate, while an increase results in a decrease in the maximum information rate if
the initial marginal benefits are positive. A decrease in the prior probability p that the
technology is hazardous decreases the minimum information rate for negative initial net
benefits: Such a decrease increases the chances of receiving favorable information about
the true state of the world, thereby increasing the VOPI.
The optimal amount of experimentation is determined by the intersection of its marginal
benefits and costs. However, it is constrained from above by the full information thresh-
old ninfo. This may lead to corner solutions.
Proposition 1.
1. The socially optimal care level in period 1 equals the statically optimal care level
x∗S.
2. If marketing in the static optimum is at least as large as the full information
threshold, experimentation is never optimal. Otherwise, if the initial net benefits
are non-negative, some experimentation is always optimal. If the initial net benefits
are negative, some experimentation is optimal if and only if the information rate
times the VOPI is larger than its initial marginal costs. This can be expressed in
terms of minimum and maximum information rates for some experimentation to
be optimal:
rmin,optinfo =
0 if BSOC ≥ 0−BSOCVOPI if BSOC < 0
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rmax,optinfo =
 1BSOC if BSOC ≥ 0∞ if BSOC < 0
3. The optimal amount of experimentation is
n∗exp =
min [rinfo ·VOPI,max [0, ninfo −BSOC ]] if BSOC ≥ 0
min [max [0, BSOC + rinfo ·VOPI] , ninfo] if BSOC < 0
The marginal value of experimentation is the largest when the initial net benefits are
non-positive, since the VOPI is then the largest. The marginal costs of experimentation
are the smallest when the initial net benefits are non-negative. Therefore, the optimal
amount of experimentation and the net value of experimentation to society are largest
if the initial net benefits are zero. Higher information rates increase the initial marginal
value of experimentation, but at the same time tighten the constraint on the maximum
productive amount of experimentation. Higher information rates therefore initially in-
crease the optimal amount of experimentation, but only until the constraint becomes
binding and the optimal amount of experimentation then decreases with further in-
creases in the information rate: The faster learning initially occurs, the higher the value
of marketing, but the faster everything of value is learned. A lower prior probability
that the technology is hazardous increases the VOPI. It therefore increases the marginal
value of experimentation, hence the optimal amount of experimentation.
2.4 Liability Regulation
We will now examine the incentives liability regimes provide for different firms regarding
their marketing decisions and the ensuing welfare consequences. If the risk is uncertain
at the time of the marketing decision, the injurer receives an experimentation discount
on the expected harm if she exerts due care x∗S . An experimentation discount of zero
corresponds to strict liability. We refer to all liability regimes with strictly positive
experimentation discount as experimentation regimes. The experimentation discount
determines how much less a firm’s total accident payments are compared to the total ac-
cident costs. Given the experimentation discount D, an injurer’s expected total accident
payments are
(1−D) · (x∗S + ph(x∗S)).
The experimentation discount determines, in relative terms, how much of the negative
externality is not internalized in equilibrium by firms marketing their applications.
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In general, the maximum experimentation discount feasible is one. However, for a given
novel technology the maximum experimentation discount is
f =
ph(x∗)
x∗ + ph(x∗)
,
corresponding to standard negligence. In our analysis, we will allow for all experimen-
tation discounts between zero and one. However, for a specific technology, only experi-
mentation discounts up to f are feasible. Where relevant, we will explicitly discuss the
implications.
2.4.1 Behavior under Liability Regimes
Since every single firm’s marketing-decision is non-pivotal for information acquisition,
firms do not have any strategic considerations regarding the learning effects of their
marketing-decisions. Firms’ incentives to market their application are therefore deter-
mined by their expected static pay-off. Given the same state of information, a given
liability regime leads to the same behavior in both periods. If uncertainty about the
risk is resolved, experimentation regimes do not offer any experimentation discount. In
that case, experimentation regimes are not different from strict liability.
Since any experimentation discount is conditional on the firm exerting due care, firms will
choose the socially optimal care level in equilibrium. Strict liability (D = 0) makes the
injurer internalize the total accident costs and therefore implements the static optimum.
Experimentation regimes (D > 0) make it worthwhile for a firm to market if its net
benefits from marketing plus the absolute experimentation discount the firm receives
(the experimentation discount times the total accident costs) are larger than zero:
[b(n)− (x∗S + ph(x∗S))] +D · (x∗S + ph(x∗S)) ≥ 0 .
Since the total accident costs are determined by the initial net benefits,
1−BSOC = x∗S + ph(x∗S),
experimentation under such a regime can be expressed in terms of the initial net benefits
and the experimentation discount and firm n will market if
n ≤ BSOC +D · (x∗S + ph(x∗S)) = BSOC +D · (1−BSOC) .
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Figure 2.3: Marketing under experimentation regimes. Due to the experimentation
discount the total accident payments are smaller than the total accident costs and the
private net benefits curve is located above the static net benefit curve. The number of
firms marketing under a experimentation regime is therefore (weakly) larger compared
to the social optimum: Experimentation is always positive if statically optimal mar-
keting is positive. In case statically optimal marketing is zero, experimentation is only
positive if the absolute experimentation discount is larger than the initial net benefits.
Lemma 4. All liability regimes implement the optimal care level x∗S.
1. Strict liability implements the statically optimal number of firms:
nSL =
0 if BSOC < 0BSOC if BSOC ≥ 0
2. Experimentation regimes implement the statically optimal number of firms if un-
certainty about the risk is resolved. If uncertainty about the risk is unresolved,
experimentation regimes implement a weakly larger number of firms than the static
optimum:
nER =
0 if BSOC +D · (1−BSOC) ≤ 0BSOC +D · (1−BSOC) if BSOC +D · (1−BSOC) > 0
The substance of lemma 4 is well-known (Shavell 1980, Polinsky 1980). The only cases
in which experimentation regimes do not implement a higher number of firms than the
static optimum is if either uncertainty about the risk is resolved, or if the experimentation
discount is too small to induce any firm to market its application. The latter is the case
if
D ≤ −BSOC
1−BSOC
and can only occur if there is zero marketing in the static optimum.
Since the static optimum is always optimal in period 2, strict liability is first-best in
period 2 and experimentation regimes in general implement too many firms in period 2
(with the exception of the two cases outlined above).
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2.4.2 Strict Liability in Period 1
In period 1 uncertainty about the risk is always unresolved. Strict liability implements
the static optimum and it is therefore first-best whenever optimal experimentation is
zero. There are two such cases. In the first one the static net benefits from marketing
are high enough for uncertainty to be resolved in the static optimum. In the second
case the initial marginal costs of experimentation are larger than the marginal value of
experimentation. The second scenario can only occur if statically optimal marketing is
zero. In all other cases some experimentation is optimal and strict liability therefore not
first-best.
Proposition 2. Strict liability always implements zero experimentation. In period 1 it
is first-best if either
BSOC ≥ ninfo or BSOC + 1
2
1
ninfo
(1− p) ≤ 0.
In all other cases optimal experimentation is positive and too few firms market under
strict liability.
2.4.3 Experimentation Regimes in Period 1
Experimentation regimes are in general inferior from a static perspective, but may have
a dynamic edge. The amount of experimentation implemented by a regime with exper-
imentation discount D can be deduced from lemma 4:
Lemma 5.
1. Experimentation under a regime with experimentation discount D is
nEDexp =
D(1−BSOC) if BSOC ≥ 0max [0, BSOC +D(1−BSOC)] if BSOC < 0
2. In case the initial net benefits are negative, experimentation is zero for some ex-
perimentation discounts. Experimentation is then only positive if
D >
−BSOC
1−BSOC .
Since liability regimes implement the socially optimal care level, they are first-best if they
also implement the socially optimal amount of marketing. Given optimal experimenta-
tion is zero, all regimes implementing zero experimentation are first-best. Given optimal
experimentation for a specific novel technology is positive, there is an experimentation
discount which implements just the right amount of experimentation for that specific
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novel technology. Whether a given experimentation discount can be implemented by a
liability regimes for a given novel technology, depends on whether D is larger than the
experimentation discount f implemented by standard negligence for the given technol-
ogy. In case D is larger than f , the experimentation discount is not feasible, otherwise
it is.
Proposition 3. An experimentation regime is first-best if and only if
nEDexp = n
∗
exp.
If marketing in the static optimum is smaller than the full information threshold, there
is always an experimentation discount such that an associated regime is first-best:
i) If optimal experimentation n∗exp for a novel technology is larger than zero this
experimentation discount is
D =

n∗exp−BSOC
1−BSOC if BSOC < 0
n∗exp
1−BSOC if BSOC ≥ 0 .
ii) If optimal experimentation n∗exp for a novel technology is zero, these experimenta-
tion discounts are
D ≤ −BSOC
1−BSOC .
The results for strict liability and experimentation regimes imply that, in case liability
regimes can be tailored to a specific novel technology at hand, the first-best outcome
can be implemented if optimal experimentation is not too large, i.e. unless D > f and
optimal experimentation therefore exceeds experimentation implemented by standard
negligence. However, whether liability regimes can actually be fine-tuned to specific
novel technologies is questionable. Firstly, it is far from clear whether courts possess
adequate knowledge about the public information gains from bringing the technology to
the market. Secondly, the legal framework giving rise to the experimentation discount
– mainly the scope of the exemptions and the burden of proof – in real-world liability
regimes is not technology-specific, but applies to all novel technologies in the same
jurisdiction in the same way.
2.4.4 Non-Technology-Specific Liability Regimes
We will now assume that liability regimes are fixed across novel technologies and in-
vestigate the trade-offs of choosing the liability regime, as well as the relative ranking
of strict liability and experimentation regimes. For a given novel technology, a liabil-
ity regime will almost always implement too much or too little experimentation: The
amount of experimentation implemented by a given liability regime is determined by the
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initial net benefits from marketing and the absolute experimentation discount. It does
not depend on the information rate and the prior probability of the technology being
hazardous. In case no experimentation is optimal, strict liability clearly is superior. In
case some experimentation is optimal and experimentation implemented by an experi-
mentation regime is too small compared to the social optimum (but still positive), the
experimentation regime is still superior to strict liability, since costs of experimentation
are convex and the value of information is concave. If experimentation is too large, this
is not necessarily the case.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
-1 0 1
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
Initial Net Benets
D = 0.7
D = 0.5
D = 0.3
Figure 2.4: Experimentation under regimes with different experimentation discounts.
Experimentation is fully determined by BSOC and D, but it does not depend on the
information rate and the the prior probability of the technology being hazardous. For
any experimentation discount experimentation is largest for BSOC = 0 and is linearly
decreasing in BSOC in either direction.
We will identify liability regimes with their associated experimentation discounts, i.e.
strict liability is simply a liability regime with an experimentation discount of zero. Ex-
perimentation is the larger the larger the experimentation discount is. The initial net
benefits from marketing influence the amount of experimentation as well: Experimenta-
tion is determined by the absolute experimentation discount firms receive minus, in case
zero marketing is statically optimal, the static loss in welfare from the first firm market-
ing. Higher initial net benefits are equivalent to lower total accident costs. Larger initial
net benefits of one unit are therefore associated with a smaller absolute experimentation
discount of D units. If the initial net benefits are non-negative, this is the only effect
present and experimentation is decreasing in BSOC at the rate D. However, if the initial
net benefits are negative, the initial static loss from marketing decreases by one unit
and experimentation is therefore increasing by 1−D if the initial net benefits increase
by one unit.
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Lemma 6. Experimentation is increasing in the experimentation discount. It is increas-
ing in the initial social benefits if BSOC < 0 and decreasing if BSOC ≥ 0.
d
dBSOC
nEDexp =
−D if BSOC ≥ 01−D if BSOC < 0
The amount of experimentation cannot be adjusted to a novel technology under a non-
technology-specific liability regime. The absolute cost and value of the experimentation
implemented are therefore of interest for comparing strict liability to an experimentation
regime, rather than the marginal quantities. Equivalently, one can compare the average
cost and value of experimentation: In case total marketing is smaller than the full in-
formation threshold, both costs and value of experimentation can be easily decomposed
into average costs and average value times experimentation. It then suffices to compare
these average quantities. However, in case total marketing is larger than the full infor-
mation threshold, the absolute value of experimentation cannot be decomposed in the
same way and it is easier to compare the absolute cost and value of experimentation.
We measure the welfare effect of experimentation regimes relative to strict liability: The
costs and value of experimentation are measured relative to the strict liability outcome
to which we assign a welfare level of zero. The value and costs of experimentation always
refer to a liability regime implementing the respective amount of experimentation, i.e.
to a specific experimentation discount which may be positive or zero.
The Absolute and Average Value of Experimentation
Calculating the absolute and average value of experimentation in the relevant cases is
straightforward: If total marketing is smaller than the full information threshold, the
value of experimentation equals the marginal value of experimentation. Otherwise the
absolute value of experimentation is of interest, which then equals the maximum value
of experimentation.
Lemma 7.
1. If total marketing is smaller than the full information threshold (n∗S+n
ED
exp < ninfo),
the average value of experimentation is
VOEED =
VOPI
ninfo
·
(BSOC +D(1−BSOC)) if BSOC < 0D(1−BSOC) if BSOC ≥ 0
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2. If total marketing is larger than the full information threshold (n∗S +n
ED
exp ≥ ninfo),
the absolute value of experimentation is
VOEED = VOPI ·

1 if BSOC < 0
ninfo−BSOC
ninfo
if 0 ≤ BSOC < ninfo
0 if BSOC ≥ ninfo
The Absolute and Average Costs of Experimentation
The costs of experimentation under a given liability regime can always be decomposed
into the average costs of experimentation times the amount of experimentation imple-
mented:
COEED = c¯ED · nEDexp .
In case the initial net benefits are non-negative, the average costs of experimentation
c¯ED are simply half the amount of experimentation
1
2
D(1−BSOC),
since the marginal costs for the unit of experimentation are zero and the marginal
costs of experimentation increase linearly. Larger experimentation discounts increase
experimentation and therefore also the average costs of experimentation. Similarly,
higher initial net benefits correspond to smaller total accident costs, therefore to a
smaller absolute experimentation discount, less experimentation and smaller average
costs of experimentation.
In case the initial net benefits are negative, the marginal costs of experimentation are
positive even for the first firm. Marginal costs of experimentation still increase linearly,
resulting in average costs consisting of two parts. The first is again half the amount of
experimentation, the second one the initial marginal costs −BSOC :
1
2
(BSOC +D(1−BSOC))−BSOC .
Larger experimentation discounts again imply larger average costs of experimentation.
Here, higher initial net benefits increase experimentation, but at the same time decrease
the initial marginal costs of experimentation. The latter effect outweighs the former
one and the average costs of experimentation decrease with higher initial net benefits.
A larger experimentation discount implies more experimentation, which in turn implies
larger average costs of experimentation. Therefore, the absolute costs of experimentation
are increasing in the experimentation discount.
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Figure 2.5: Experimentation isocost curves. In the area below the solid black line
experimentation is zero. Increasing D shifts to a higher isocost line. Increasing BSOC
shifts to a higher isocost line for BSOC < B
∗
SOC and shifts to a lower isocost line
for BSOC > B
∗
SOC (compare lemma 8). Since the VOPI is bounded from above by
0.5, experimentation regimes for parameter combinations above the 0.5 isocost line are
always inferior to strict liability.
In case the initial net benefits are non-negative, the absolute costs of experimentation
are decreasing in the initial net benefits, because the amount of experimentation is then
solely determined by the absolute experimentation discount. Larger initial net benefits
(or equivalently smaller total accident costs) imply a smaller amount of experimentation
and therefore also smaller average costs of experimentation. In case the initial net
benefits are negative, the absolute costs of experimentation are increasing in the initial
net benefits up to B∗SOC (compare lemma 8), which depends on the experimentation
discount in place. The absolute costs are decreasing beyond this point. The reason
is that the absolute costs of experimentation are average costs times experimentation:
While the average costs of experimentation are decreasing in the initial net benefits,
experimentation is increasing in the initial net benefits. For details we refer the reader
to the proof of lemma 8.3. These characteristics of the absolute costs of experimentation
are reflected in Figure 2.5, which shows several experimentation isocost curves.
Lemma 8.
1. The costs of experimentation for a given experimentation discount can be decom-
posed into average costs of experimentation times the amount of experimentation:
COEED = c¯ED · nEDexp
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The average costs of experimentation are
c¯ED =
12D(1−BSOC) if BSOC ≥ 01
2D(1−BSOC)− 12BSOC if BSOC < 0
The average costs of experimentation are decreasing in the initial net benefits BSOC
and in the experimentation discount D.
2. The absolute costs of experimentation are increasing in the experimentation dis-
count D.
3. For a given experimentation discount D, there exists
B∗SOC = −
D2
(1−D2) < 0,
such that the absolute costs of experimentation are increasing in the initial net
benefits for BSOC < B
∗
SOC and decreasing in the initial net benefits for BSOC >
B∗SOC .
Relative Ranking of Strict Liability and Experimentation Regimes
An experimentation regime is superior to strict liability if the absolute value of experi-
mentation outweighs the absolute costs of experimentation:
VOEED > COEED.
In case total marketing is smaller than the full information threshold, this is equiva-
lent to the marginal value of experimentation being larger than the average costs of
experimentation:
rinfo ·VOPI > c¯ED. (1)
In case total marketing exceeds the full information threshold, the full value of ex-
perimentation is realized, which is capped at the maximum value of experimentation.
Experimentation regimes are then superior if the maximum value of experimentation is
larger than the absolute costs of experimentation:
MVOE− COEED > 0.
This means that the fraction of the VOPI which is not realized under marketing in the
static optimum, i.e. under strict liability, must be larger than the costs of the amount
of experimentation implemented:(
1− max[0, BSOC ]
ninfo
)
·VOPI > COEED. (2)
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In fact, irrespective of whether total marketing exceeds the full information threshold,
an experimentation regime is superior to strict liability if and only if both conditions
hold: On the one hand it is necessary that the maximum value of experimentation must
be large enough to exceed the actual absolute costs of experimentation. On the other
hand it is necessary that the marginal value of experimentation is larger than the actual
average costs of experimentation. Since each of the conditions is sufficient for either of
the cases of total marketing exceeding or not exceeding the full information threshold,
the conditions are jointly necessary and sufficient.
The experimentation discount only enters through the cost side in both conditions and
a larger experimentation discount implies in both cases higher (average and absolute)
costs. Both conditions therefore imply a maximum experimentation discount. For an
experimentation regime to be superior to strict liability, the actual experimentation
discount has to be below both of the maximum experimentation discounts implied by
either condition, since both conditions have to hold. At the same time experimentation
has actually to be positive. This means that the experimentation discount also has to
be larger than some minimum experimentation discount in case the initial net benefits
are negative.
Proposition 4.
1. An experimentation regime is superior to strict liability if and only if the following
conditions are fulfilled:
i)
rinfo ·VOPI > c¯ED
ii)
(1−max[0, BSOC ] · rinfo) ·VOPI > COEED
iii)
−BSOC
1−BSOC < D
2. Let the initial net benefits be negative. An experimentation regime is superior to
strict liability if it holds for the experimentation discount D that
−BSOC
1−BSOC < D < min
[√
2 ·VOPI + (BSOC)2
1−BSOC ,
2 ·VOPI · rinfo +BSOC
1−BSOC
]
3. Let the initial net benefits be non-negative. An experimentation regime is superior
to strict liability if it holds for the experimentation discount D that
D < min
[√
2 ·VOPI · (1− rinfo ·BSOC)
1−BSOC ,
2 ·VOPI · rinfo
1−BSOC
]
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The first condition states that the marginal value of experimentation has to be larger
than the average costs of experimentation for an experimentation regime to outperform
strict liability. The condition is fulfilled for more experimentation discounts, the higher
the information rate is, since the information rate increases the marginal value of exper-
imentation. Increasing the initial net benefits has two effects: It decreases the average
costs of experimentation and decreases the value of perfect information by increasing
welfare in the no-information baseline. The latter effect only exists if the initial net
benefits are larger than zero, but reduces the value of perfect information eventually
to zero. The maximum information discount for which the first condition is fulfilled is
therefore inversely U-shaped. The maximum is attained for initial net benefits strictly
larger than zero, since the latter effect is quadratic and hence initially zero.
The second condition states that the maximum value of experimentation has to be
larger than the absolute costs of experimentation. A higher information rate decreases
the maximum experimentation discount fulfilling this condition, since it decreases the
maximum value of experimentation by increasing the fraction of the value of perfect
information realized under strict liability. This effect is only present if the initial net
benefits are larger than zero. Increasing the initial net benefits increases the absolute
costs of experimentation below B∗SOC and decreases the absolute costs of experimen-
tation beyond B∗SOC (compare lemma 8). It has no effect on the maximum value of
experimentation for non-negative initial net benefits and decreases the maximum value
of experimentation for positive initial net benefits, since it decreases the value of per-
fect information and increases the fraction of it which is realized under strict liability.
An increase in the initial net benefits therefore lowers the maximum experimentation
discount such that the second condition is fulfilled for initial net benefits below B∗SOC
and increases it between B∗SOC and zero. Above zero the net effect depends on the the
relative size of the opposing effects.6
The third condition only depends on the initial net benefits and states that experi-
mentation has actually to be positive: It demands that the absolute experimentation
discount is larger than the social costs of the first unit of marketing. For non-negative
initial net benefits this condition is therefore fulfilled for all positive experimentation
discounts. For negative initial net benefits increasing the initial net benefits leads to
more experimentation discounts implementing at least some experimentation.
Whether condition (1) or condition (2) is the binding one for the maximum experimen-
tation discount crucially depends on the information rate. Condition (1) is fulfilled for
large information rates and not for small ones. For positive initial net benefits, condition
(2) is not fulfilled for large information rates and is fulfilled for small information rates
if the VOPI is larger than the absolute costs of experimentation. For non-positive initial
6It can be easily shown that for information rates below two, the maximum experimentation discount
increases at zero before eventually dropping to zero as the maximum value of experimentation goes to
zero. For information rates above two, the maximum experimentation discount directly decreases in the
initial net benefits from zero on.
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Figure 2.6: Maximum and minimum experimentation discount for an experimenta-
tion regime to be superior to strict liability. The minimum experimentation discount is
shown as the black solid line. The other curves represent the maximum experimenta-
tion discount for varying information rates. In case the initial net benefits are negative,
an increase in the initial net benefits increases the maximum experimentation discount
if the information rate is low enough such that condition (1) is binding or the initial
net benefits are larger than B∗SOC . In case the initial net benefits are non-negative,
the maximum experimentation discount directly begins to fall for the highest informa-
tion rate, whereas it initially rises and later falls for lower information rates. Higher
information rates imply a higher experimentation discount for non-positive initial net
benefits, but do not necessarily so for positive initial net benefits.
net benefits condition (2) is independent from the information rate and fulfilled if the
VOPI is larger than the absolute costs of experimentation. Therefore, for large enough
information rates, condition (2) always becomes the binding one. Condition (1) becomes
the binding one if the VOPI is larger than the absolute costs of experimentation and, in
case the initial net benefits are positive, the information rate is small.
The preceding discussion enables us to deduce the relationships between the determi-
nants of our model and the maximum experimentation discount. An increase in the
information rate increases the maximum experimentation discount as long as condition
(1) is the binding condition. If condition (2) is binding, it decreases the maximum ex-
perimentation discount in case the initial net benefits are positive and does not change
the maximum experimentation discount in case the initial net benefits are non-positive.
In case the initial net benefits are negative, an increase in the initial net benefits increases
the maximum experimentation discount, except for the case that condition (2) is the
binding one and that the initial net benefits are smaller than B∗SOC . In case the initial
net benefits are non-negative, the effect of an increase in the initial net benefits depends
both on which of the conditions is binding and on the exact values of the initial net
benefits and the information rate. In contrast, in the social optimum, both the amount
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of experimentation and the net value of experimentation are largest when the initial
net benefits are zero. The discrepancy is due to the fact that the initial net benefits
not only determine the initial marginal costs of experimentation and co-determine the
VOPI, but also determine the amount of experimentation given a fixed experimentation
discount. At larger initial net benefits than zero less experimentation is implemented
compared to initial net benefits of zero, since total accident costs are smaller, implying
smaller average and absolute costs of experimentation. Since a maximum experimen-
tation discount by definition implements too much experimentation compared to the
social optimum, decreasing experimentation by higher initial net benefits increases the
maximum experimentation discount, if the decrease in costs outweighs the accompany-
ing decrease in the value of experimentation. In case total marketing exceeds the full
information threshold, the maximum experimentation discount may also be larger for
initial net benefits smaller than B∗SOC compared to initial net benefits of zero, since
experimentation is increasing in the initial net benefits.
In every case the only direct effect of a decrease in the prior is an increase in the value of
experimentation, thereby increasing the experimentation discounts fulfilling conditions
(1) and (2) and increasing the maximum experimentation discount.
Trade-offs in Choosing the Experimentation Discount
The preceding result stated which experimentation regimes are superior to strict liability
in a given setting. For clarifying the trade-offs in choosing an experimentation discount
it is useful to look at a fixed experimentation discount’s impact on different settings
and compare the outcomes with the social optimum for each setting. We will do so by
deriving minimum and maximum information rates for experimentation regimes to be
superior to strict liability.
Condition (1) corresponds to a minimum information rate: The larger the information
rate, the larger the marginal value of information. Condition (2) corresponds to a
maximum information rate for positive initial net benefits, since a larger information
rate decreases the maximum value of experimentation in that case. In case of non-
positive initial net benefits, condition (2) is independent from the information rate and,
together with the requirement of positive experimentation, constitutes a precondition
for an experimentation regime to be superior unrelated to the information rate.
Proposition 5.
1. Let the initial net benefits be non-negative. An experimentation regime with exper-
imentation discount D is superior to strict liability if and only if
i)
−BSOC
1−BSOC < D <
√
2 ·VOPI + (BSOC)2
1−BSOC .
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ii)
rinfo > r
min,ED
info =
c¯ED
VOPI
> rmin,optinfo
2. Let the initial net benefits be negative. An experimentation regime with experimen-
tation discount D is superior to strict liability if and only if
i)
rinfo > r
min,ED
info =
c¯ED
VOPI
> rmin,optinfo
ii)
rinfo < r
max,ED
info =
VOPI− COEED
VOPI ·BSOC < r
max,opt
info
For a positive experimentation discount, the minimum information rate for the exper-
imentation regime to be superior to strict liability is larger than the minimum infor-
mation rate in for at least some experimentation to be socially desirable. The reason
is that, given a non-technology-specific experimentation regime, the marginal value of
experimentation has to exceed the average costs of experimentation for the experimen-
tation implemented to be welfare-enhancing. In contrast, in the social optimum the
marginal value only has to exceed the initial marginal costs of experimentation for some
experimentation to be optimal. The former is larger than the latter, since the costs of
experimentation are convex.
The maximum information rate, in case the initial net benefits are positive, for an
experimentation regime to be superior to strict liability is smaller than the correspond-
ing maximum information rate for some experimentation to be socially desirable. In
the social optimum, the maximum information rate is simply determined by the full
information threshold. For a non-technology-specific experimentation regime, the max-
imum value of experimentation must exceed the costs of the experimentation actually
implemented. For negative initial net benefits there is no maximum information rate
in either the social optimum or for a non-technology-specific experimentation regime.
However, for the experimentation regime there is a condition ensuring that the amount
of experimentation is actually positive and that the VOPI exceeds the actual costs of
experimentation. Again, these requirements arise because the experimentation discount
is fixed and experimentation is no choice variable.
These differences in the conditions under which some experimentation is socially optimal
and the condition under which non-technology-specific experimentation regimes imple-
ment experimentation in a welfare-enhancing way, highlight the inevitable shortcomings
of a non-technology-specific experimentation regime for individual novel technologies.
For some novel technologies experimentation is too large. This may happen if experi-
mentation is not optimal in the first place or if actual experimentation is larger than the
socially optimal one. In the latter case, the experimentation regime may even be infe-
rior to strict liability although some experimentation is socially desirable. The larger the
experimentation discount, the more often this is the case. For other novel technologies
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experimentation is too low. As long as experimentation is still positive, the experimen-
tation regime outperforms strict liability. However, in case the initial net benefits are
negative, experimentation becomes zero for too small experimentation discounts, ren-
dering the the experimentation regime equivalent to strict liability. The smaller the
experimentation discount, the more often this is the case.
This implies the presence of two related trade-offs. Firstly, the experimentation dis-
count trades off too much and too little experimentation for different novel technologies.
Secondly, the experimentation discount trades off how often the experimentation regime
is inferior to strict liability despite some experimentation being optimal and how often
the experimentation regime is equivalent to strict liability despite some experimentation
being optimal, i.e. how often it implements experimentation in a welfare-reducing way
and how often it fails to implement socially desirable experimentation. Comparatively
narrow experimentation regimes, like the European Products Liability Directive, favor
not implementing any experimentation more often over implementing experimentation
in a welfere-reducing way more often compared to regimes with higher experimentation
discounts, like the one given by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. In
order to know the globally optimal experimentation discount, one would need to know
the probability density f(rinfo, BSOC , p) across novel technologies.
Impact on Expected Product Innovation
In our setting product innovation happens when an existing innovation, i.e. an applica-
tion of the novel technology, is actually marketed. Experimentation increases product
innovation by definition and unambiguously in period 1. Given there is some experimen-
tation in period 1, the probability of learning whether the novel technology is hazardous
or safe between periods is increased. The increased probability can lead to society learn-
ing that the novel technology is safe, that the novel technology is hazardous or to not
learning the true state of the world. In the first case, product innovation is increased
compared to the no-experimentation baseline and it is not affected in the third case
relative to the baseline. In the second case, product innovation is smaller compared to
the baseline if marketing in the static optimum would have been positive and unaffected
compared to the baseline if it would have been zero. Therefore, expected product in-
novation in period 2 is unambiguously larger under experimentation in case marketing
in the static optimum is zero. In case marketing in the static optimum is positive, the
sign of expected product innovation depends on the prior and the amount of marketing
in the static optimum.
Proposition 6. In case there is experimentation in period 1, compared to the static
optimum product innovation is
1. higher in period 1 compared to the static optimum,
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2. higher in period 2 if marketing in the static optimum is zero,
3. higher in period 2 if marketing in the static optimum is positive if 1− p > n∗S and
smaller otherwise.
The only possibility for expected product innovation to be smaller in case there is ex-
perimentation, is when the prior probability of the novel technology being safe is smaller
then the number of firms marketing in the static optimum. In this case the instances in
which the novel technology turns out to be hazardous times the applications marketed in
the static optimum is larger than the instances in which the novel technology turns out
to be safe times the applications not marketed in the static optimum. For this to be the
cases the total accident costs in case the technology is hazardous need to be small. In all
other cases product innovation is higher in case there is experimentation, in particular
when no application of the novel technology would have been marketed at all.
2.5 Extensions and Discussion
2.5.1 Extensions
We discuss two extensions. The first is allowing for different initial private benefits.
The second is allowing for different amounts of firms and applications of the novel
technologies.
Private Benefits
We now allow for private benefit curves of the form
bS(n) = S · (1− n),
reflecting different stakes S. The following lemma shows that allowing for different stakes
does not enrich the model in substance.
Lemma 9. Let setting 1 be defined by bS(n), p, h(x) = H(x), ninfo and setting 2 be
defined by b1(n), p, h(x) =
H(S·x)
S , ninfo.
1. In settings 1 and 2, the following quantities coincide: n∗S, n
∗
exp, n
SL
exp, n
ED
exp .
2. The following quantities and functions are larger in setting 1 than in setting 2 by
a factor of S: x∗S, p · h(x∗S), VOE, COE.
Lemma 9 says that in settings 1 and 2 the same number of firms marketing are optimal
and that the same liability regimes implement the same number of firms. The only
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difference is in the stakes: Care costs, expected harm and private benefits are larger
in setting 1 by a factor of S compared to setting 2. This is reflected in that the value
and costs of experimentation also only differ by a factor of S across the two settings
and implies that the same liability regimes do not only lead to the same outcomes, but
also entail the same welfare levels up to the common factor of S. Therefore setting 1
and setting 2 are equivalent with respect to their positive and normative implications
and all costs and benefits in the original model can be interpreted as fractions of the
initial firm’s private benefits. Since setting 2 is within the bounds of the original model,
allowing for different stakes does not enrich the model in substance.
Lemma 9 tells us that for the model outcome only the relative size between the initial
firm’s private benefits and the total accident costs is important. Therefore, nothing is
lost if we normalize S to one. In the model both the size of the private benefits from
marketing and the size of the total accident costs are captured in the initial net benefits.
An increase in the private benefits relative to the total accident costs corresponds to an
increase in the initial net benefits in the model, with the consequences for experimenta-
tion in the social optimum and the performance of experimentation regimes relative to
strict liability discussed in the preceding two chapters.
Number of Applications and Firms
We now allow for private benefit curves of the form
bB(n) = (1− n
B
),
reflecting different numbers of applications of the technology. We call the number of
applications the technology’s ’breadth’. The following lemma shows that allowing for
different breadths does not enrich the model in substance.
Lemma 10. Let setting 1 be defined by bB(n), p, h(x), ninfo and setting 2 be defined
by b1(n), p, h(x),
ninfo
B .
1. In settings 1 and 2 the following quantities coincide: x∗S, p · h(x∗S).
2. The following quantities are larger in setting 1 than in setting 2 by a factor of B:
n∗S, n
∗
exp, n
SL
exp, n
ED
exp .
3. The following functions are larger in setting 1 than in setting 2 by a factor of B
when evaluated at B times the number of firms compared to setting 2: VOE, COE.
Lemma 10 says that in settings 1 and 2 the same share of firms marketing are optimal
and that the same liability regimes implement the same share of firms. The value and
costs of experimentation differ by a factor of B across the two settings when evaluated
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for the same share of firms. Therefore setting 1 and 2 are equivalent with respect to
their positive and normative implications for the same share of firms and the number of
firms in the original model can be interpreted as share of a population of firms. Since
setting 2 is within the bounds of the original model and the outcome of setting 1 can
directly be deduced from setting 2, allowing for different breadths of technologies does
not enrich the model in substance.
Lemma 10 tells us that for the model outcome only the relative size between the number
of firms and the information rate is important. Therefore, nothing is lost if we normalize
B to one. An increase in the novel technology’s breadth and an increase in the infor-
mation rate per firm are both equivalent to an increase in the information rate in the
model, with the consequences for experimentation in the social optimum and the perfor-
mance of experimentation regimes relative to strict liability discussed in the preceding
two chapters.
2.5.2 Discussion
We kept the model employed in this paper simple for reasons of clarity and tractabil-
ity. We now discuss the implications of our model choices. We modeled the value of
information as a piecewise linear function. This is clearly a simplification, but does
not have substantial repercussions on our results compared to a strictly concave and
strictly increasing function7 with identical initial information rate. The only qualitative
differences are that, given such a function, in case of positive marketing in the static
optimum some experimentation is always optimal (not only for n∗S < ninfo) and that
there are only interior solutions for positive amounts of socially optimal experimenta-
tion. Quantitatively, the socially optimal amount of experimentation would go down
compared to our model in cases in which there is an interior solution in our model and
go up in cases in which there is a strictly positive corner solution. The ability to imple-
ment the optimal amount of experimentation in case liability regimes can be tailored to
the specific technology at hand does obviously not depend functional form of the value
of information.
The transition at the full information threshold from positive slope to zero slope is an ap-
proximation of a continuously decreasing information rate. We identified two conditions
for an experimentation regime to be superior to strict liability when liability regimes
are not technology-specific. Condition (1) concerns settings in which total marketing is
7The type of function we have in mind here is of the following form:
n
n+ ninfo
·VOPI.
The initial information rate here is also 1
ninfo
. It determines the how fast the rate of information
decreases with marketing. The value of information asymptotically approaches the value of perfect
information.
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below the full information threshold and condition (2) concerns settings in which it is
above. These conditions would merge into a single condition for a strictly concave value
of information. However, this would not change the model outcomes qualitatively: For
the results concerning the maximum experimentation discount one would simply have
to replace the information rate by the average information rate. Quantitatively, this
would imply a reduction of the maximum experimentation discount.
Two characteristics concerning the comparative statics directly depend on the infor-
mation rate: Firstly, the maximum experimentation discount decreases with increasing
information rate in case marketing in the static optimum is positive and total marketing
exceeds the full information threshold. Secondly, the maximum experimentation dis-
count can decrease with increasing initial net benefits in case marketing in the static
optimum is zero and total marketing exceeds the full information threshold. Both of
these characteristics derive from condition (2) and are still present in case of a strictly
concave functional form for a very high initial information rate.
We employed a two-stage model with perfect information diffusion and perfectly corre-
lated risk characteristics. Compared to our model, we expect that a model employing
continuous learning in time would make the initial units of marketing relatively more
important and valuable. Compared to our model, experimentation would then be par-
ticularly valuable in case of zero marketing in the static optimum. We expect that less
than perfect information diffusion and imperfectly correlated risk characteristics would
lower the value of experimentation. Allowing for different priors among agents would
necessitate a complete reconceptualization of the information structure with uncertain
consequences.
In our model, all applications of the novel technologies are marketed by different firms
and applications belong to different markets. When single firms have control over a
significant portion of applications, strategic considerations enter the marketing decision.
Such firms would generally undertake some, but too little, experimentation, knowing
that they can partially reap the informational benefits from experimentation in the
future. Considering firms which compete with their applications on the same market
would open up new strategic incentives with uncertain overall consequences.
2.6 Conclusion
How should and does tort law deal with uncertain risks emerging from novel technolo-
gies? Exemptions for harm materializing from novel and uncertain risks are ubiquitous
in tort law. (Reimann 2003, Owen 2010). However, the classical analysis of tort law for
uncertain risks (Shavell 1992) comes to the conclusion that strict liability implements
the social optimum. We provide an economic rationale for the exemptions for novel and
uncertain risks resting on the assumptions that post-market experience is essential in
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learning about novel technologies’ risk characteristics and that learning is a function
of the cumulative market experience with the novel technology. The information gen-
erated by post-market experience is public. Marketing the novel technology therefore
involves a positive information externality on top of the negative risk externality. Ex-
perimentation, i.e. marketing beyond the static optimum, can then be optimal due to
the public value of information. Our interpretation of the exemptions prevalent in tort
law is that they act as an experimentation discount on the expected harm for firms
bringing the novel technology to the market. Thereby, regimes employing such exemp-
tions can implement experimentation, whereas strict liability does not provide such a
discount and does therefore not implement any experimentation. With this rationale,
we offer a new mechanism to support the longstanding claim that strict tort regimes can
cause innovative and novel products to be withheld from the market (Burk and Boczar
1993, Viscusi and Moore 1993, Finkelstein 2004) and the first one to explain this claim
with specific reference to state-of-the-art defenses and unknowable risks (Connolly 1965,
O’Reilly 1987, Fondazione Rosselli 2004).
When liability regimes can be tailored to the specific novel technology at hand, the
first-best can be implemented as long as optimal experimentation does not exceed the
amount of experimentation implemented by standard negligence. However, the exemp-
tions provided for uncertain risks are general rules and not technology-specific. Courts
have to adhere to those general rules, such that the first-best does not seem to be viable
in the real world. Non-technology-specific liability regimes have to trade off implement-
ing too much and too little experimentation across novel technologies. In particular,
they trade off for how many novel technologies an experimentation regime is inferior to
strict liability due to excessive experimentation and for how many novel technologies an
experimentation regime does not implement any experimentation although some exper-
imentation would be socially desirable. The European Products Liability Directive and
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability can serve as examples of regimes
striking these trade-offs differently. Granting only comparatively narrow exemptions for
uncertain risks, the former is an example for a relatively low experimentation discount,
while the latter is closer to a standard negligence regime and is therefore an example for
a relatively large experimentation discount.
The analysis presented in this paper offers a variety of avenues for further work and gen-
eralization. On the one hand there are generalizations possible within our framework. In
order to identify the first-order effects of public post-market stage learning, we employed
a two-stage model with discrete marketing choices in quantity and time, perfect and in-
stantaneous information diffusion, perfectly correlated risks across the applications of
the novel technology, applications of the technology which are neither substitutes nor
complements and with each firm only having control over one application of the tech-
nology. Relaxing those assumptions would lead to more refined understanding of the
relationship between learning about novel risks at the post-market stage and tort law.
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On the other hand the framework we developed in this paper serves as an ideal starting
point for thinking about the regulation of novel and uncertain risks more generally. The
insights on post-market learning could and should be connected and related to issues
of pre-market testing, post-market monitoring and direct regulation of novel substances
such as enacted in the REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction
of Chemicals) regulation in the European Union.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. Statically optimal marketing is n∗S = max[0, BSOC ]. The static social value
of the initial firm marketing is BSOC . If n
∗
S = 0, all marketing is experimentation and the static
social value from the initial firm marketing BSOC is non-positive and is the initial marginal
costs of experimentation. Since the private benefits of marketing decrease with slope one, the
marginal costs of experimentation in that case are −BSOC +nexp. If n∗S > 0, the initial marginal
costs of experimentation are zero and the the marginal costs of experimentation in that case are
nexp.
Proof of Lemma 8. Only the third statement remains to be shown.
COEED = c¯ED · nEDexp = (
1
2
D(1−BSOC)− 1
2
BSOC) · (B +D(1−BSOC))
The statement follows from
d
dBSOC
= −1
2
(d+ 1)(BSOC +D(1−BSOC)) + (1−D)(D(1−BSOC)−BSOC)1
2
= 0
The rationale behind this result is the following: The amount of experimentation is increasing
in the initial net benefits. The average costs of experimentation are decreasing in the initial
net benefits. For substantially negative initial net benefits, the amount of experimentation is
close to zero, while the average costs of experimentation are relatively high. The change in
the amount of experimentation therefore dominates the change in the costs of experimentation,
which is a direct implication of the product rule. If the initial net benefits are close enough to
zero, the situation is reversed. The larger the experimentation discount, the faster the amount
of experimentation increases and the slower the average cost of experimentation decreases in the
initial net benefits. Therefore, the larger the experimentation discount, the larger is the interval
in which the costs of experimentation are increasing in BSOC .
Proof of Lemma 9. The care optimization problem is
Setting 1: min[x+H(x)], Setting 2: min[x+
H(S · x)
S
]
Results in setting 1 are referred to by a superscript ’1’, in setting 2 by a ’2’. The optimization
yields
x∗,1S = S · x∗,2S and p ·H(x∗,1S ) = S ·
(
H(x∗,1S )
S
)
= S ·
(
H(S · x∗,2S )
S
)
It follows that
B1SOC = B
2
SOC and n
∗,1
S = n
∗,2
S .
This implies that static behavior is identical while static payouts are larger by a factor of S in
setting 1. Therefore, VOI, VOE and COE are larger by a factor of S in setting 1, implying
n∗,1exp = n
∗,2
exp.
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Lastly, for a given experimentation discount, behavior is determined by
bS(n)−D · (x∗,1S + pH(x∗,1S )) = 0 and b1(n)−D ·
(x∗,1S + pH(x
∗,1
S ))
S
= 0,
leading to identical outcomes on both settings for all liability regimes.
Proof of Lemma 10. The claims about x∗S , p · h(x∗S), n∗S and COE are evident. Payoffs at the
same share of firms are identical. Since static marketing and the maximum number of firms
marketing in setting 1 is larger by a factor of B compared to setting 2, we have
VOPI1 = VOPI2.
Since there are B times more firms in setting 1 at the same share of firms than in setting 2, but
there is a B times higher information rate in setting 2, this implies the statement about VOE
and therefore also the statement about n∗S . The statements about n
SL
exp and n
ED
exp directly follow
from the definition of the experimentation discount.
Proof of Proposition 1. Only part three remains to be shown. In case we have an interior so-
lution, equating marginal costs and marginal value of experimentation yields max[0, BSOC ] +
rinfo ·VOPI. In case we have a corner solution the possible values are zero and max[0, BSOC ] if
BSOC < 0. and max[0, BSOC − ninfo] if BSOC ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Only the second and the third statement remain to be shown. Only the
inequalities concerning the maximum experimentation discount habe to be shown. rinfo ·VOPI >
c¯ED means
rinfo ·VOPI > 1
2
D(1−BSOC)− 1
2
BSOC
in case the initial net benefits are negative and
rinfo ·VOPI > 1
2
D(1−BSOC)
in case they are non-negative. The respective latter inequalities follow from these statements.
(1−max[0, BSOC ] · rinfo) ·VOPI > COEED means
VOPI > (
1
2
D(1−BSOC)− 1
2
BSOC) · (B +D(1−BSOC))
in case the initial net benefits are negative and
(1−BSOC · rinfo) ·VOPI > (1
2
D(1−BSOC)) · (D(1−BSOC))
in case they are non-negative. The respective former inequalities follow from these statements.
Proof of Proposition 5. Only rmin,EDinfo (D) > r
min,opt
info and r
max,ED
info (D) > r
max,opt
info remain to be
shown. The former follows from the convexity of the costs of experimentation. The latter follows
since rmax,optinfo =
1
BSOC
.
Proof of Proposition 6. Only the third part remains to be shown. Let q be the increase in
probability that the true state of the world is learned. Expected product innovation relative to
the static baseline is then
q · [(1− p)(1− n∗S)− pn∗S ].
Expected product innovation is therefore positive if and only if 1− p > n∗S .
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3.1 Introduction
Climate litigation has attracted renewed interest as a governance tool both in the context
of climate change (Thornton and Covington 2016, Marjanac et al. 2017, McCormick et
al. 2017) and in the context of potential solar geoengineering1 (Horton et al. 2014,
Reynolds 2015). A key challenge in climate litigation is to assess the factual basis of
causation (Horton et al. 2014, Marjanac et al. 2017, McCormick et al. 2017; also,
compare recent cases: decisions to investigate by the Human Rights Commission of
the Philippines, 2017; Court of Appeal Hamm, Lliuya v. RWE, 2017). This challenge
becomes particularly salient for extreme events, such as prolonged droughts or excessive
precipitation: Due to the inherent stochasticity of the climate system, attributing a
single extreme event to human intervention into the climate system with certainty is
impossible (e.g. Allen et al. 2007). The traditional legal ’but for’ test of deterministic
necessary causation is, therefore, not suitable in this context, and attribution based on
probabilistic notions appears to be the only possible option.
The Fraction of Attributable Risk (FAR) has been proposed as a method to tackle the
problem of causation in climate litigation (Allen 2003, Allen et al. 2007, Horton et
al. 2014, Marjanac et al. 2017). Furthermore, individual attribution studies explicitly
refer to liability (Otto et al. 2017) and potential legal implications of event attribution
(Hauser et al. 2017). FAR is a standard concept in attribution science, and Hannart
et al. (2016) argue that it can be interpreted as the probabilistic counterpart of the
traditional legal ’but for’ test in the context of event attribution. Researchers have
applied this concept to extreme events, including heat waves, cold spells, droughts and
floods at an increasing rate (Herring et al. 2016a, Herring et al. 2018a), and by now an
’attribution community’ has come into existence within climate science. FAR essentially
quantifies the fraction of the total probability of an event which can be traced back to a
climate alteration (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions or a deliberate climate intervention).
In this paper, we assume FAR to be the relevant concept, although the discussion applies
equally to the potential use of other concepts of attribution science in a trial.
Against this background, the paper makes two contributions. The first is to demonstrate
that FAR can only be an effectual tool for resolving questions of causation if and to the
extent to which evidentiary standards used by courts adequately accommodate the type
of scientific evidence that FAR estimates represent. Evidence must be legally admissible
in order to be considered at all by the court. Excluding FAR estimates from a trial on
the basis of admissibility requirements denies them a role in resolving issues of causation.
However, relaxing admissibility requirements affects the reliability of FAR estimates that
parties bring to court: It gives parties that have material interests in the outcome of
1Solar geoengineering is a novel, untested, but potentially effective form of intervention in the global
climate system with the purpose of counteracting global warming. Deployment, however, will entail the
risk of undesirable side effects (Scha¨fer et al. 2015, Ocean Studies Board and National Research Council
(2015), Niemeier and Tilmes 2017).
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the trial greater latitude to choose those methodologies that produce FAR estimates
most favorable to their position. Typically, such FAR estimates will not accurately
reflect the true statistical relationship between climate alteration and extreme event.
Thus, rules on scientific evidence need to strike a balance between, on the one hand,
the admissibility of FAR evidence and, on the other, maintaining the epistemological
quality, i.e. reliability, of FAR evidence. In highlighting the need to strike this balance
in legal admissibility criteria, the present paper contributes to an emerging literature
that assesses the potential of attribution science for solving the problem of causation in
climate litigation (Lusk 2017, Marjanac and Patton 2018).
The second contribution of the paper is to apply the first contribution to a specific pro-
posal for how to accommodate FAR estimates in evidentiary standards by modifying an
existing set of admissibility criteria. We use as the object of this application the Daubert
standard. This standard offers a set of specific criteria for admissibility. It applies to
the United States, where climate liability suits have been launched, and is influential in
other jurisdictions such as Canada and the UK. The Daubert standard consists of five
criteria that, unmodified, would exclude every FAR estimate on the basis of one crite-
rion (’testability ’) and be inapplicable to FAR estimates on another (’error rate’). A
simple elimination of these two criteria would ensure that FAR estimates are principally
admissible, but would also allow parties to introduce unreliable FAR estimates based on
biased methodological choices. We argue, however, that a modified set of criteria, in-
cluding criteria directly aiming at the reliability of the FAR estimates, would be capable
of leading to both admissible and reliable FAR estimates. We furthermore discuss other
relevant factors, including the type of the extreme event, the existence of a framework
to determine the reliability of FAR estimates, and such a framework’s accessibility to
courts.
3.2 Poland vs. Australia: A Fictitious Tort Case
The challenges of establishing causation in climate litigation are significant, but can ap-
pear arcane to the novice. To provide tangibility, we introduce a fictitious case based on
a solar geoengineering (SG) scenario, developed for the Geoengineering Model Intercom-
parison Project (Kravitz et al. 2011). It involves the calculation of FAR estimates based
on two climate models and serves as illustration for the problem of causation discussed
in this paper. We choose a case based on a SG scenario, since it can be framed with
two clear parties and thus avoids specifying details of a climate change trial which are
important (compare Otto et al. 2017), but not essential for the message of the present
paper. Technical details supporting the specifics of the scenario can be found in the
appendix.
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The year is 2060. Australia has been deploying stratospheric aerosol injection for several
years by now. Its goal is to stabilize radiative forcing at the levels present in the year
2020, thus offsetting the effect of the rise in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration
levels. This year, Poland, an area of significant grain production, experiences severe
drought conditions. There is no precipitation for 40 days in a row. Plants wither; the
grain harvest is severely reduced and can only be partially salvaged through expensive
emergency irrigation. Estimates put the economic damages at 18e billion.
Poland has experienced droughts in times before SG. The duration, intensity, and re-
sultant damages of the 2060 drought are unusual, however. Some climate models give
reason to suspect a link. According to these models, the region within which Poland is
situated generally faces drier conditions under the current climate compared to a climate
without SG activities. These results provides grounds for claiming that Australia’s ac-
tions have made the drought more probable. Poland decides to appeal to an international
court to hold Australia liable for the drought and to receive compensation.
In court, Poland presents evidence based on data from the climate model developed at the
Max-Planck-Institute, the MPI-ESM. To quantify the relative contribution of Australia’s
SG deployment to the probability of the drought, the evidence employs the method of
Fraction of Attributable Risk (FAR). The evidence reports a FAR of 0.83, meaning
that the estimated probability that Australia deploying SG was necessary for the event to
occur is 83%. Poland lays out on which modeling choices and assumptions its assessment
rests: It presents the simulations based on the MPI-ESM, explains how it characterized
the drought in terms of duration and spatial extent, that it used the climate index of
Consecutive Dry Days (CDD) and which statistical techniques were employed to perform
the FAR estimation.
Australia challenges Poland’s claim in court. It presents a set of simulations based on the
HadGEM model developed by UK Meteorological Office. Australia’s quantification yields
a FAR of only 0.18, supported by a methodological brief similar to Poland’s. The court
is thus confronted with diverging and complex scientific evidence that must be assessed in
order to adjudicate the case. Both parties have provided evidence to the court and both
have introduced FAR estimates to support their case. However, Poland’s and Australia’s
FAR estimates differ substantially. Ultimately, the court needs to come to an assessment
of the merits of the evidence and to make a judgment on existence or absence of a causal
link between Australia undertaking SG and Poland’s harm.
3.3 Admissibility, Reliability and Evidence Production
Behind the specifics of the fictitious case presented above, there lies a general problem of
admissibility, reliability and causation in climate litigation. In abstract terms, it can be
captured by a setting featuring one applicant (’victim’) who claims before a court to have
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suffered damage from an extreme event allegedly caused by one respondent (’injurer’).
Each of the two parties brings forward evidence in the form of FAR estimates and is
in control over the methodological choices underlying their respective estimate. It is
from these choices that the contestability of FAR estimates derives: There exist various
degrees of freedom for the methodological choices underpinning a FAR estimate. These
choices can impact significantly on the magnitude of the FAR estimate (Stott et al.
2016, Stott et al. 2018) and different choices may lead to different conclusions (Hauser
et al. 2017). In climate litigation, the parties have material interests in the outcome
of the trial. Their control over the methodological choices that generate FAR estimates
therefore calls for some evidentiary standard.
We conceptualize the court’s assessment of the evidence as a two-step process.2 The
first step constitutes the evidentiary standard: The court determines whether a FAR
estimate is admissible. Only admissible evidence can be taken into account by the court
in the second step. The admissibility test does not evaluate the outcome of a FAR
estimate, but its underlying methodology. In the second step, the court evaluates all the
admissible evidence by weighting it in order to come to a judgment. In this second step,
the court depends on the reliability3 of the evidence. FAR evidence can only help the
court to arrive at a legally correct judgment to the extent that it accurately reflects the
true statistical relationship between climate alteration and extreme events. Therefore,
FAR evidence has to be both admissible and reliable.
The more lenient the evidentiary standard is, the easier it is for FAR evidence to pass
the legal hurdle of admissibility. However, the nature of the admissibility test has reper-
cussions for the reliability of the FAR estimates that parties will produce. Applicant
and respondent differ in their interest vis-a`-vis the desired outcome of the trial. In a
trial, therefore, the methodological choices underlying FAR estimates have to be concep-
tualized as strategic choices aimed at maximizing the likelihood of prevailing in court.
The parties make these strategic choices in light of how the court assesses them. The
more lenient the admissibility test, the greater the latitude to choose methodologies that
produce FAR estimates most favorable to each party’s position. However, the more a
desired result of a FAR estimate determines its underlying methodology, the more biased
and the less reliable is the FAR estimate.
2This a simplification of the legal reality in that the two steps are not formally separated in all
jurisdictions. However, for the purposes of this paper, the simplification is innocuous. For details, we
refer the reader to the legal appendix.
3We use the terms reliable and reliability in a strictly epistemological and not in a legal sense here,
in accordance with the following definition: ’An object (a process, method, system, or what have you) is
reliable if and only if (1) it is a sort of thing that tends to produce beliefs, and (2) the proportion of true
beliefs among the beliefs it produces meets some threshold, or criterion, value’. (Goldman 1986, p. 26).
In legal contexts, ’evidentiary reliability’ of evidence is sometimes used as a criterion for admissibility.
In social sciences other than law, ’reliability’ is usually employed as a prerequisite of ’validity’ and has
he meaning of consistency or repeatability (Carmines and Zeller 1979). In order to avoid terminological
confusion, we want to emphasize that we exclusively refer to the epistemological definition. For a more
detailed discussion of these terms and definitions, see Haack (2008).
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Figure 3.1: Model of Production and Assessment of FAR Evidence.
Normatively speaking, the admissibility test ought to ensure that reliable FAR estimates
are admissible and that unreliable ones are not. However, FAR estimates cannot be per-
fectly reliable due to limits in the understanding of the climate system – their reliability
is not absolute, but gradual. How well FAR estimates can help solve the issue of cau-
sation in climate litigation therefore crucially depends on how well rules on scientific
evidence strike the balance between the admissibility of FAR evidence and incentivizing
their reliability (compare Figure 3.1).
In the following, we will provide a tight definition of the FAR, introduce the Daubert
standard, and discuss the nature of the methodological choices underlying FAR estimates
in order to examine, in the next section, how well the Daubert criteria strike a balance
between admissibility and reliability for FAR evidence.
The Fraction of Attributable Risk
FAR is a method to determine the relative contribution to the probability of an event
occurring (e.g. the drought in Poland) by a specific condition (e.g. SG). If the probability
of the drought is P0 in absence of SG (the counterfactual) and the probability in the
presence of SG (the actual climate) is P1, SG increases the total probability of the event
by P1−P0. The fraction of the total probability of the event occurring, P1, attributable
to SG is then
FAR =
P1 − P0
P1
= 1− P0
P1
For example, a FAR of 0.5 means that the probability for a drought in Poland in the
presence of SG is twice the probability in its absence – in other words half of the drought’s
risk is then attributable to SG. In order to estimate P0 and P1, model simulations are
run for the actual climate and the counterfactual climate.
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Methodological Choices: Climate Model(s) and Framing
We divide the methodological choices underlying a FAR estimate into two modules.
The first module concerns the choice of one or more climate model(s) from the set of
available models. In the fictional case, applicant and respondent choose different climate
models (the HadGEM and the MPI-ESM, respectively). The second module, the framing
of the event, consists of the choice of metrics and definitions used to characterize the
event, including the statistical tools employed to process the climate model data for the
metrics and definitions used. In the fictional case, the event is framed as the incident of
40 consecutive dry days, with an implicit set of definitions of what constitutes a ’dry’
day, a certain spatial definition of the event, etcetera. For details on the framing choices
employed in the fictional case, we refer the reader to the technical appendix.
The reliability of a FAR estimate hinges on both modules: Firstly, on the reliability of the
climate model(s) employed for simulating the event as it has been framed, and secondly,
on the framing of the event. The framing has to be valid, meaning that ’it measures what
it purports to measure’ (Carmines and Zeller 1979). The framing of an event is valid if
it actually captures the event it purports to describe. The difference between reliability
and validity is that reliability refers to a process that yields a numerical value, while
validity refers to the suitability of certain choices for the description of a phenomenon
or event. Both are not absolute concepts and to be understood in a gradual sense.
The Daubert Criteria
Courts have struggled for a long time with how to handle scientific evidence. Notably,
in international law, which is the relevant regime for inter-state litigation, no rules
or generally accepted criteria concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence exist.
Criteria that have been developed within domestic jurisdictions vary mostly due to
differences between common and continental legal traditions. However, at a certain
stage of every single trial, a court will (implicitly or expressly) be called upon to decide
whether it is willing to take into account the evidence provided by the parties. The most
advanced criteria for this test have been developed in the US legal system in the shape of
the Daubert standard. This standard consists of five criteria (’Daubert criteria’), which
will be used here as an example of a procedural gateway that could also be referred to
in inter-state disputes in future. The Daubert criteria are:
I. whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested (’testabil-
ity ’),
II. whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication (’peer review ’),
III. its known or potential error rate (’error rate’),
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IV. the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation (’standards
of control ’), and
V. whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within the relevant scientific com-
munity (’general acceptance’).
3.4 Admissibility and Reliability of FAR Estimates under
Daubert
3.4.1 Admissibility of FAR Estimates
It is useful to distinguish between two types of reasons leading to the inadmissibility of
a FAR estimate. The first is that any way of using the method of FAR is as a matter
of principle inadmissible. The second is that only certain methodological choices are
inadmissible. The inadmissibility of FAR estimates on principle grounds does not seem
to be optimal. In this, we rely on the judgment of a report of the US National Academy
of Sciences (NAS 2016) on the attribution of extreme weather events. It concludes,
”it is now often possible to make and defend quantitative statements about the extent
to which human-induced climate change has [...] influenced either the magnitude or
the probability of occurrence of specific types of event or event classes.” Furthermore,
this sentiment resonates with similar assessments in the two most recent of the annual
reports on extreme events published in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological
Society (BAMS).
We separate the Daubert criteria into two groups. The criteria testability (I) and error
rate (III) directly refer to FAR estimates’ scientific merit, and we refer to them as sub-
stantive criteria. They may render FAR estimates inadmissible on principal grounds.
We refer to the criteria peer review (II), standards of control (IV) and general accep-
tance (V) as formal criteria. They relate to the status FAR estimates have within the
scientific community. Peer review and general acceptance are arguably already fulfilled
today for the method of FAR as such. FAR is introduced as the ’commonly accepted
event attribution technique’ in the latest annual report in the BAMS (Herring et al.
2018b), and there is a large literature employing the concept FAR for event attribution
as documented by the annual BAMS reports. There are general recommendations for
performing event attribution in NAS (2016), which can be interpreted as standards of
control for the method of FAR as such. The more interesting role of the formal criteria
is therefore in examining specific methodologies. We start out by discussing the sub-
stantive criteria and their potential to render FAR estimates inadmissibility on principal
grounds.
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Testability demands falsifiability (Popper 1959) of the theory underlying the evidence
presented.4 This requirement presents an insurmountable hurdle for FAR estimates due
to at least two reasons, and its application would thus likely result in any FAR estimate
being inadmissible: Firstly, any FAR estimate relies on climate model output. A cli-
mate model cannot be expected to exactly reproduce the climate system. It is a tool,
which can be used to investigate and understand the climate system. Physical processes
represented in climate models are, due to computational constraints, generally subject
to approximations and parameterizations in climate modeling. In a strict sense, climate
models are therefore known to be false, and the criterion of falsifiability is not appro-
priate (Otto 2012). Instead of looking for universal properties, it is more appropriate
to ask whether a given model is ”unusable in answering specific questions” (McAvaney
2001), and a model should be limited to particular domains, while accepting a particular
level of inaccuracy (Petersen 2012). Secondly, a necessary part of a FAR estimation is
estimating the probability of the event concerned happening in the counterfactual. By
definition, the counterfactual cannot be observed in reality. Both the assumptions re-
garding the counterfactual and a climate model’s reliability for the counterfactual cannot
be compared to real world measurements.
Applying the third criterion (error rate) in a strict sense to FAR estimates is also prob-
lematic. The method of calculating a FAR has itself no error rate. Any such rate derives
from errors in estimating the probabilities P0 and P1 and depends strongly on the spe-
cific circumstances of the estimation, such as the event in question and the methodology
used. Definite numerical error rates are not suitable for assessing climate model perfor-
mance. Furthermore, whether framing an event a certain way is valid can ultimately not
be determined in a quantitative way. Lastly, error rates are not applicable to the coun-
terfactual, since such error rates require experimentation in controlled environments.
The preceding assessment resonates with the legal literature on the Daubert standard,
which comes to the conclusion that the Daubert criteria (I) and (III) are not suitable for
the intricacy of methods and procedures which characterize current scientific practice
more generally (Jasanoff 2005). Specifically, testability has been criticized for being ill-
suited for the courtroom (Haack 2010). Both criteria exclude evidence from scientific
fields in which classical experimentation is not possible as well as evidence from the
modeling of complex systems. In those cases, the Daubert standard often produces
’evidence-narrowing’ decisions (Heinzerling 2006), implying that plaintiffs frequently
would lose cases they should win (McGarity 2004, Wagner 2005, Swinehart 2008).
From a naive point of view, one could argue that the Daubert criteria (I) and (III) should
simply be abandoned, rendering FAR estimates admissible in general and allowing courts
to include the information FAR estimates can provide into their evaluation. However,
the incentive problem raised in the previous section then comes into play. In the absence
4Note that the US Supreme Court explicitly refers to Popper in its judgment in which it developed
the Daubert criteria, and it explicitly equates testability with falsifiability.
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of substantive criteria in the legal gate, the latitude of parties to choose, for example, a
certain climate model would be too large. In absence of substantive criteria, the formal
criteria can only be directly applied to individual methodological choices. However, this
is unlikely to present a real hurdle to methodological choices. For example, all climate
models frequently employed in scientific studies would arguably pass the criteria of peer
review and general acceptance, and there exist at least some standards of control for
individual climate models. However, not any such climate model is equally suitable for
simulating all extreme events. Parties could take advantage of this situation, and courts
would then receive considerably less reliable evidence from both parties than might be
produced. In this light, the question of an appropriate modification of the Daubert
standard and alternatives to criteria (I) and (III) arises. While the concept of testability
is entirely unsuitable for examining FAR estimates, this does not mean one cannot test
their performance in specific settings and the principal idea of assessing an error rate is
sensible.
3.4.2 Reliability of FAR Evidence Produced
The purpose of introducing alternative substantive criteria suggests that such criteria
should directly demand reliability. Reliability in itself is a quantitative concept. While
the reliability of a FAR estimate cannot be directly measured or observed due to the
same reasons as for an error rate, reliability can be and often is argued for. For example,
climate model reliability for specific tasks is usually quantitatively (e.g. model valida-
tion) and qualitatively (e.g. validity of assumptions, process understanding) argued for.
This distinguishes reliability from a purely numerical error rate, which has ultimately to
be obtained by experimentation. The reliability of FAR estimates hinges on the climate
model reliability and the validity of the framing. Instead of one criterion demanding the
reliability of FAR estimates, separately demanding climate model reliability and framing
validity helps clarify the different roles both concepts play in arriving at a reliable FAR
estimate. While unreliable climate model data likely does not correctly represent the
event as it has been framed, an invalid framing does not capture the actual event as
such and even a reliable climate model then simulates a fictitious event. We remind the
reader that, while reliability is a quantitative concept, validity is a qualitative one.
In order to be meaningful, climate model reliability and framing validity always have
to refer to a specific event. Before formulating the alternative substantive criteria, we
would like to emphasize that this point is indeed crucial. Climate model reliability for
simulating extreme events depends on the type of the event, the region and the climate
model. Christidis et al. (2013) find that the reliability of the HadGem3-A model for
extreme event attribution varies with region and type of the event. They examine three
different cases, concluding that model reliability is high regarding the attribution of the
2009/2010 UK cold winter and the July 2010 Moscow heat wave, but reliability is low
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regarding the Pakistan floods in July 2010. NAS (2016) states that ”[a]ttribution is
more feasible for some events than for others’ and ’the optimal choice of [...] model will
depend on the question being addressed and the event under consideration” (compare
also Stott et al. 2016). Sillmann et al. (2013) evaluate the performance of various
climate models with respect to many different metrics of climate extremes, concluding
that the performance is greatly dependent on both the metric and the climate model
under consideration. Summing up, the question of climate model reliability hinges on the
demonstration of reliability for the specific event and cannot be meaningfully answered
for a climate model in isolation.
Key part of an event’s framing is the definition of its spatial and temporal dimension,
which metric or extreme index is used to describe the event, the threshold defining the
event, whether a conditional or unconditional modeling approach is used, the statistical
tools employed and, in the case of SG, how the intervention in question is modeled. The
attribution science community emphasizes the importance of how an event is framed
(NAS 2016, Stott et al. 2016, Stott et al. 2018) and that an ”[a]ttribution result can
depend strongly on the definition of the event” (Stott et al. 2016). For example, there are
various potential choices of relevant extreme indices for a given extreme event: A warm
or cold spell can be defined in terms of duration, intensity or a combination of both;
droughts can be defined as meteorological, hydrological, socioeconomic and agricultural
(Wilhite and Glantz 1985). The relative merit of different choices depends on the type
of the event, the geographic and climatological characteristics of the relevant region and
the specific aspects important to the legal claim. While there never is a single-best way
to frame an event, but a range of valid and scientifically defensible framing, there are
clearly also less valid and invalid framing choices for a given event.
Modifying the third Daubert criterion error rate into two criteria, demanding ’sufficient
climate model reliability for the specific event ’ (IIIa) and ’sufficient validity of the fram-
ing for the specific event ’ (IIIb), would accommodate the need for suitable substantive
criteria. It furthermore highlights the importance of taking into account the specifics of
a given event in the assessment of climate model reliability and framing validity. The
court needs to decide in each specific case how to strike the balance between admis-
sibility and FAR estimate reliability. This balance may depend on, for example, how
settled the science of attribution is for a specific type of event or the availability of other
evidence and is reflected in the word ’sufficient’.
The formal criteria (II), (IV) and (V) can serve as a basis for carrying out the assessment
of reliability and validity by the substantive criteria. Having established that method-
ologies can only be meaningfully examined with respect to a specific event, the formal
criteria can only be meaningfully applied to the methods with which the reliability and
validity of the chosen methodology is demonstrated or attacked, not to a methodology
in and of itself. For example, it is not important whether a climate model is generally
accepted for being used in attribution studies. However, it is important whether the
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climate model in the specific context satisfies generally accepted methods of establishing
climate model reliability. Peer review, standards of control and general acceptance may
be used as different hurdles to clear, reflecting different applications of what is deemed
’sufficient’ by a court in a given context. The requirements may differ between types of
events, different parts of the methodology and may depend on the availability of other
evidence. In some contexts, attribution science may be settled in a way such that there
are actual standards of control, for others there may be general acceptance of a certain
methodology and for some there may simply be single examples in the peer reviewed
literature.
The court’s assessment necessarily has to rely on the methods for assessing extreme
event methodologies developed by the attribution science community. In that, a court
is constrained in two ways. The first is that the court’s assessment is limited by the
best-possible assessment given the contemporary epistemology of extreme event attri-
bution. To date, there is no settled epistemology of climate modeling. However, there is
consensus on the basic principles for extreme event model evaluation in the attribution
community: the model’s ability to simulate the event, the understanding and represen-
tation of the processes driving the event and the quality of the observational record
(Herring et al. 2016b, Stott et al. 2016, NAS 2016). The extent to which there is an
agreed-upon framework or operationalization of these basic principles is not clear. For
example, NAS (2016) cites three studies with differing approaches to model evaluation,
concluding that ”[s]uch evaluations are necessary, but they are not a sufficient demon-
stration of model quality”, and reemphasizes the role for the mechanisms producing
variability and extremes, as well as their representation in the model in the assessment
of a climate model’s reliability for a specific event. The extent to which conclusions
can be drawn on a model’s reliability for the counterfactual seems to date to be an
open question (NAS 2016), and studies usually simply assume that the model’s relia-
bility is the same for the factual and the counterfactual (e.g. Christidis et al. 2013).
In light of differing findings dependent on the climate model choice in attributing the
2015 European drought to climate change, Hauser et al. (2017) call for ”multi-model and
multi-method based event attribution”. Sillmann et al. (2013) find that multi-model ap-
proaches generally outperform individual models in reproducing historic extreme index
reanalysis data.
How different framing choices impact on the outcome of a FAR estimate is subject of
an ongoing debate in the attribution community (Stott et al. 2018). Currently, there is
a discussion regarding the merits of different choices of statistical tools and paradigms
(Stott et al. 2017, Mann et al. 2017), and Hauser et al. (2017) obtain differing results for
the attribution of the 2015 European drought to climate change, depending on framing
and climate model choices. Furthermore, different metrics lead to different attribution
assessments for the last California drought (Seager et al. 2015, Diffenbaugh et al. 2015,
Williams et al. 2015). There is consensus that the strongest conclusions about an event
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can be drawn when FAR estimates based on different framing choices of an event and on
different climate model choices yield consistent results (NAS 2016, Hauser et al. 2017,
Stott et al. 2018). While the attribution community clearly emphasizes and appreciates
the importance of framing choices, by the attribution community’s own account this is
an area where progress can still be made.
The second way in which a court is constrained in the assessment of methodology is how
well the contemporary epistemology of extreme event methodology is accessible to the
court. If an implicitly agreed-upon framework (potentially in part) suitable for answering
questions of reliability and validity exists within the attribution science community, but
is not explicitly drafted or in any other way identifiable by the court, the framework’s
mere existence is of little help to a court. A court does not have the expertise to tell
the scientific merits of competing arguments concerning model reliability by experts by
itself. However, it may well be equipped to evaluate which line of argumentation is in
line with certain well-defined and clearly framed standards or operationalizations of the
basic principles of model evaluation and which is not.
Both constraints jointly determine how well a court can assess the reliability of a FAR
estimate. The more accurately a court can distinguish between reliable and unreliable
FAR estimates, the better it can include the former while keeping the latter out, and
the finer it can strike the trade-off between admissibility and reliability. The literature
on the Russian heat wave in 2010 might serve as illustration here. Dole et al. (2011)
concluded that the event was largely natural, while Rahmstorf and Coumou (2011)
concluded that the anthropogenic influence was significant. This apparent contradiction
could be resolved by understanding that Dole et al. (2011) focused on the magnitude of
the event, while Rahmstorf and Coumou (2011) focused on the occurrence frequency of
the event (Otto et al. 2012). It is easily imaginable that a court could be confused about
the validity of the two approaches for resolving the question of causation without the
clarification in the literature. The difference between ’frequency’ and ’magnitude’ has,
by now, also been explicitly discussed in NAS (2016), making it much less likely that
a court would overlook the contribution, misunderstand the point, would be deceived
about the point, or be doubtful about the scientific consensus in this respect. Using the
’frequency’ approach for answering questions of causation might be an example which
courts identify as a standard of control and exclude any ’magnitude’ approach.
A different example are high temperature extreme events. The latest annual report
in the BAMS states that the ”majority of heat papers now use a widely established
and accepted methodology” (Herring et al. 2018b). Here, courts might ascribe general
acceptance to such methodologies, at least to the extent that they can identify the details
of the, according to Herring et al. (2018b), ”established and accepted methodology”. In
contrast, assessing a bias correction undertaken on climate model output might present
difficulties to a court. Stott et al. (2016) warn that ”bias corrections methods need
to be applied” in some cases, but ”should be applied with caution”, while NAS (2016)
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simply states that ”some bias correction will almost certainly be required” and ”the
validity of this must be established”. Shiogama et al. (2013) note that their results were
sensitive to bias correction. A court today would probably not be able to assess how a
given bias correction would affect the reliability of climate model data – even if it might
be blatantly obvious in that specific instance to a neutral attribution scientist. A court
might therefore only be able to check whether peer reviewed studies have employed bias
corrections in similar circumstances or not.
Irrespective of the legal institutions, the contemporary state of the art and the fun-
damental ability of climate models to perform event attribution set an upper limit on
climate model reliability (Trenberth et al. 2015, Otto 2016). While future advances in
climate modeling may well further improve this state of the art, we refrain from dis-
cussing its potential future evolution. However, the extent to which future advances
actually improve the reliability of FAR estimates in a trial depends on how issues we
raised in this paper are resolved.
3.5 Conclusion
Causation is a key challenge in climate litigation and attribution science has increasingly
been brought up as a potential means to resolve that challenge. Usually, the admissibility
of climate model based evidence, such as a Fraction of Attributable Risk (FAR), is at
the center of the discussion. We argued that such evidence is only effectual if it is both
admissible and reliable. While inadmissible evidence is excluded from trials, unreliable
evidence does not help in arriving at the right conclusion. The parties of the trial have
a material interest in the outcome of the trial. Lowering standards of admissibility
impacts on the reliability of evidence, since it gives the parties more leeway in choosing
methodologies leading to FAR estimates favorable to their case. FAR can therefore only
be an effectual tool for resolving questions of causation to the extent that relevant legal
rules on scientific evidence strike the right balance between the admissibility of FAR
evidence and the reliability of FAR evidence.
We provide a specific proposal for how to accommodate FAR estimates in evidentiary
standards by modifying an existing set of admissibility criteria, the Daubert standard.
This standard offers a set of five specific criteria for admissibility and applies within
United States, where climate liability suits have been launched, and is influential in
other jurisdictions such as Canada and the UK. Two of these criteria are substantive
in that they address the scientific merit of evidence. One of these two criteria (’testa-
bility ’) would exclude every FAR estimate. The other (’error rate’) is inapplicable to
FAR estimates, since numerical error rates are ultimately dependent on experimenta-
tion, which is not feasible in event attribution. We argued that dropping the first one,
and modifying the second one into two criteria directly addressing the reliability of FAR
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estimates, is capable of leading to admissible and reliable FAR estimates. FAR estimate
reliability depends on both climate model reliability and framing validity. Accordingly,
the alternative criteria demand ’sufficient climate model reliability for the event in ques-
tion’ and ’sufficient framing validity for the event in question’. The other three, formal,
criteria peer review, standards of control and general acceptance can serve as a basis for
carrying out the assessment of reliability and validity through the substantive criteria.
The word ’sufficient’ reflects the trade-off necessary between admissibility and reliability.
The optimal trade-off is likely to differ between different types of extreme events, since
attribution science is more advanced for some types of events, like temperature-related
ones, than for others. This implies that how well the problem of causation can be solved
at best depends on the type of the event.
In assessing the reliability of FAR estimates, a court is dependent on the contemporary
epistemology of extreme event modeling and the accessibility of this knowledge to the
court. The combination of the two sets an upper limit on how well courts can assess the
reliability of FAR estimates, which determines how well a court can strike the trade-off
between admissibility and reliability. NAS (2016) and the annual special reports on event
attribution in the BAMS are important steps in making the relevant knowledge accessible
and identifiable to courts in potential future cases. Especially with ongoing and future
advances in attribution science in mind, we can only encourage the compilation of similar
reports in the future.
Technical Appendix: Fictitious Tort Case
We base the fictitious court case on simulations performed for the Geoengineering Model
Intercomparison Project GeoMIP (Kravitz 2011). The purpose of the case is not to
perform a credible FAR analysis. Its purpose is, firstly, to demonstrate the variety of
choices to be made even in an analysis only going through the basic steps of a FAR
estimation. Secondly, it shows that, at least when naively executed, FAR estimates
can widely differ when different climate models are chosen, while all other choices are
identical.
We chose scenario G3 from GeoMIP as the relevant scenario. In G3, solar geoengineer-
ing (SG) is deployed by injecting sulfur into the stratosphere. The basis of G3 is the
RCP4.5 scenario (e.g. Meinshausen 2011) of the fifth phase of the Coupled Model Inter-
comparison Project (CMIP5). Sulfur injections in G3 start in year 2020 and go on for
50 years. The injections are designed to keep the top of the atmosphere radiative forcing
constant at the level of 2020, despite the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations given
in the RCP4.5 scenario. For the analysis of both the G3 and RCP4.5 simulations of
both climate models (see below) three ensemble members have been available.
Chapter 3. Establishing Causation in Climate Litigation 68
The climate models we use in the fictitious court case are in all likelihood different from
climate models in any potential future climate litigation. The way we use the climate
model output to arrive at FAR estimates constitutes a radical simplification of the state
of the art in event attribution. Our FAR estimates therefore do not remotely reflect
the reliability of FAR estimates in the literature or in a potential future trial and it is
a futile task to estimate today how reliable future simulations of extreme events may
be. However, as noted above, the purpose of the case is not to perform a credible
FAR analysis and our aspiration is not to speculate about the future development of
attribution science. A further difference to a potential future case is that we compare
two fictitious future climate states, while in an actual case one of the simulations would
need to describe the factual climate of that time. However, also for an actual and
likely transient climate state the evaluation of simulated low-frequency extreme events
is inherently difficult.
We let the opposing parties in the fictitious court case choose the two models described
below just because of opportunity. Other models that simulated the G3 scenario had
either no ensemble available, the warming in the stratosphere seemed to be unrealistic
or coupling of the aerosols to radiation was not available or erroneous. The latter is
necessary to simulate a realistic radiative forcing of the sulfate aerosols.
The choice of Poland and Australia has no political background. However, it is not
completely arbitrary. An analysis of precipitation by Aswathy et al. (2015) and a
metric for surface dryness in G3 simulations indicated that Australia could gain from
sulfur injections by increased winter precipitations in many areas. Poland is part of an
area for which at least one of the models analyzed by us indicates a potential impact
of SG. In addition, the choice of a drought case is somewhat arbitrary, but informed
by the well-known result that SG affects the water cycle (e.g. Tilmes et al. 2013).
Some extremes like hurricanes or flash floods in mountainous regions are small-scale
phenomena and need a much finer grid resolutions than used in most present-day climate
models to be simulated explicitly. Droughts, however, are often related to large-scale
stationary weather patterns that may be more realistically represented in these models.
Model description
The claims of Poland base on the Max-Planck-Institute Earth System Model (MPI-ESM,
(Giorgetta et al. 2013) while Australia bases its analysis on the HadGEM2-ES, the UK
Met Office Earth System Model (Collins et al. 2011). Both models are state of the art
climate models used in particular for the CMIP5 simulations.
The atmospheric part of the HadGEM2-ES is also used as weather forecast model.
Further, the model includes components for the simulation of tropospheric chemistry,
aerosols, land surface and hydrology, terrestrial carbon cycle, ocean sea ice and ocean
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biogeochemical processes. In the model configuration used for the G3 simulations an
aerosol microphysical model is included that explicitly simulates the evolution of the
sulfur from its injection in the form of SO2 to sulfate aerosols.
The MPI-ESM is a state of the art coupled three-dimensional atmosphere-ocean-land
surface model, with a well-represented stratosphere and an interactive carbon cycle.
It consists of an atmosphere and ocean component and includes submodels for land
processes, vegetation, and ocean biogeochemistry. Within the MPI-ESM, in contrast
to the HadGEM2-ES simulations, the stratospheric aerosol layer is prescribed via its
optical properties (Niemeier et al. 2013). It was pre-calculated in simulations with
ECHAM5-HAM (Stier et al. 2005), a general circulation model coupled interactively
to an aerosol microphysical model. Simulations with different injection rates were per-
formed (Niemeier et al. 2011) and the resulting aerosol optical properties interpolated
to monthly values for use in the MPI-ESM.
Metric used
Consecutive dry days (CDD) is a standard extreme index used in climate modeling.
It is part of the list of ten extreme indices in Frich et al. (2002), emerging from the
meeting of the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) Commission for Climatology
(CCl)/Climate Variability (CLIVAR) Working Group on Climate Change Detection in
September 1998. However, it does not exhaustively describe the phenomenon ’drought’
and other extreme indices could be chosen as well. Furthermore, droughts can be de-
fined in various categories, like meteorological, hydrological, socionomic, and agricultural
droughts (Wilhite and Glantz 1985). Besides relatively simple extreme indices like CDD,
there exist more complex metrics for describing droughts, e.g. the Palmer drought in-
dex and standardized precipitation index (Guttman 1998), which may be more or less
suitable depending on the category of drought one has in mind.
Analysis of extreme values
RCP4.5 is a transient future scenario with steadily increasing greenhouse gases. As the
scenario requires to balance only additional post-2020 radiative greenhouse-gas forcing
by stratospheric aerosol, the sulfur injections in the first years after 2020 are very small
with the consequence of a small signal-to-noise ratio. Therefore, our analysis concen-
trates on the last 20 years (2050-2069) of the simulation. From the three ensemble
members available from each model for each scenario, we created fictitious time-series of
60 years assumed representative for the two climate states with and without application
of SG.
Figure 3.2 shows the difference of the maximum number of consecutive dry days (CDD)
calculated for the RCP4.5 and the G3 scenarios. A day is considered ’dry’ if precipitation
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Figure 3.2: Anomalies of maximum numbers of consecutive dry days (CDD) simu-
lated with the climate models MPI-ESM (left) and HadGEM2-ES (right). Plotted are
the differences between the G3 and RCP4.5 scenarios in percent (top) and days (bot-
tom). The maximum CDD values have been analyzed from fictitious 60-year time-series
representing the climate state between years 2050 and 2069, which was created out of
three realizations. The boxes mark the region defined as ’Poland’.
is less than 0.1 mm. The analysis for this paper focuses on the area of ’Poland’. Results
may depend on how one exactly defines the spatial boundaries of the area. We chose
the spatial boundaries as 14°E to 22°E and 50°N to 54°N in order to include all model
grid-boxes which cover the area of Poland. The area average gives an increase of CDD
of one week for Poland in the MPI-ESM and an increase of two days for Poland in the
HadGEM2-ES. Figure 3.2 shows that the signal of CDD extremes is very noisy and
indicates how difficult it may be to unambiguously attribute specific events in a certain
region to the applied forcing.
FAR estimation
In order to estimate probability density functions (PDFs) for a CDD event in a given
year, we calculated the maximum CDD (XCDD) event of each single year in the time
series, both for the factual (G3) and the counterfactual (RCP4.5) climate states. We
did so, by first taking the area average and calculating the XCDD on that basis. For
each climate model and each scenario, this allows the calculation of a PDF based on
these 60 values. In order to obtain the PDFs, we fitted the 60 XCDDs to a Gumbel
distribution and a Fre´chet distribution. The Gumbel distribution shows better results
than the Fre´chet distribution and is often used in the literature for the statistics of
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droughts (Vicente-Serrano and Beguer´ıa-Portugue´s 2003). We therefore decided to use
the PDFs obtained from the Gumbel fits (compare Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Histograms of maximum number of consecutive dry days (XCDD) and
the probability density functions of XCDD in a given year resulting from a Gumbel fit.
The histograms show the XCDD of each single year from the fictitious 60-year time
series for results of the MPI-ESM (top) and the HadGEM2-ES (bottom), both for the
G3 scenario (left) and the RCP4.5 scenario (right), respectively.
The FAR for climate model and given event XCDD is:
FARi(XCDD) = 1− G
RCP
i (XCDD)
GG3i (XCDD)
Here, Gscenarioi (XCDD) is the likelihood of the event, according to climate model i, in
the counterfactual and factual, respectively. Given the event of 40 CDD we assumed, the
FAR estimate based on the HadGEM2-ES model yields 0.18, while the FAR estimate
based on the MPI-ESM model yields 0.94 (compare Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Probability density functions (PDFs) of yearly maximum consecutive dry
days (XCDD) resulting from a Gumbel fit and FAR estimates for given XCDD. Results
of the MPI-ESM (top) and HadGEM2-ES (bottom). FAR estimates based on the MPI-
ESM are higher than those based on the HadGEM2-ES. The vertical dotted lines mark
results for 40 XCDD, the event chosen in the fictitious court case.
Legal Appendix
The distinction between admissibility of evidence on the one hand and its evaluation
on the other is not uniformly incorporated and applied in different domestic and in-
ternational rules of procedure, and neither is the chronology between admissibility and
evaluation. For example, in the U.S., as in other common law systems, the question of
how to evaluate the evidence partly arises prior to the actual trial, namely when the
judge assesses the admissibility of the evidence. The main reason for this admissibility
test is that the jury should not be influenced by evidence which later crystallizes as
being invalid, i.e. lacking scientific standards. The admissibility test is thus (at least
implicitly) done prior to the hearing by the judge, who follows a set of rules of evidence
(i.e. the Daubert criteria) that must be fulfilled for a scientific testimony to be brought
before the court. In contrast, in civil law systems, admissibility only refers to rele-
vance (van Rhee 2016) and certain prohibitions (Nunner-Krautgasser and Anzensberger
2016), since here the irreversible influence on a jury in trial does not exist. As far as
international courts are concerned, in absence of a jury, all evidence has so far usually
been considered as being admissible (for the ICJ: Devanay 2016, Tomka and Proulx
2015, Ridell and Plant 2009, for EU Courts: Barbier de la Serre and Sibony 2008), and
detailed considerations of the provided evidence are generally missing. In substance,
however, the differences between these approaches are less clear as one might expect at
first sight: The assessment of what is referred to in common law systems as ’reliability’
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within the admissibility test forms, at least to some extent, a ’functional equivalent’
to the independent consideration and evaluation of the evidence in civil law procedure
(compare Sladic and Uzelac 2016, Tomka and Proulx 2015, Barbier de la Serre and Si-
bony 2008). The fact that in many instances courts do not provide detailed information
in their judgments on how they have evaluated the evidence that they have considered
admissible does not mean that such evaluations have not taken place. Rather, with the
exception of trials governed by the principle of official investigation, it is inevitable for
every judge to at least implicitly assess the admissibility of and evaluate the evidence
provided by the parties in order to be able to come to a decision. This two-step exercise
is particularly challenging in situations where the factual basis of causation between
a certain act and its alleged consequences is subject to scientific uncertainty. Climate
intervention scenarios, with regard to which evidence can only be provided by way of
climate models, are particularly striking examples of such situations.
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4.1 Introduction
Due to slow progress of climate change mitigation, techniques to increase the earth’s
reflection of solar radiation, so-called solar geoengineering (SG), have received increasing
attention as potential means to reduce climate change risks. SG is a potential high-
leverage set of technologies which could be capable of lowering global temperatures
within short time-scales (Keith et al. 2010). Under plausible assumptions, SG seems
to be cheap enough to be undertaken by a single country and with very small direct
costs, compared to mitigation or unmitigated climate change damages (Barrett 2008,
Keith et al. 2010). Since SG also would have regionally different impacts (Lunt et al.
2008, Robock et al. 2008, Irvine et al. 2010, Ricke et al. 2010), it constitutes a ’free-
driver’ problem (Weitzman 2015): Without any form of governance in place, the country
with the strongest preferences for SG has incentives to deploy SG beyond the preferred
provision point of all other countries. This free-driver outcome is highly undesirable
from a social point of view and calls for some form of governance.
An emphasis on the need for governance for Geoengineering in general, and SG in
particular, is ubiquitous in the literature (Barrett 2008, Shepherd 2009, Keith et al. 2010,
Rayner et al. 2013, Pasztor 2017). Liability regimes as potential tools for SG governance
have gained wide attention, with a focus on historical precedents, the applicability of
existing international law to SG, political feasibility and the issue of causation (Horton
et al. 2014, Saxler et. al 2015, Reynolds 2015). From an economic point of view, the
purpose of liability regimes is to solve incentive problems and liability regimes are a
widely used and researched tool for internalizing environmental externalities.1 In this
paper I develop a theoretical model of SG liability which I then numerically implement,
in order to understand the basic incentive structure and to examine the extent to which
different liability regimes can solve the free-driver incentive problem.
SG has a key feature which sets it apart from more traditional domains of liability like
car accidents or pollution problems. Following Weitzman’s terminology, SG is a public
good-or-bad, a public good which benefits agents at some levels and harms the same
agents at other levels: Studies focusing on two of the most important climate metrics,
mean temperature and mean precipitation, suggest that moderate amounts of SG would
benefit most regions of the world (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu
et al. 2015) and that SG would only start to be detrimental to those regions’ welfare
if provided beyond those moderate amounts.2 The public good-or-bad characteristic
1Prominent national, supranational and international examples include the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in the US, the European Environmental Liability
Directive 2004/35/EC, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.
2Mean temperature and mean precipitation are of great relevance for impacts which could trigger a
lawsuit: directly, since they, for example, greatly influence which types of agriculture are feasible in a
given region and indirectly, since they are closely connected to the probability of occurrence of extreme
events.
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impacts on the incentives a liability regime provides in two ways. The first one is via
the definition of harm, i.e. the question of which SG impacts have to be compensated
for. The second one is via the liability standards, i.e. the question of the circumstances
under which harm from SG has to be compensated for.
In this paper I focus on the implications of SG’s public good-or-bad characteristic for
liability regimes. Consequently, a liability regime in the model consists of a definition
of harm and a liability standard. There are n agents in the model, who can be thought
of as countries or regions, having climate preferences in the form of convex damage
functions. In order to reflect the good-or-bad characteristic, at least some agents benefit
from moderate SG levels. The agent with the strongest preferences for SG is assumed
to be the sole SG provider. Direct costs are assumed to be negligible. I examine the
equilibrium outcome both under no liability (the free-driver outcome) and under various
liability regimes, each consisting of a definition of harm and a liability standard, relative
to the social optimum defined by the minimization of aggregate damages.
The reference point against which harm is measured or should be measured is not self-
evident for a public good-or-bad. One possibility is to use the victim’s position in a
world without any SG as reference point. I call this the absolute definition of harm. A
second possibility is to use the victim’s preferred provision level as reference point, a
world in which SG is not provided beyond the victim’s optimum. I call this the marginal
definition of harm. In contrast, the two definitions of harm coincide for a pure bad like
car accidents or pollution, since a victim’s optimal provision level is then always zero.
Negligence, one of two fundamental types of liability standards, uses a behavioral stan-
dard in order to determine whether to assign liability. The traditional economic in-
terpretation of the negligence standard is that it balances the marginal costs with the
marginal benefits of avoiding harm (Posner 1972, Landes and Posner 1987): The injurer
can forgo a reduction of own damages (and potentially those of some third parties) in
order to not increase damages of other agents. In a one-victim-one-injurer setting, there
is only one way to trade off marginal costs and benefits from avoiding harm. However,
the public good-or-bad SG constitutes a multiple-victim-third-party-beneficiary setting,
raising the question of whose costs and whose benefits are or should be traded off by a
negligence standard. I will give three interpretations of the negligence standard.
From a normative welfare perspective all agents’ welfare should be considered in the
negligence standard. I call the standard emerging from considering all agents benefits
and harms the benefit-harm negligence standard. However, consideration of effects on
parties that are not part of the trial is generally not permissible in international law,
probably the most important body of law for SG, rendering the benefit-harm negligence
standard unlikely to be applied in practice. The other two interpretations are designed
to reflect potential scenarios of a trial and third-party beneficiaries are consequently
excluded from the standard in these interpretations. The first scenario is a trial between
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all victims and the injurer. Here, the victims’ harm is considered on aggregate, giving rise
to the aggregate harm negligence standard. In the second scenario, there are individual
trials between each victim and the injurer. Here, each victim’s harm is considered
individually, giving rise to the individual harm negligence standard, which sets a standard
for each individual victim. I will consider these three negligence standards and the other
fundamental type of liability standard, strict liability. Under strict liability an injurer is
liable for all harm she causes irrespective of her behavior.
I find that only one liability regime implements the social optimum in general – the
marginal definition of harm combined with the benefit-harm negligence standard. How-
ever, as already noted, the benefit-harm negligence standard is unlikely to be employed
in a real-world scenario. All other liability regimes are biased. The direction of these
biases is often ambiguous in general, since there are often multiple biases at play, which
potentially pull into opposing directions.
Liability regimes employing the absolute definition of harm cannot implement the social
optimum in general, since it only reflects increases in the victims’ damage levels above
the respective victim’s damage level without any SG at all. In contrast, the marginal
definition of harm reflects all increases in the respective victim’s damage levels due to
increases in SG provision. The former definition is therefore biased towards too high
SG provision levels, while the latter is unbiased. This result is of importance for SG
compensation regimes more generally, in that any compensation regime must define a
reference point which is used to determine the amount of compensation to award. The
characteristics and incentive effects of the absolute and the marginal definition then carry
over to their respective counterparts in any mechanism under which the SG provider
has to compensate victims.
Liability regimes employing the benefit-harm negligence standard can implement the
social optimum in general. This standard is unbiased since it considers all agents’ welfare.
All other liability standards do not internalize the positive externality. Strict liability and
the aggregate harm negligence standard both fully internalize the negative externality.
They therefore implement the same SG provision level in equilibrium and are biased to
too low SG levels. The individual harm negligence standard does not fully internalize
the negative externality, since each victim’s harm is balanced individually against the
injurer’s benefits. Its bias is therefore ambiguous in general. No liability implements
the free-driver outcome.
I numerically implement the SG liability model into the Residual Climate Response
(RCR) model (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012) which has been developed and used (Moreno-
Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015) to examine regional SG effects.
I do so for two reasons. Firstly, in order to obtain an estimate of how severe the
SG governance problem is, I want to quantify the in the theoretical literature well-
established (Weitzman 2015, Heyen 2016) free-driver problem. Secondly, the numerical
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implementation of the liability model might help illuminate how the performance of
the non-optimal liability regimes compared to the free-driver outcome and the social
optimum is, whether there are major differences in performance between these regimes
and whether the choice of the definition of harm and the choice of the liability standard
are equally important. The RCR model is a simple framework for evaluating regional
climate responses to SG which uses quadratic regional damage functions in regional
mean temperature and precipitation, with damages being minimal and normalized to
zero at regional preindustrial conditions. For the implementation I use data from the
G1 experiment of the Geoengineering Intercomparision Project (Kravitz et al. 2011).
In line with the literature (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Yu et al. 2015), I find that socially
optimal SG is very effective at reducing residual damages for the temperature metric
(0.2% of unmitigated climate change damages) and effective for the precipitation metric
(5.1%). Concurrent research comes to the conclusion that the SG governance problem
might be substantial: Using an integrated assessment model approach for quantifying
the free-driver outcome, Emmerling and Tavoni (2017) find SG overprovision of a factor
of eight. Using the much simpler RCR model approach, I find that the the extent of the
free-driver problem depends on the metric chosen: For a metric of mean temperature
there is only moderate SG overprovison in the free-driver outcome in which SG is still
capable to reduce damages effectively (1.8%). However, there is drastic overprovision
for a metric of mean precipitation in the free-driver outcome, leading to damages 6.5
times higher than without any SG. These findings confirm earlier results that regional
differences in SG impacts are larger for precipitation than for temperature (Moreno-
Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015). In the free-driver outcome, the
differences in residual damages between the two metrics are amplified, since SG provision
is according to the strongest preferences for SG.
In the presence of liability regimes, SG is also for the precipitation metric implemented
in a welfare-enhancing way: All regimes reduce damages to at most 19.6% of unmiti-
gated climate change damages for this metric. Liability regimes employing the marginal
definition of harm virtually implement the social optimum for both metrics. For the
temperature metric, the absolute definition’s bias renders liability regimes without any
effect at all. Differences in outcomes across the definition of harm are larger than differ-
ences in outcomes across liability standards and liability regimes employing the marginal
definition of harm do consistently better than regimes employing the absolute definition.
Therefore, given the assumptions of this numerical implementation, the choice of the def-
inition of harm is more consequential than the choice of the liability standard for the
performance of a liability regime.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 lays out the general SG liability model.
Section 4.3 discusses the definitions of harm, while section 4.4 the liability standards.
Section 4.5 examines the performance of the various liability regimes. In section 4.6 the
SG liability model is implemented into the RCR model. Section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2 The SG Liability Model
I model SG as a public good-or-bad which exhibits the free-driver characteristic. Be-
sides the usual public good features of non-excludability and non-rivalry, being a public
good-or-bad means that a marginal increase in the provision of the good-or-bad may
be beneficial or harmful for the same agent, depending on amounts already provided.
The free-driver characteristic implies that agents are heterogeneous in their preferences
regarding the SG provision level x and that SG can be provided at negligible marginal
costs.
These assumptions are reflected in the model set-up: I assume that there are n different
agents and that each agent i has a well-defined and positive damage function
di(x),
depending on the SG provision level x. Each damage function is convex and continuous
in x. Furthermore, each damage function is increasing beyond some provision level. This
implies that each agent i has a unique optimal SG level xi. In line with SG’s good-or-bad
characteristic I assume that xi > 0 for at least some agents.
I assume the social welfare criterion to be the minimization of total damages
min
x∈[0,xn]
∑
i
di(x).
Due to the individual damage functions’ characteristics this problem has a unique so-
lution which is denoted by x∗. I assume that it is always the n-th agent who has the
greatest incentives to provide SG at the margin and that agent n is the sole SG provider.3
There is a liability regime in place which makes the SG provider pay for the harm she
causes to other agents according to some liability function L(x). The liability function
determines the amount of compensation the SG provider as to pay given her behavior.
The SG provider knows the liability function and minimizes her own damage function
plus the liability function:
min
x∈[0,xn]
[dn(x) + L(x)] .
The liability function L(x) depends on two dimensions in this model, harm to other
parties and the liability standard. The liability standard determines whether the SG
provider has to make liability payments to other parties. Harm determines the amount
of compensation a party receives, in case the SG provider has to compensate the party
according to the prevailing liability standard.
3The domain in the minimization problem can be restricted because SG levels beyond the free-driver
outcome xn are never optimal and no agent has an incentive to provide SG beyond xn.
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4.2.1 Definition of Harm
There are two salient reference points for measuring SG harm: The first one is the
potential victim’s condition without any SG provision. I call this definition of harm
the absolute definition of harm. The second one is the victim’s optimal condition or
preferred provision level, in other words, the level from which on SG is indeed a bad for
the agent in question. I call this definition of harm the marginal definition of harm.
According to the absolute definition of harm, an agent i is harmed by SG if her damage
level is above her damage level in the complete absence of SG. The reference point here
is the damage level at zero SG provision, i.e. harm is
hAi (x) = max{0, di(x)− di(0)}.
According to the the marginal definition of harm, an agent i is harmed if her damage
level would be lower under some smaller SG level than the actual one. The reference
point here is the damage level at her optimal provision point xi, i.e. harm is
hMi (x) = di(max{x, xi})− di(xi).
Since harm is always positive, the definition of harm only impacts on the internalization
of the negative externality. In theory, a definition of harm could also be employed to
internalize the positive externality of SG provision, by allowing for negative harm for
some provision levels x. Such ’negative liability’ does not correspond to the institutional
reality (Dari-Mattiacci 2009) and is therefore not considered in this paper.
4.2.2 Liability Standards
There are two traditional types of liability standards, strict liability and negligence stan-
dards. Under strict liability, the SG provider has to compensate for any harm inflicted
on any agent according to the prevalent definition of harm. Liability payments to be
made by the SG provider are then
LSL(x) =
∑
i 6=n
hi(x).
Under negligence, the provider has to pay damages in accordance with the prevalent
definition of harm, if she fails to meet a certain behavioral standard. The SG provider’s
behavior is characterized by the provision level x. In the law-and-economics literature,
the behavioral standard is conceived as a level of (costly) precaution which reduces harm
to other agents. Its standard economic interpretation is that it provides a balancing of
the marginal harm and marginal costs of preventing harm (Posner 1972, Landes and
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Posner 1987). Translated into the context of SG, the costs of refraining from increasing
the SG level are the forgone benefits in form of reduced damages to the SG provider
and, potentially, other agents. The costs of preventing harm are weighted against the
prevented harm from not increasing the SG level. Since there is SG overprovision in
absence of governance, the behavioral standard is conceptualized as a maximum level of
SG provision in this model. Liability payments then depend on the SG level x chosen
by the provider:
LN (x) =
0 if x ≤ xNLSL(x) if x > xN
Here, xN is the behavioral standard. If the SG provider complies with the standard, she
is absolved from liability. If she does not comply she has to pay for all harm caused, i.e.
she faces liability payments equivalent to those under strict liability.
In traditional liability settings, in which a single injurer’s actions unambiguously harm
a single victim, there is only one way how the behavioral standard can trade off the
two parties’ interests. However, in the multi-agent context of the public good-or-bad
SG, there are several potential options for defining the behavioral standard. I give
three different interpretations of the behavioral standard, one guided by the normative
criterion of welfare maximization and two reflecting potential institutional realities.
From a normative welfare perspective, the weighting underlying the behavioral standard
should reflect the consequences of the SG provision level on all agents’ welfare: This
includes the harm inflicted on other parties, as well as the benefits, in form of damage
reduction, conveyed to other parties as positive externality and the SG provider’s damage
reduction. I call the behavioral standard emerging from this interpretation the benefit-
harm negligence standard: This behavioral standard xBHN is the unique solution
4 to
min
x∈[0,xn]
[
LSL(x) +
∑
i 6=n
di(min{xi, x}) + dn(x)
]
.
Under benefit-harm negligence, the SG provider has then to compensate either all victims
or none, depending on whether she complied with the benefit-harm negligence standard
or not.
While appealing from a normative point of view, the benefit-harm negligence standard,
however, is likely to be incompatible with institutional reality. Consideration of effects
on parties that are not part of the trial is generally not permissible in international law.
This is likely to prevent third-party beneficiaries from being considered in the behavioral
standard and makes the benefit-harm negligence standard unlikely to be employed in a
real-world scenario.
4There exists a unique solution since this is a continuous and convex optimization problem on a
compact set.
Chapter 4. A Model of Solar Geoengineering Liability 82
Interpretations of negligence focusing on the parties harmed and the SG provider are
arguably more in line with institutional reality. Two different potential settings arise:
In the first one the parties harmed sue jointly and are part of the same trial. In the
second one they sue individually and there are separate trials for each party harmed. The
former scenario suggests an interpretation of negligence under which the victims’ harm is
considered on aggregate in the weighting process. I call this standard the aggregate harm
negligence standard. The behavioral standard xAHN is defined as the unique solution
to
min
x∈[0,xn]
[
LSL(x) + dn(x)
]
.
Under aggregate harm negligence the SG provider has then to compensate either all
victims or none, depending on whether she complied with the aggregate harm negligence
standard or not.
In the latter scenario, there are as many potential trials as potential victims. In each
case the court balances the victim’s harm individually with the SG provider’s damage
reduction from increasing SG provision. I call this the individual harm negligence stan-
dard under which there is a standard xILN (i) for each potential victim i, where each
standard the solution to the respective minimization problem
min
x∈[0,xn]
[
hi(x) + dn(x)
]
.
Under individual harm negligence, the SG provider has then to compensate victims on an
individual basis, depending on whether she complied with the standard corresponding
to the respective victim or not.
4.3 Assessment of the Definitions of Harm
For a liability regime to induce the socially optimal SG provision level, it must make
the SG provider internalize the negative and the positive externalities on the other n−1
agents. Harm determines how large the compensation is which the SG provider has to
pay to victims, given that she has to compensate according to the liability standard.
Since this compensation is always positive, the definition of harm only impacts on the
internalization of the negative externality. I will now examine the marginal and absolute
definition of harm with regard to their ability to be part of a SG liability regime which
internalizes the negative externality.
Fully internalizing the negative externality means that any welfare-reducing effect of
further provision is reflected in the SG provider’s optimization problem. Under all
liability regimes, the occurrence of harm is a necessary condition to award compensation.
Any negative change in welfare to third parties can only be internalized by a liability
regime to the extent that the negative change is reflected in what is understood to be
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harm, i.e. to the extent that there is a corresponding positive change in the prevalent
definition of harm. In case of the absolute definition of harm
hAi (x) = max{0, di(x)− di(0)},
there are settings in which a negative change in third parties’ welfare does not correspond
to an increase in harm: Assume that xi > 0 for some agent i and that the current
provision level is xi. Consider a marginal increase in the provision level. Agent i will
clearly be worse-off by this marginal increase, since xi is her optimal provision point.
However, given the absolute definition of harm, harm is only positive if agent i’s damages
are larger compared to the her damages without any SG at all. Since her damages,
given the provision level xi, are even smaller than those in the complete absence of SG,
a marginal increase in the provision level cannot render her damages larger than those
in complete absence of SG. This effect disappears as soon as the actual damage di(x) is
larger than the initial damage level di(0) in absence of SG, in particular it is non-existent
if the agent’s optimal provision level xi is zero. I denote the largest provision level such
that absolute harm is zero for agent i by xAi . Furthermore, given a specific provision
level x, I define the victim set at a provision level x as the set of agents for whom a
marginal increase in the provision level is detrimental: V (x) = {i | xi < x}.
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Figure 4.1: Reference points for the marginal definition of harm (MDH) and the
absolute definition of harm (ADH). Victim V ’s damage function is in blue (solid curve),
the injurer I’s damage function is in red (dashed curve). The marginal definition of
harm is represented by the combination of the dotted and the solid vertical lines. The
absolute definition of harm is represented by the solid vertical line. At the provision
level x˜ the marginal definition of harm is positive, while the absolute definition of harm
is zero.
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I have just argued that for all agents with xi > 0, there is a provision interval [xi, x
A
i ]
in which the agent i’s marginal damage from SG provision is positive, while marginal
harm5, given the absolute definition of harm, is zero. Therefore, the negative impacts on
agent i from further provision in that interval can never be reflected in the SG provider’s
private maximization problem by means of any liability regime employing the absolute
definition of harm: Employing the absolute definition of harm introduces a bias towards
too high SG provision levels x in equilibrium.
In contrast, in case of the marginal definition of harm
hMi (x) = di(max{x, xi})− di(xi),
marginal harm and marginal damage coincide for all agents in the victim set V (x):
d
dx
hMi (x) =
d
dx
di(x) if x ≥ xi
Any negative change (and only negative changes) in third-party welfare is reflected in the
marginal definition of harm. Therefore, employing the marginal definition of harm does
not introduce a bias towards too high SG provision levels x in equilibrium. Whether the
negative changes in welfare on third parties is actually internalized by a specific liability
regime employing the marginal definition of harm is then up to the specific liability rule
employed.
Proposition 1.
1. The absolute definition of harm does in general not fully reflect the negative exter-
nality from increases in the SG provision x. For
min{xi | xi > 0} ≤ x < max{xAi | i 6= n},
the sum of marginal damages for agents in the victim set V (x) is larger than the
sum of marginal harm:
∑
i∈V (x)
d
dx
di(x) >
∑
i∈V (x)
d
dx
hAi (x).
2. The marginal definition of harm fully reflects the negative externality from in-
creases in the SG provision x. For all x, the sum of marginal damages for agents
5The harm’s derivative does not exist at all points. However, since the harm function is convex, the
one-sided derivatives exist, in particular the right derivative. Throughout the paper I am interested in
the changes of an increase in SG, i.e. the right derivative. In cases in which the derivative does not
exist, be it for the harm function or any other function, I mean ”right derivative” when referring to the
derivative or marginals.
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in the victim set V (x) and the sum of marginal harm coincide:
∑
i∈V (x)
d
dx
di(x) =
∑
i∈V (x)
d
dx
hMi (x).
3. No liability regime employing the absolute definition of harm can in general im-
plement the socially optimal SG provision level. If there are two liability regimes
employing the same liability standard, one using the marginal definition and the
other one using the absolute definition of harm, the former implements a (weakly)
higher SG provision level than the latter.
The assumption that xi > 0 for more than one agent is crucial for this result. In
substance, there is not any difference between the marginal and the absolute definition
of harm, if this assumption is not fulfilled: If for all agents (except for the SG provider)
xi = 0, we have a traditional setting of harm in which the first unit of an activity directly
harms all potential victims. In such a setting, the distinction between the marginal and
the absolute definition of harm becomes meaningless. The marginal definition of harm
essentially reestablishes such a traditional setting of harm: By setting the reference point
to the agent’s optimal provision level, it ignores all changes in an agent’s welfare before
the public good-or-bad unambiguously becomes a bad for the agent in question. This
allows the marginal definition of harm to reflect all negative changes in the victim’s
welfare.6
The absolute definition of harm’s bias does not imply that a specific liability standard
in combination with the absolute definition of harm does always worse than the same
standard in combination with the marginal definition of harm, since there is also a
positive externality at play. If the positive externality is as well not (fully) internalized
given the regime’s liability standard, which would give rise to a bias in the opposite
direction, the two biases (partially) cancel out. Which of the two liability regime then
entails the larger bias is ambiguous and depends on the specific case at hand.
Proposition 1 is of importance for SG compensation regimes more generally. Any com-
pensation regime (e.g. insurance provided by the SG provider) has to define a reference
point used to ascertain the amount of compensation to be paid. The counterparts of the
marginal and the absolute definition in such a compensation regime then have the same
characteristics as those stated in proposition 1.
6The distinction between the marginal and the absolute definition of harm is related to a legal and
philosophical discussion on the nature of harm (Feinberg 1986, Perry 2003), which differentiates between
a ’worsening’ notion and a ’counterfactual’ notion of harm.
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4.4 Assessment of the Liability Standards
In this section I discuss the liability standards, employing generic harm functions hi(x)
which can stand for both definitions of harm. I denote the equilibrium SG provision
level under a liability standard S by xˆS . The equilibrium provision level also depends
on the definition of harm. However, all statements made in this section, in particular
statements about the equilibrium provision levels, hold for both definitions of harm.
Liability standards can only make the SG provider internalize the negative externality
to the extent that it is reflected in the definition of harm hi(x). They can therefore only
internalize harm, but not the negative externality as such.
4.4.1 No Liability
In case of no liability, the SG provider does neither face direct costs nor liability pay-
ments. Acting in self-interest, she provides SG up to her personal optimum. SG provision
in equilibrium is then the free-driver outcome xˆFD = maxi xi > x
∗.
4.4.2 Strict Liability
Under strict liability, liability payments are the sum of the individual agents’ harm:
LSL(x) =
∑
i 6=n
hi(x).
The SG provider minimize the sum of her liability payments and her own damage:
min
x∈[0,xn]
[LSL(x) + dn(x)].
At any provision level, the provider faces the trade-off between a marginal decrease
in her own damages and a marginal increase in her liability payments. The liability
payments reflect the increases in third-party harm and the SG provider therefore in-
ternalizes the full harm externality. However, positive externalities are not captured
in her minimization problem. Since the negative externality is fully captured, but the
positive externality is not captured, strict liability carries a bias towards too low SG
provision levels. A liability regime employing strict liability can therefore in general not
implement the socially optimal outcome x∗.
4.4.3 Negligence Rules
Negligence rules set a behavioral standard to which the provider must adhere in order
to escape liability payments. The behavioral standard is some maximum SG provision
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level xN . The SG provider faces damages of
LN (x) =
0 if x ≤ xNLSL(x) if x > xN
and her minimization problem accordingly is
min
x∈[0,xn]
dn(x) +
0 if x ≤ xNLSL(x) if x > xN

If the SG provider is better-off by complying with the standard compared to her optimal
choice under strict liability, she will choose the provision level xN in equilibrium.
Benefit-Harm Negligence
The benefit-harm negligence standard is guided by the normative approach of balancing
costs and benefits of all agents. The behavioral standard xBHN is defined as solution to
min
x∈[0,xn]
LSL(x) +∑
i 6=n
di(min{xi, x}) + dn(x)
 .
This minimization problem includes the same components as the SG provider’s mini-
mization problem under strict liability plus the terms representing the positive exter-
nality. It therefore holds that the behavioral standard under benefit-harm negligence is
larger than the equilibrium outcome under strict liability : xBHN ≥ xˆSL. Complying with
the benefit-harm negligence standard, the SG provider does not face liability payments
and her damage level is dn(xBHN ). Under strict liability she faces liability payments
and her damage level is dn(xˆSL). Since xn ≥ xBHN ≥ xˆSL, she is better-off by comply-
ing with the benefit-harm negligence standard. It follows that x∗BHN = xBHN ≥ x∗SL.
Since the benefit-harm negligence standard takes into account both the positive and the
negative externality, it is not biased and a liability regime employing this standard may
implement the social optimal outcome x∗ in general.
Aggregate Harm Negligence
The aggregate harm negligence standard reflects a setting in which all agents harmed
jointly sue the SG provider. In this setting all agents harmed are party to the trial
and their harm is taken into consideration on aggregate. The resulting aggregate harm
negligence standard xALN is defined as solution to
min
x∈[0,xn]
[LSL(x) + dn(x)] .
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Since this is identical to the private minimization problem the SG provider faces under
strict liability, we have xALN = x
∗
SL. It directly follows that the SG provider chooses
x∗ALN = xALN = x
∗
SL in equilibrium in order to avoid paying damages. The aggregate
harm negligence standard leads to the same outcome as strict liability : It carries a bias
towards too low SG provision levels and fully internalizes the negative externality while
not capturing the positive externality at all. However, note that the aggregate harm
negligence standard has other distributional effects: While the agents harmed receive
compensation under strict liability, there are no liability payments under the aggregate
harm negligence standard in equilibrium.
Individual Harm Negligence
The individual harm negligence standard reflects a setting in which agents harmed in-
dividually sue the SG provider. In this setting there is an individual for each victim
and their harm is taken into consideration individually. Therefore, there is an individual
behavioral standard xIHN (i) for each agent i (except for the SG provider) under the
individual harm negligence standard. The individual standard for agent i is defined as
solution to:
min
x∈[0,xn]
[hi(x) + dn(x)] .
For a given provision level x the liability payments are
LIHN (x) =
∑
i 6=n
lIHN (i, x) with
lIHN (i, x) =
0 if x ≤ xIHN (i)hi(x) if x > xIHN (i) .
The SG provider’s minimization problem then is
min
x∈[0,xn]
dn(x) +∑
i 6=n
0 if x ≤ xIHN (i)hi(x) if x > xIHN (i)
 .
Since there is an individual behavioral standard for each potential victim, the SG
provider will in general adhere to some of these behavioral standards and not to others.
Since these behavioral standards only consider one victim’s harm at a time, they fail to
internalize the harm of all other victims in their balancing process: Consider the smallest
of the individual standards. At this standard’s provision level, the marginal benefit to
the SG provider and the marginal harm to the victim in question are balanced, but the
marginal harm to all other victims is neglected. Taking this harm to the other victims
into account shows that the aggregate marginal harm at this provision level outweighs
the SG provider’s marginal benefit. Therefore, the victims’ harm is only partially inter-
nalized under the individual harm negligence standard. This implies that the individual
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harm negligence equilibrium provision level is larger than under strict liability and the
aggregate harm negligence standard: xˆIHN ≥ xˆAHN = xˆSL. However, not only the vic-
tims’ harm is not fully internalized, but also the positive externality is not internalized
at all under the individual harm negligence standard: The individual harm negligence
standard is biased, but the direction of the bias is ambiguous in general. It is therefore
also ambiguous whether the individual harm negligence equilibrium provision level is
larger or smaller than the benefit-harm negligence equilibrium provision level. The an-
swer to this depends both on the definition of harm and the agents’ damage functions.
Due to the standard’s bias, a liability regime employing the individual harm negligence
standard is in general not able to implement the socially optimal SG provision level.
The results about liability standards are summarized in
Proposition 2.
1. No liability regime employing one of the liability standards of strict liability, the
aggregate harm negligence standard or the individual harm negligence standard can
in general implement the socially optimal SG provision level.
2. For both definitions of harm, it holds that
xˆFD ≥ xˆBHN ≥ xˆSL = xˆAHN and xˆFD ≥ xˆIHN ≥ xˆSL = xˆAHN .
The ordering of xˆBHN and xˆIHN is ambiguous in general and depends on the
agents’ damage functions di(x) and the prevalent definition of harm.
The benefit-harm negligence standard is the only liability standard which can be part of
a liability regime which implements the socially optimal SG provision level in general.
However, as already mentioned, the benefit-harm negligence standard is unlikely to be
employed in a real-world scenario, since consideration of effects on parties that are not
part of the trial is generally not permissible in international law, which is probably the
most important body of law for SG. Furthermore, the benefit-harm negligence standard
imposes the highest informational requirements on a court, since for the determination
of the standard the welfare of all regions would have to be considered.
4.5 Assessment of Liability Regimes
I now assess the performance of liability regimes, each consisting of a definition of harm
and a liability standard. I denote the equilibrium SG provision level under a liability
regime consisting of liability standard S and definition of harm H by xˆS(H). The
behavioral standard corresponding to a negligence rule S in combination with a definition
of harm H is accordingly denoted by xS(H).
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The marginal definition of harm and the benefit-harm negligence standard both do not
carry a bias. A liability regime employing those two components indeed succeeds in
implementing the socially optimal SG level: The social optimum x∗ is defined as the
solution to
min
x∈[0,xn]
∑
i
di(x).
Given the marginal definition of harm
hMi (x) = di(max{x, xi})− di(xi),
the behavioral standard under the benefit-harm negligence standard is defined as the
solution to
min
x∈[0,xn]
∑
i 6=n
(di(max{x, xi} − di(xi))) +
∑
i 6=n
di(min{xi, x}) + dn(x)
 .
Since di(max{x, xi}) + di(min{x, xi}) = di(x) + di(xi), this is equivalent to
min
x∈[0,xn]
∑
i 6=n
di(xi) + dn(x)
 ,
and therefore equivalent to the minimization problem which defines the social opti-
mum. From the discussion of the benefit-harm negligence standard we know that the
SG provider adheres to that standard in equilibrium. It follows that xˆBHN (M) =
xBHN (M) = x
∗.
Knowing the biases, or absence of biases, of the different definitions of harm and of the
different liability standards, one can infer the performance of the other potential liability
regimes relative to the social optimum.
Proposition 3.
1. A liability regime employing the marginal definition of harm and the benefit-harm
negligence standard implements the socially optimal SG provision level in equilib-
rium.
2. In combination with the marginal definition of harm, strict liability and the aggre-
gate harm negligence standard implement too low SG provision levels in equilibrium
compared to the social optimum, whereas the marginal definition of harm combined
with the individual harm negligence standard may lead to too high or too low pro-
vision levels in equilibrium compared to the social optimum.
3. In combination with the absolute definition of harm, the benefit-harm negligence
standard implements too high SG provision levels in equilibrium compared to the
social optimum, whereas strict liability, the aggregate harm negligence standard and
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the individual harm negligence standard in combination with the absolute definition
of harm implement too high or too low SG provision levels in equilibrium compared
to the social optimum.
Summary of Model Results
Bias: Liability Standards MDH ADH
Bias: Definitions of Harm o +
BHN Standard o o +
SL & AHN Standard - - ?
IHN Standard ? ? ?
Table 4.1: The second row and the second column report the biases for the definitions
of harm and the liability standards, respectively, alone. The net bias for the liability
regimes, each consisting of a definition of harm and a liability standard, are reported in
the third and fourth column. An ’o’ marks the absence of a bias, a ’+’ one towards too
high SG provision levels, a ’–’ one towards too low ones and a ’?’ marks a bias whose
direction is ambiguous in general. Abbreviations: Marginal definition of harm (MDH);
Absolute definition of harm (ADH); Benefit-harm negligence (BHN); Aggregate harm
negligence (AHN); Individual harm negligence (IHN); Strict Liability (SL).
4.6 Numerical Implementation
I numerically implement the SG liability model for two main reasons: Firstly, various
studies have numerically examined the regional effects of SG (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012,
Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015), using regional mean temperature and regional
mean precipitation as metrics. These studies have so far focused on Pareto-optimal and
socially optimal SG provision levels, finding that the socially optimal provision of SG
reduces damages at the regional level compared to climate changes damages substantially
(Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Yu et al. 2015) and that Pareto-optimal SG reduces regional
damages considerably at least for the temperature metric (Kravitz et al. 2014). However,
these studies ignored the underlying incentive structure. The free-driver’s incentive to
provide SG up to her private optimum is well-established in the literature (Weitzman
2015, Heyen 2016). I quantify the free-driver problem in order to estimate the extent of
the SG governance problem.
Secondly, in the theoretical part of this paper I found that only one liability regime
implements the social optimum. However, this regime employs the liability standard
arguably least likely to be employed in the real world. All other liability regimes fail
to implement the social optimum. Whether these liability regimes implement too much
or too little SG compared to the social optimum is often ambiguous, due to the pres-
ence of multiple biases, which potentially pull into opposing directions. The numerical
implementation of the liability model might help illuminate how the performance of
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these non-optimal, but more likely to be employed, liability regimes compares to the
free-driver outcome and the social optimum is, whether there are major differences in
performance between these regimes and whether the choice of the definition of harm and
the choice of the liability standard are equally important.
Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012) have developed a simple framework for evaluating regional
effects of SG, the Residual Climate Response (RCR) model. The RCR model uses
quadratic regional damage functions in regional mean temperature and precipitation,
with damages being minimal and normalized to zero at regional preindustrial conditions.
These quadratic damage functions are one specific instance of the more general regional
damage functions used in the theoretical part of this paper. Using preindustrial climate
conditions as a baseline to evaluate regional SG impacts, and thereby assuming that
any deviation from that baseline inflicts damage, has been criticized as unrealistic in the
literature (Heyen et al. 2015). However, since there is no obvious way which baseline
to employ instead, I follow the existing studies (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al.
2014, Yu et al. 2015) and hold on to using the preindustrial baseline.
4.6.1 The Residual Climate Response Model
The RCR model uses 22 geographic regions (as defined in Giorgi and Francisco 2000).
The relevant climate metric is either regional mean temperature or regional mean precip-
itation. Let M be either of these metrics. A region’s climate preferences are determined
by a regional damage function. Regional damage is quadratic in the regional deviation
∆Mi(x) from the preindustrial mean:
di(x) = −∆Mi(x)2.
These preferences imply that regional damage is lowest (i.e. zero) for preindustrial
regional means.
The regional deviation from the preindustrial mean is the sum of the individual regional
deviations due to climate change (∆MiCO2) and SG (∆MiSG(x)). Both of these devi-
ations are normalized by preindustrial regional interannual variability σiM,pre. The SG
provision level’s impact is assumed to be linear7:
∆Mi(x) = ∆MiCO2 + ∆MiSG(x) = ∆MiCO2 + x ·∆MiSG.
7Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012) and Kravitz et al. (2014) provide evidence for the reasonableness of this
linear climate response assumption.
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∆MiCO2 is the normalized difference between the pure climate change regional mean
M iCO2 and the preindustrial regional mean M
i
pre:
∆MiCO2 =
M iCO2 −M ipre
σiM,pre
.
∆MiSG is the normalized difference between the regional mean M iSG in the SG climate,
in which global mean temperature is restored to the preindustrial level, and the pure
climate change regional mean M iCO2:
∆MiSG =
M iSG −M iCO2
σiM,pre
.
For all regions, M ipre, M
i
CO2, M
i
SG and σ
i
M,pre have to be calculated from climate model
data. ∆MCO2 is called the CO2 vector and x · ∆MSG is called the SG vector. For a
given SG provision level x, the residual vector ∆M(x) contains all regions’ normalized
deviations from the preindustrial mean.
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Figure 4.2: Residual Climate Response model. The horizontal axis shows changes
in temperature for the injurer I, the vertical axis shows changes in temperature for
the victim V . The blue CO2 vector represents the temperature change due to climate
change. The green SG vector represents the temperature change due to SG implemented
according to the injurer’s preferences. The red vector is the residual vector in the
social optimum, pointing to regional temperatures under the socially optimal amount
of SG. Since regional damages are quadratic, the squared length of the residual vector
represents the residual damages in the social optimum. In absence of governance, the
injurer has incentives to provide SG up to her preferred provision level xI , the free-
driver outcome, implying a larger residual vector than in the social optimum. The
victim’s preferred provision level xV is attained at the intersection of the SG vector
with the horizontal axis.
Chapter 4. A Model of Solar Geoengineering Liability 94
The measure of global welfare is residual damages D(x), i.e. the sum of regional residual
damages di(x), normalized to units of unmitigated climate change damages:
D(x) =
∑
i di(x)∑
i di(0)
The theoretical minimum of residual damages is zero (for preindustrial climate condi-
tions), while residual damages for pure climate change conditions (zero SG) are one.
Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012) use three different ways of weighting a region’s damages. In
this paper all regions’ damages are accorded the same weight.
I use data from the G1 experiment as defined in the Geoengineering Model Intercompar-
ision Project (Kravitz et al. 2011). The G1 experiment consists of a preindustrial model
run, a pure climate change model run with elevated CO2 levels and a model run in which
SG is deployed on top of the elevated CO2 climate in order to restore the preindustrial
global mean temperature. This implies that a SG provision level of x = 1 in the model
corresponds to restoring preindustrial global mean temperature. M ipre, M
i
CO2, M
i
SG and
σiM,pre can be calculated from the runs of the G1 experiment. I did so for each of the
thirteen climate models participating in G1 individually and averaged the results. I then
carried out the numerical implementation based on the averaged M ipre, M
i
CO2, M
i
SG and
σiM,pre. I used the average across climate models, since the free-driver scenario reflects
the strongest preferences for SG and is therefore prone to outliers.
4.6.2 Results from the RCR Model
I report the equilibrium SG level and the associated residual damages for the social
optimum, for the free-driver outcome under no liability and for each liability regime.
For comparison I also report the results for the Pareto optimum. I find an optimal SG
level of 0.99 for the temperature metric and of 0.80 for the precipitation metric. These
optimal SG levels entail residual damages of 0.2% and 5.1% of unmitigated climate
change damages. Pareto-optimal SG levels are 0.93 for the temperature metric and zero
for the precipitation metric. These results are in line with the findings of Moreno-Cruz
et al. (2012), Kravitz et al. (2014) and Yu et al. (2015).8
8Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012) report residual damages of 1% for the temperature metric (independent
of the weighting) and a range of 3%− 15% for the precipitation metric. Kravitz et al. (2014) and Yu et
al. (2015) use data from the climate models participating in the G1 experiment. Yu et al. (2015) report
residual damages of 0% (independent of the climate model) for the temperature metric and an average
of 14% with a standard deviation of 14% for the precipitation metric in the social optimum. Note that in
this study the results for the individual models were calculated and then averaged, while in the present
paper the averaging is done for the parameters M ipre, M
i
CO2, M
i
SG and σ
i
M,pre. For the median climate
model, Kravitz et al. (2014) report a Pareto-optimal SG level of 0.91 for the temperature metric and of
zero for the precipitation metric.
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Concurrent research comes to the conclusion that the SG governance problem might be
substantial: Using an integrated assessment model approach for quantifying the free-
driver outcome, Emmerling and Tavoni (2017) find SG overprovision of a factor of eight.
Using the simpler RCR model approach, I find that the the extent of the free-driver
problem depends on the metric chosen: For the temperature metric, there is moderate
SG overprovison in the free-driver outcome (13% higher compared to the social optimum;
total damage is 1.6 percentage points of unmitigated climate change damages higher than
in the social optimum) and SG still reduces regional damages very effectively. However,
for the precipitation metric, overprovision in the free-driver outcome is 362% compared
to the social optimum and total damage is 658 percentage points of unmitigated climate
change damages. While the inefficiencies due to the free-driver outcome are small for
the temperature metric, these results suggest that the free-driver problem for SG is
devastating if mean precipitation is the relevant metric.
These results reflect the findings from earlier studies that regional differences in SG ef-
fects are more pronounced for precipitation than for temperature (Moreno-Cruz et al.
2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015). The findings for the free-driver outcome
confirm the direction of these results, but are more incisive: For the temperature metric
SG is even in the free-driver outcome very effective at reducing unmitigated climate
change damages. However, SG does not only become ineffective in the free-driver out-
come under the precipitation metric, but it produces damages more than a factor 6.5
higher compared to unmitigated climate change. The reason that the difference in re-
sults for the two metrics in the free-driver outcome become so extreme is that the region
with the strongest preferences for SG determines the level of SG. In this scenario the
larger regional SG disparities for precipitation have a much stronger effect on welfare,
compared to scenarios in which the socially optimal or the Pareto-optimal SG level are
deployed.
Liability regimes employing the marginal definition of harm do very well for both the
temperature and the precipitation metric. They reduce damages compared to the free-
driver outcome very effectively, both in absolute and in relative terms: The only stan-
dards for which the absolute difference between the residual damages under a liability
regime employing the marginal definition of harm and the damage level in the social
optimum is larger than 0.1% percentage points of unmitigated climate change damages
are strict liability and the aggregate harm negligence standard in combination with the
precipitation metric. The absolute difference in residual damages here is 0.7% percent-
age points of unmitigated climate change damages. This difference corresponds to 13.7%
higher damages under the liability regime compared to the social optimum. At the same
time it corresponds to only 1h of the difference in residual damages between the free-
driver outcome and the social optimum, which implies that the liability regime achieves
99.9% of the possible reduction in residual damages.
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Panel A: Temperature Metric
Marginal Definition of Harm Absolute Definition of Harm
SG Level Damages SG Level Damages
Social Optimum 0.99 0.2 0.99 0.2
Pareto Optimum 0.93 0.5 0.93 0.5
Free-Driver Outcome 1.12 1.8 1.12 1.8
BHN Standard 0.99 0.2 1.12 1.8
SL & AHN Standard 0.96 0.3 1.12 1.8
IHN Standard 0.96 0.3 1.12 1.8
Panel B: Precipitation Metric
Marginal Definition of Harm Absolute Definition of Harm
SG Level Damages SG Level Damages
Social Optimum 0.81 5.1 0.81 5.1
Pareto Optimum 0.00 100 0.00 100
Free-Driver Outcome 2.93 658 2.93 658
BHN Standard 0.81 5.1 1.11 18.7
SL & AHN Standard 0.74 5.8 1.03 12.1
IHN Standard 0.80 5.1 1.12 19.6
Table 4.2: SG levels are given as a fraction of the SG level which restores global mean
temperature to preindustrial. Residual damages in percent of unmitigated climate
change damages. No SG therefore corresponds to residual damages of 100%.
Liability regimes employing the absolute definition of harm do less well. For the temper-
ature metric, liability regimes employing the absolute definition of harm are without any
effect at all. This shows that even in the free-driver outcome there is no harm to other
agents according to the absolute definition, given the temperature metric and the climate
preferences assumed in the RCR model. However, for the precipitation metric, liabil-
ity regimes employing the absolute definition of harm achieve a substantial reduction
in damages: The absolute differences in residual damages between social optimum and
liability regime range from 7.0% (SL and AHN), through 13.6% (BHN) to 14.5% (IHN).
This corresponds to 137%, 167% and 184% higher damages under the respective liability
regime compared to the social optimum and to 1.9%, 2.1% and 2.2% of the difference in
residual damages between the free-driver outcome and the social optimum. While the
differences in damages to the social optimum are not trivial, all of these liability regimes
achieve at least 97.8% of the possible reduction in residual damages.
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The differences in outcomes across liability standards are comparatively small. For the
temperature metric, the liability standards are irrelevant given the absolute definition of
harm, since harm is then zero even in the free-driver outcome. In combination with the
marginal definition of harm, the different liability standards still lead to almost the same
outcomes. For the precipitation metric, residual damages under the benefit-harm negli-
gence and the individual harm negligence standard are very similar: For the marginal
definition of harm, the benefit-harm negligence standard implements the social optimum
(residual damages of 5.1%) and the SG equilibrium provision level under the individual
harm negligence standard is close enough to the social optimum that the absolute differ-
ence in residual damages to the social optimum is smaller than 0.1%. For the absolute
definition of harm, residual damages under the benefit-harm negligence standard are
18.7% and 19.6% for the individual harm negligence standard. The results for the pre-
cipitation metric confirms that the ordering in terms of SG equilibrium provision level of
the benefit-harm and the individual harm negligence standards is in general ambiguous.
Under strict liability and the aggregate harm negligence standard, residual damages are
somewhat higher for the marginal definition of harm (5.8%) compared to the other two
standards, but substantially smaller for the absolute definition of harm (12.1%). The
reason is that these two standards are biased towards too low SG provision levels. Since
the marginal definition of harm has no bias, the standards’ bias drives the SG equilib-
rium provision level away from the social optimum. However, the absolute definition of
harm is biased towards too high SG provision levels and the biases at play then partially
cancel out.
The results show that, at least under the assumptions of the RCR model, liability regimes
employing the marginal definition of harm do in every instance better than regimes em-
ploying the absolute definition. Furthermore, the only instance in which the performance
between regimes employing different liability standards differs noticeably, is for the pre-
cipitation metric in combination with the absolute definition of harm. However, even
in this case, the differences in residual damages between liability regimes employing dif-
ferent definitions of harm are larger than between liability regimes employing different
liability standards. The results of the implementation therefore suggest that the choice
of the definition of harm is more consequential for a liability regime’s performance than
the choice of the liability standard and that the marginal definition of harm is generally
superior to the absolute definition of harm. Liability regimes always lead to a significant
reduction in residual damages with the exception of those employing the absolute defini-
tion of harm in case of the temperature metric. In particular, this means that liability
regimes always achieve a significant reduction in residual damages under the precipi-
tation metric, the case in which the free-driver outcome leads to devastating damage
levels.
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4.7 Conclusion
SG is a set of techniques which has received increasing attention as potential means to
offset climate change. Governance is a key issue for SG, since it is likely to be cheap and
would have regionally different impacts, giving rise to the ’free-driver’ problem (Weitz-
man 2015): In the absence of governance, the country with the strongest preferences
for SG has incentives to deploy SG beyond the preferred provision point of all other
countries. This paper focuses on liability regimes as a potential governance instrument.
In the paper I developed a framework to understand the basic incentives SG liability
regimes provide. Furthermore, I implemented the model numerically in order to obtain
a first-order estimate of the extent of the SG governance problem and the capability of
liability regimes to solve it in a simplified setting.
SG is a public good-or-bad, a public good which benefits agents at some levels and
harms the same agents at other levels. This feature sets SG apart from more traditional
domains of liability. The public good-or-bad characteristic is in two ways relevant for
the incentives a liability regime provides. The first one concerns the definition of harm,
which is about which SG impacts have to be compensated for. The second one concerns
the liability standards, which are about the circumstances under which harm from SG
has to be compensated for. The liability model of SG in this paper puts the definition of
harm and the liability standards center stage in order to focus on the specific incentives
arising for a SG provider from SG’s good-or-bad characteristic under a liability regime.
A liability regime in the model consequently consists of a definition of harm and a
liability standard.
I give two definitions of harm. As liability standards I consider strict liability and three
interpretations of the negligence standard. Only one definition of harm, the marginal
definition, and only one liability standard, the benefit-harm negligence standard, are
unbiased. Therefore, only the liability regime employing the marginal definition of harm
and the benefit-harm negligence standard implements the social optimum. However, the
benefit-harm negligence standard is the one least likely to be employed in a real-world
scenario due to the legal institutional reality. All other liability regimes do in general
not implement the social optimum and carry a bias towards too low or high SG provision
levels. The direction of this bias is often ambiguous, since a regime’s net bias is generally
the result of multiple biases which may pull into opposing directions. This highlights the
difficulties in deciding which liability regime to pick in a real-world scenario and shows
that the choice of one component of a liability regime should in general depend on the
other component. Lastly, it should be noted that the results for the definition of harm
are of relevance for any SG compensation mechanism.
I numerically implement the theoretical model into the Residual Climate Response
(RCR) model (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012), a framework for investigating regional im-
pacts of SG, using climate model data on regional mean temperature and precipitation
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from the G1 experiment of the Geoengineering Model Intercomparision Project (Kravitz
et al. 2011). It should be kept in mind that the RCR model is a simple framework and
that the results from using it serve as first-order estimation of the effects examined.
Concurrent research comes to the conclusion that the SG governance problem might be
substantial: Using a more sophisticated integrated assessment model approach for quan-
tifying the free-driver outcome, Emmerling and Tavoni (2017) find SG overprovision of a
factor of eight. Using the simpler RCR model approach, I find that the the extent of the
free-driver problem depends on the metric chosen: For the temperature metric, there
is moderate SG overprovison in the free-driver outcome and SG still reduces damages
in the free-driver outcome down to 1.8% of unmitigated climate change. It is extreme
for the mean precipitation metric and SG increase damages by more than a factor of
6.5 in the free-driver outcome compared to unmitigated climate change. These findings
suggest that, from an economic point of view, the SG governance problem is very severe
in case precipitation is the relevant metric, but rather benign in case temperature is the
relevant metric. This reflects earlier findings (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al.
2014, Yu et al. 2015) that regional SG differences are more pronounced for precipita-
tion than for temperature. The difference between the two metrics is amplified in the
free-driver outcome, since the region with the most extreme preferences for SG then
determines the SG provision level.
Liability regimes lead to a welfare-enhancing implementation of SG for the precipitation
metric: All regimes reduce damages to at most 19.6% of unmitigated climate change
damages for this metric. Liability regimes employing the marginal definition of harm vir-
tually implement the social optimum for both metrics. For the temperature metric, the
absolute definition’s bias renders liability regimes without any effect at all. Differences
in outcomes across the definition of harm are larger than differences in outcomes across
liability standards and the marginal definition of harm always performs better than
the absolute definition. Given the assumptions of the RCR model, all liability regimes
drastically mitigate the extreme free-driver problem found for the precipitation metric,
the marginal definition of harm is generally superior to the absolute definition and the
choice of the definition of harm is of greater importance than the liability standard for
the performance of a SG liability regime.
This paper has focused on the specific incentives liability regimes provide in light of
SG’s good-or-bad characteristic. I therefore abstracted from various other SG aspects,
which are important, but do not lie at the heart of the SG-specific incentives liability
regimes provide. These aspects include uncertainty about SG impacts, other potential
SG side-effects like ozone loss or potential health impacts and potential coalitions among
agents (compare Ricke et al. 2013). Furthermore, I abstracted from issues of causation.
There are literatures dealing both with issues of causation in the context of SG (Horten
et al. 2014 and Saxler et al. 2015) and with the general law-and-economics implications
of uncertain causation (Shavell 1985). Lastly, the model presupposes an existing SG
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liability regime. Currently, there is no dedicated SG liability regime in place and it is
far from clear whether there will be such a regime in the future. In any case, even in the
absence of a dedicated SG liability regime, customary international law may provide a
legal basis for SG liability (Saxler et al. 2015).
There are valuable extensions future research could pursue. The first potential extension
concerns the formation of coalitions. Agents who benefit greatly from SG could decide
to form a coalition (Ricke et al. 2013) in order to provide SG jointly, while sharing
the expected liability payments, thereby partly internalizing the positive externalities
from SG provision. Taking coalitions into account has therefore the potential to alter
the assessment of the liability regimes presented in this paper. The second potential
extension is the consideration of treaty formation, asking the questions of whether and
under which conditions a liability regime could emerge as the result of a negotiation and
bargaining process. The framework presented in this paper and its insights regarding
the incentives potential liability regimes provide are ideal starting points for approaching
these two extensions.
Lastly, future research could focus on extending the RCR model. At the moment, agents
in the RCR model have preferences for a preindustrial climate, an assumption which does
not seem to be very realistic (Burke et al. 2015, Heyen et al. 2015). An extension of the
RCR model, which allows for climate preferences diverging from preindustrial climate
conditions, would be a valuable contribution for the assessment of regional SG impacts
in general and as a result also for the assessment of the performance of SG liability
regimes.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Only the second statement of the third part remains to be
shown. Liability standards are defined via the balancing of a subset of victims’ harm
and a subset of beneficiaries’ benefits (including the SG provider). At any x and for any
subset of victims the respective sum of marginal harm is weakly smaller for the absolute
definition of harm than for the marginal definition of harm. Therefore, the SG provider
is for a given liability standard at a given provision level x never liable given the absolute
definition of harm if she is not liable given the marginal definition of harm. If she is not
liable given the absolute definition of harm, her marginal costs of SG provision are zero
under the absolute definition. If she is liable, she is also liable under the marginal defi-
nition and marginal liability payments, her marginal costs of SG provision, are weakly
higher given the marginal definition than given the absolute definition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Only the second statement of the second part remains to be
shown. Consider two settings in which the marginal definition of harm is the relevant
definition and in which there are four agents. Setting 1: d1(x) = 0.5x
2; d2(x) = 0.5(7.5−
x)2; d3(x) = 0.5(5 − x)2; d4(x) = 0.5(10 − x)2. Here, we have xˆBHN = 5.625 and
xˆIHN = 5. Setting 2: d1(x) = 0.5x
2; d2(x) = 0.5(2.5 − x)2; d3(x) = 0.5(5 − x)2;
d4(x) = 0.5(10− x)2. Here, we have xˆBHN = 4.325 and xˆIHN = 5.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Only the statements about the SL, the AHN and IHN standards
in part three remain to be shown. Setting 1: d1(x) = 0.5(5 − x)2; d2(x) = 0.5(10 −
x)2. Absolute harm here is zero even for x = 10. All liability regimes employing
the absolute definition therefore implement a too high SG provision level. Setting 2:
d1(x) = 0.5x
2; d2(x) = 0.5(8 − x)2; d3(x) = 0.5(10 − x)2. Here, all three liability
standards in combination with the absolute definition of harm implement a SG provision
level of 5, which is below the socially optimal level x∗ = 6.
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5.1 Introduction
Techniques to increase the earth’s reflection of solar radiation, so-called solar geoengi-
neering (SG), have received increasing attention as potential means to reduce climate
change risks. While SG may well be able to compensate for increased temperatures on
a global level, SG has regionally heterogeneous impacts (Lunt et al. 2008, Robock et
al. 2008, Irvine et al. 2010, Ricke et al. 2010). These heterogeneous impacts are widely
regarded as a source of substantial SG governance problems and as a potential source
of conflict (Robock 2008, Shepherd 2009, Weitzman 2015, Heyen 2016, Pasztor 2017).
Regional differences in SG impacts have been the focus of a number of studies (Moreno-
Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015, Pfrommer 2018). Generally,
the results indicate that regional temperature disparities from SG may not be as severe
as previously thought. However, this literature employs the assumption that regional
climate preferences derive from a common baseline climate, e.g. 1990 or preindustrial cli-
mate conditions. This ’change-is-bad-assumption’ has been criticized (Heyen et al. 2015)
and research has provided empirical evidence that certain temperature levels may gener-
ally be more conducive to economic activity than others, irrespective of historic regional
climate conditions. Schlenker and Roberts (2009) provide evidence for a non-linear,
inversely U-shaped, relationship between crop yield and daily temperature. Graff and
Neidell (2014) find a similar relationship between labor supply and daily temperature.
Burke et al. (2015) estimate a globally generalizable, inversely U-shaped relationship
between overall economic productivity and regional mean temperature. Additionally,
there are region-specific reasons why a deviation from regional baseline climate condi-
tions may be beneficial (Heyen et al. 2015), e.g. that more natural resources in high
northern latitudes may become available as temperatures rise.
The main purpose of the paper is to gain a conceptual understanding of the impact
that regionally diverging temperature preferences have on SG outcomes. To this aim,
I extend the Residual Climate Response (RCR) model developed by Moreno-Cruz et
al. (2012). The RCR model is the main framework for examining SG impacts on the
regional level in the literature. The extension allows for regions to have temperature
preferences diverging from the baseline climate and builds on an illustrative example
by Heyen et al. (2015). They demonstrate by that example that regional temperature
disparities may be substantially higher when regions have diverging temperature pref-
erences. The extended model calculates the welfare maximizing SG level depending on
the diverging temperature preferences that regions have. This optimal SG level deter-
mines each region’s temperature. The difference between regional temperature and a
region’s desired temperature level is the region’s residual temperature. Regional residual
temperature determines regional damages and therefore regional climate welfare.
The key theoretical insight of the extended model is that the impact of diverging pref-
erences can be split into two components. The first component changes the optimal SG
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level, but does not affect the set of residual temperatures. This component therefore does
not change regional disagreement over SG. The second component leaves the optimal
SG level unaffected, but changes the set of residual temperatures. This decomposition
helps in understanding how specific diverging preferences affect globally optimal SG and
regional disagreement over SG.
At least three different aspects of SG performance are of interest in relation to diverging
preferences. The first aspect is the relative effectiveness of SG in reducing damages.
Relative effectiveness measures in percent the share of regional damages that optimal
SG can compensate for. There are two potential damage baselines for measuring relative
effectiveness. The first baseline is total damages (arising from the combination of CO2
driven temperature changes1 and diverging preferences), giving rise to the total damage
reduction metric M1 – the metric considered by Heyen et al. (2015). The second base-
line is purely CO2 driven damages, giving rise to the CO2 damage reduction metric M2.
While the total damage reduction metric measures how well optimal SG compensates
for damages originating from the difference between regional temperatures in a high
CO2 climate and regionally preferred temperatures, the CO2 damage reduction metric
measures how well optimal SG compensates for damages caused by CO2 induced tem-
perature changes only. The two damage baselines – and the two metrics – are identical
in the absence of diverging preferences.
Relative effectiveness measures SG performance with respect to one fixed set of diverging
preferences. The other two aspects measure SG performance relative to SG performance
in the absence of diverging preferences (the ’baseline scenario’). The second aspect is
the change of the minimum climate damages, or equivalently, of the maximum climate
welfare that SG can implement relative to the baseline scenario. It is captured by
comparing residual damages (the sum of regional damages given optimal SG) for a
given set of diverging preferences to residual damages in the baseline scenario. This
second aspect gives rise to the minimum climate damage metric M3. By help of the
minimum climate damage metric, one can compare the maximum climate welfare that
SG can implement across different sets of diverging preferences. The last aspect is the
change in the gross value of SG relative to the baseline scenario. It is captured by
comparing the maximum reduction of damages that SG can achieve for a given set of
diverging preferences to the maximum reduction in the baseline scenario and gives rise
to the gross value metric M4. By help of the gross value metric, one can compare the
gross value of SG across different sets of diverging preferences.
A set of diverging preferences can be expressed as a combination of a ’scenario’ and of a
’preference strength’. A scenario describes regions’ diverging temperatures preferences
relative to each other, the preference strength determines the magnitude of the desired
1In the entire paper, CO2 is intended to mean ”CO2 equivalent”, i.e. CO2 represents all greenhouse
gases.
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temperature deviations from the baseline climate. Scenarios in which high-latitude re-
gions generally prefer higher temperatures than in the baseline climate and low-latitude
regions generally prefer lower temperatures are of specific interest, since there is em-
pirical evidence suggesting that such a pattern of diverging preferences generally holds
(Burke et al. 2015). In order to develop a basic understanding of how such scenarios
affect SG outcomes, I numerically implement two concrete realizations of such scenar-
ios with data from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparision Project (Kravitz et al.
2011). For each scenario, I implement different strengths of diverging preferences.
The numerical implementation yields two main results. Firstly, it shows that the per-
formance of optimal SG relative to the baseline scenario depends on the aspect of SG
performance one is interested in. The presence of diverging preferences may change
SG performance in either direction and the direction generally depends on which of the
three aspects of SG performance is considered. The latter implies that the aspects and
metrics developed are in fact independent and convey complementary information about
how SG performance changes in the presence of diverging preferences.
Secondly, the numerical results suggest two welfare implications. The first is that optimal
climate welfare (climate welfare given optimal SG) may increase relative to the absence
of diverging preferences. However, such a positive change in optimal climate welfare
only occurs when diverging temperature preferences are small in magnitude compared
to average CO2 induced warming. The second implication is that optimal climate welfare
is often higher than climate welfare in the baseline climate, i.e. in the climate before
CO2 driven temperature changes set in. These implications demonstrate that diverging
climate preferences do not necessarily lower SG performance, at least when optimal
SG can be implemented. I argue that these welfare implications are likely to emerge
more generally in scenarios in which high-latitude regions prefer higher temperatures
and low-latitude regions prefer lower temperatures than in the baseline climate.
I proceed as follows. In section 5.2, I introduce the RCR model. Section 5.3 extends the
RCR model. Construction and implementation of the scenarios follows in section 5.4.
Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The Residual Climate Response Model
The Residual Climate Response (RCR) model (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012) is a simple
framework for evaluating regional effects of solar geoengineering (SG). The main purpose
of the RCR model is to examine how well SG can compensate for CO2 induced climate
change on the regional level. Due to its simplicity, the model is intuitively accessible
(compare Figure 5.1). Its strength lies in identifying first-order effects in the assessment
of regional SG impacts and in providing a framework for conceptually thinking about
regional disparities in SG outcomes.
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The RCR model operates on a fixed number of regions. Regional climate damages derive
from the difference in mean temperature between actual climate conditions and climate
conditions in some baseline climate. The CO2 vector TCO2 consists of the regional
temperature increases due to CO2 emissions relative to the baseline climate.
2 One unit
of SG is defined as the amount of SG restoring global mean temperature to the level
of the baseline climate. The SG vector TSG consists of the regional mean temperature
changes due to one unit of SG relative to the high CO2 climate. Since the CO2 and
SG vectors are not congruent (i.e. the relative effects of CO2 and SG on temperatures
differ across regions), SG can only imperfectly compensate for CO2 induced temperature
increases on a regional level. The model assumes linearity in the effect of SG on regional
temperature.3 The SG level x is defined as a fraction of one unit of SG. Due to the
linearity assumption, the residual vector TRES of regional temperatures, given the SG
level x, is
TRES(x) = TCO2 + x · TSG.
The global welfare measure is residual damages, i.e. the sum of regional damages, and
corresponds to the squared length of the residual vector TRES for a given level of SG:
D(x) =
∑
i
di(x) = |TRES(x)|2 with di(x) = (T iCO2 + x · T iSG)2.
The optimal SG level, minimizing residual damages, is
x∗ = −
∑
i T
i
SG · T iCO2
|TSG|2 = −
TSG • TCO2
|TSG|2 =
|TCO2| · cos(ϕ)
|TSG| ,
where ϕ is the angle between the CO2 and the SG vector and (•) the dot product between
vectors.4 The smaller ϕ, the more similar the CO2 and the SG vector and the better SG
can compensate for the temperature changes on a regional level caused by CO2: In case
the vectors are parallel (ϕ = 0°), compensation is perfect. Consequently, we then have
x∗ = 1 and D(x∗) = 0. In case the vectors are perpendicular (ϕ = 90°), compensation
is not possible at all. Consequently, we then have x∗ = 0 and D(x∗) = |TCO2|2. If not
stated otherwise, the terms residual damages and residual vector from now on refer to
the respective outcomes given the optimal SG level.
2While other metrics, like regional precipitation, are generally relevant and employed as well, I focus
on the metric of regional temperature. Baseline climates employed in the literature are preindustrial
and 1990 climate conditions (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015, Pfrommer
2018).
3Evidence for the reasonableness of this assumption is provided, among others, by Moreno-Cruz et
al. (2012) and Kravitz et al. (2014).
4Technically, ϕ as depicted in Figure 5.1, is not the angle between the CO2 and the SG vector, but
between the CO2 vector and the negative of the SG vector. ϕ is to be understood as defined by Figure
5.1. The reason for doing so is that I do not want to deviate from the definition in Moreno-Cruz et al.
(2012). The only implication is that cos(ϕ) picks up a minus sign:
cos(ϕ) = − TCO2 • TSG|TCO2| · |TSG| .
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Figure 5.1: Two-region representation of the Residual Climate Response model. The
horizontal axis shows changes in temperature for region A, the vertical axis shows
changes in temperature for region B. The blue CO2 vector represents regional tem-
perature changes due to CO2. The green SG vector represents regional temperature
changes due to optimal SG. The red residual vector points to regional temperatures
under optimal SG. Since regional damages are quadratic, the squared length of the
residual vector is proportional to residual damages. The angel ϕ between CO2 and
SG vector represents the extent to which SG can compensate for regional temperature
changes due to CO2 and determines the socially optimal SG level as well as the metric
M.
The metric M used for assessing SG is the relative effectiveness of optimal SG in compen-
sating for CO2 induced damages on the regional level.
5 Due to the linearity assumption,
M does not depend on the length of the CO2 vector, but only on ϕ. Since the dot
product between the residual vector TRES(x
∗) and the SG vector TSG is zero, the two
are perpendicular (see Figure 5.1) and M evaluates to
D(0)−D(x∗)
D(0)
= 1− |TRES(x
∗)|2
|TCO2|2 = 1− sin
2(ϕ).
5.3 Extension of the Residual Climate Response Model
The following extension of the RCR model includes the possibility of diverging regional
preferences from the baseline climate. The vector TDIV of diverging temperature pref-
erences consists of each region’s preferred temperature relative to the baseline climate.
5The damages different regions experience may also be weighted. Such weights may, for example,
reflect differences in population or economic output. However, the analysis does not fundamentally
change in the presence of welfare weights and the possibility of welfare weights is therefore not further
pursued in this paper.
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From a societal perspective, the aim in deploying SG in the baseline model is to compen-
sate for the CO2 induced regional temperature deviation from the baseline climate as
represented by the CO2 vector. In the face of diverging preferences, the aim changes to
compensating for the differences between regional temperatures in the high CO2 climate
and regions’ preferred temperature levels. The residual vector in the extended model is
therefore
TRES(x, TDIV) = (TCO2 − TDIV) + x · TSG
and the welfare goal is minimizing
D(x, TDIV) = |TRES(x, TDIV)|2.
When referring to the residual vector and the residual damages in the absence of diverg-
ing preferences, I will leave out the second argument.
Denote the angle between the SG vector and the diverging preferences vector by ϑ
(see Figure 5.2). Furthermore, denote optimal SG in the baseline model as x∗ and in
the extended model as x∗DIV. The optimal amount of SG in the presence of diverging
preferences is then
x∗DIV = −
TSG • (TCO2 − TDIV)
|TSG|2 = x
∗ +
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| .
The vector of diverging preferences can be decomposed into a component parallel and
a component perpendicular to the SG vector. In case ϑ is larger than 90°, the parallel
component points in the opposite direction of the SG vector. The diverging preferences
vector then (partially) substitutes for the cooling the SG vector provides and less SG
is optimal than in the absence of diverging preferences. The contrary is true in case
ϑ is smaller than 90° and the parallel component points in the same direction as the
SG vector. The decomposition of the diverging preferences vector into the parallel and
perpendicular components is
TDIV = T
⊥
DIV + TDIV,
with TDIV =
TSG • TDIV
|TSG|2 · TSG and T
⊥
DIV = TDIV − TDIV.
The component parallel to the SG vector changes regional temperature preferences in
the same proportions as SG changes regional temperatures. Increasing or decreasing
SG relative to optimal SG in the baseline model can therefore perfectly compensate for
the parallel component. This implies that the parallel component does not change the
residual vector. Therefore, optimal SG changes, but regional damages and hence residual
damages do not change relative to the absence of diverging preferences. In particular,
when the diverging preferences vector is (anti)parallel to the SG vector, regions disagree
about SG in exact the same way as in the baseline model.
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Figure 5.2: Extension of the Residual Climate Response model. The combination
of the solid green vector and the dashed green vector represents regional temperature
changes due to optimal SG in the baseline model, the dashed red vector represents the
regional residual temperatures in the baseline model. The solid green vector represents
regional temperature changes due to optimal SG in the presence of the purple diverging
preferences vector. The latter can be decomposed into a component parallel and a com-
ponent perpendicular to the SG vector. The parallel component changes the optimal
SG level. The perpendicular component changes the residual vector. Since the angle ϑ
between the diverging preferences vector and the SG vector is larger than 90°, optimal
SG decreases relative to the baseline model. The residual vector in the presence of
diverging preferences is the red baseline residual vector less the purple perpendicular
component. Since the perpendicular component points into the opposite direction of
the baseline residual vector, the residual vector in the presence of diverging preferences
is longer than the baseline residual vector, i.e. residual damages increase.
In contrast, changing the SG level cannot compensate for the perpendicular compo-
nent at all and the perpendicular component does therefore not affect optimal SG. It
must then completely be taken up by the residual vector, thereby changing how regions
disagree about SG relative to the baseline model. In particular, when the diverging pref-
erences vector is perpendicular to the SG vector, optimal SG does not change compared
to the baseline model.
The residual vector in the presence of diverging preferences may be longer or shorter than
the residual vector in the baseline model – reflecting an increase or decrease in residual
damages – depending on its perpendicular component’s length and direction relative to
the baseline residual vector. The angle between the perpendicular component and the
baseline residual vector is from now on denoted by γ. The tighter γ and the shorter
the perpendicular component relative to the baseline residual vector, the more likely
it is that residual damages are smaller in the presence of diverging preferences. When
γ is smaller than 90°, the vectors largely point into the same direction and partially
cancel out. When γ is larger than 90°, both vectors point in opposing directions and the
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perpendicular component necessarily increases residual damages. In Figure 5.2, we have
γ = 180°, hence residual damages in the example depicted are larger in the presence of
diverging preferences. When the perpendicular component is at least twice at large as
the baseline residual vector, the perpendicular component necessarily overcompensates
for the baseline residual vector and residual damages increase even if the vectors are
parallel (γ = 0°).
Theoretical Result. Let TDIV = T
⊥
DIV + TDIV be the vector of diverging preferences
and its decomposition into the perpendicular and the parallel component.
1. The optimal SG level is
x∗DIV = x
∗ +
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| = x
∗ +
|TDIV|
|TSG| · sign(cos(ϑ)).
2. The residual vector is
TRES(x
∗
DIV, TDIV) = TRES(x
∗)− T⊥DIV
3. Residual damages in presence of diverging preferences are smaller than those in
absence of diverging preferences if and only if
cos(γ) >
1
2
|T⊥DIV|
|TRES(x∗)| ,
where γ is the angle between the perpendicular component T⊥DIV and the residual
vector TRES(x
∗) in the baseline model.
Assessment Metrics
In the baseline model, the performance of optimal SG is captured by a single aspect, the
relative effectiveness in damage compensation. In contrast, at least three different as-
pects of SG performance are of interest in relation to diverging preferences. Analogously
to the baseline RCR model, the first aspect is the relative effectiveness of optimal SG
in reducing damages for a given set of diverging preferences. Measuring relative effec-
tiveness necessarily involves the definition of a damage baseline. In the baseline model,
the obvious choice for the damage baseline is damages in absence of SG or, equivalently,
damages caused by CO2. However, damages in absence of SG and damages caused by
CO2 are different damage baselines in the presence of diverging preferences. These two
damage baselines for measuring relative effectiveness give rise to two different metrics
in the extended model. The first is the total damage reduction metric M1, using total
damages (arising from the combination of CO2 induced temperature changes and di-
verging preferences) as damage baseline. The total damage reduction metric is the one
Chapter 5. Diverging Regional Climate Preferences 111
used by Heyen et al. (2015) for illustrating the potential impact of diverging preferences
on SG performance. The second damage baseline is the CO2 damage reduction met-
ric M2, using damages purely caused by CO2 induced temperature changes (i.e. total
damages less damages from the mere presence of diverging preferences) as damage base-
line. The total damage reduction metric measures how well optimal SG compensates
for damages arising from the differences between regional temperatures in the high CO2
climate and regionally preferred temperatures. Since the total damage reduction metric
measures SG effectiveness relative to the regional optima, its maximum value is 100%.
The CO2 damage reduction metric measures how well optimal SG compensates for dam-
ages arising from differences between regional temperatures in the high CO2 climate and
regional temperatures in the baseline climate. The relative effectiveness in compensat-
ing for damages purely caused by CO2 induced temperature changes can therefore be
higher than 100%. In those cases, optimal SG compensates for more damages than CO2
causes, meaning that residual damages are lower than damages in the baseline climate.
Analytical definitions of the metrics can be found in Table 5.1.
At least two different aspects of SG performance concerning the change in performance
across sets of diverging preferences are of interest. The first aspect is the minimum cli-
mate damages, or, equivalently, the maximum climate welfare that SG can implement.
This aspect is captured by residual damages, i.e. damages given optimal SG. In order
to compare SG performance across different sets of diverging preferences, I normalize
residual damages for a given set of preferences to baseline residual damages. This gives
rise to the minimum climate damage metric M3, measuring how maximum climate wel-
fare changes with the presence of diverging preferences. The second aspect is the gross
value of SG, which is captured by the maximum damage reduction SG can achieve.
For comparing the gross value across sets of diverging preferences, I normalize to the
gross value of SG in the baseline model. This gives rise to the gross value metric M4,
which measures how the gross value of SG changes with the presence of diverging prefer-
ences. Note that in the baseline model, or for any other fixed set of climate preferences,
maximum climate welfare and the gross value of SG are redundant. However, they are
independent across climate preferences, since total damages vary across different climate
preferences.
Metrics in the Presence of Diverging Preferences
M1 M2 M3 M4
∆D(TDIV)
D(0, TDIV)
∆D(TDIV)
D(0, TDIV)− |TDIV|2
D(x∗DIV, TDIV)
D(x∗)
∆D(TDIV)
D(0)−D(x∗)
Table 5.1: ∆D(TDIV) expresses the difference in damages between no SG and op-
timal SG for a given vector of diverging preferences: ∆D(TDIV) = D(0, TDIV) −
D(x∗DIV, TDIV). The metrics are the total damage reduction metric M1, the CO2 dam-
age reduction metric M2, the minimum climate damage metric M3 and the gross value
metric M4.
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The metric in the baseline model is determined by ϕ, whereas the metrics in the extended
model additionally depend on ϑ and the relative length of the diverging preferences
vector and the CO2 vector.
5.4 Exemplary Implementation of Two Scenarios
The exemplary implementation of the extended RCR model delivers a closer examination
of how a specific class of diverging preferences scenarios affects SG outcomes. I follow
the relevant literature (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015,
Pfrommer 2018) in defining the regions of the RCR model according to Giorgi and
Francisco (2000). I use data from the thirteen climate models which participated in
the G1 experiment as defined in the Geoengineering Model Intercomparision Project
(Kravitz et al. 2011) for the implementation. Each model performed a run simulating
preindustrial climate conditions, a run simulating a climate with four times elevated
CO2 concentration levels, and a run in which SG is used to restore the global mean
temperature to the preindustrial level. The regional mean temperatures, averaged over
the thirteen models, of the three runs are used to calculate the CO2 vector and the SG
vector.
The SG literature usually normalizes regional temperatures to each region’s preindus-
trial interannual variability when assessing SG (Heyen et al. 2015). However, potential
sources for diverging regional preferences derive from phenomena related to absolute
temperatures (Burke et al. 2015, Heyen et al. 2015). Therefore, I use absolute tem-
peratures for the implementation. For comparison, I provide the results when using
normalized temperatures in the appendix. The results I obtain for the baseline RCR
model when using normalized temperatures are in line with the literature (Moreno-Cruz
et al. 2012, Yu et al. 2015). The main difference in results between using normalized
and absolute temperatures in the presence of diverging preferences is that optimal SG
levels are substantially higher when using normalized temperatures. The difference is
explained by low-latitude regions having on average a much smaller interannual vari-
ability in mean temperature than high-latitude regions. The upshot is that absolute
temperatures should be used for the extended RCR model, unless one has evidence that
the impacts one is interested in are better captured by normalized temperatures.
The Scenarios
I focus on scenarios which are based on the premise that, as a rule, high-latitude regions
prefer a warmer climate and low-latitude regions prefer a cooler climate relative to the
baseline climate. This general scenario structure is both plausible and supported by
empirical evidence (Burke et al. 2015). I group regions into high-latitude, high-mid-
latitude, low-mid-latitude and low-latitude bins (see Table 5.2). In scenario A, regions
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pertaining to the high-latitude group desire a warmer climate than in the baseline climate
and regions in the low-latitude group desire a colder one. All mid-latitude regions
are content with the baseline climate. The difference in scenario B is that regions in
the high-mid-latitude group also desire a warmer climate. Implementing two scenarios
reduces the risk of picking up results which are idiosyncratic to a specific scenario and
essentially serves as a robustness check. Regions’ diverging preferences in the scenarios
are always equally strong or not present: Each region’s desired temperature is one unit
above temperatures in the regional baseline climate, one unit below temperatures in the
regional baseline climate or equals temperatures in the regional baseline climate.
Grouping of Regions and Scenarios
Each Region’s Scenario
Avg. Lat. Opt. SG Level Res. Temp. A B
Greenland 67.5N 1.09 0.44 1.0 1.0
Alaska 66.0N 1.08 0.50 1.0 1.0
North. Europe 61.5N 1.09 0.33 1.0 1.0
North Asia 60.0N 1.12 0.66 1.0 1.0
WN America 45.0N 1.04 0.06 0.0 1.0
CN America 40.0N 1.07 0.23 0.0 1.0
Central Asia 40.0N 1.02 -0.08 0.0 1.0
Tibet 40.0N 0.99 -0.29 0.0 1.0
Mediterranean 39.0N 1.04 0.05 0.0 0.0
SS America 38.0S 1.02 -0.04 0.0 0.0
EN America 37.5N 1.03 0.01 0.0 0.0
South. Australia 37.5S 1.01 -0.09 0.0 0.0
East Asia 35.0N 1.03 0.02 0.0 0.0
Sahara 24.0N 0.99 -0.21 -1.0 -1.0
Central America 20.0N 0.97 -0.29 -1.0 -1.0
South Asia 17.5N 0.96 -0.35 -1.0 -1.0
Southern Africa 11.5S 0.97 -0.27 -1.0 -1.0
North. Australia 9.5S 0.95 -0.38 -1.0 -1.0
Southeast Asia 4.5N 0.93 -0.35 -1.0 -1.0
Amazon Basin 4.0S 0.99 -0.20 -1.0 -1.0
Western Africa 3.0N 0.97 -0.31 -1.0 -1.0
Eastern Africa 3.0N 0.97 -0.30 -1.0 -1.0
Table 5.2: Regions are ordered according to their average latitude and grouped into
’high-latitude’, ’high-mid-latitude’, ’low-mid-latitude’ and ’low-latitude’ bins. The left
columns states each region’s average latitude, each region’s preferred SG level and each
region’s residual temperature under optimal SG. The right columns states regions’
diverging preferences, relative to each other, from the baseline climate in the scenarios
A and B.
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The last part of the theoretical result implies non-linear effects in the relative length of
the diverging preference vector on the change in SG outcomes. In order to capture these
effects, I consider different strengths of diverging preferences (i.e. different sizes of what
constitutes ”one unit”) for each scenario. In other words, a scenario defines regions’
diverging preferences relative to each other (the direction of the diverging preference
vector) and the preference strength defines the magnitude of the desired temperature
deviations from the baseline climate (the vector’s relative length). Jointly, the two
determine a set of diverging preferences. I define preference strength in percent of the
average regional temperature change caused by CO2. Due to the RCR model’s linearity,
this relative definition leads to well-defined results. As an example, say CO2 driven
average regional warming is 4°C. A strength of 50% in diverging preferences then means
that regions desiring a temperature change relative to the regional baseline climate do
so by 2°C.
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Figure 5.3: Two-region representation of the basic scenario structure. Given baseline
climate preferences, optimal SG undercompensates for temperature in the high-latitude
region, but overcompensates for temperature in the low-latitude region. The high-
latitude region desires a warmer climate and the low-latitude region a colder climate
compared to the baseline climate. In this specific example, the SG vector and the
diverging preferences vector are perpendicular (ϑ = 90°), hence the optimal SG level
does not change relative to the baseline model. Due to the structure of the scenario,
the perpendicular component of the diverging preferences vector (note that there is no
parallel component in this specific example) and the baseline residual vector (which
here is the combination of the violet diverging preferences vector and the red residual
vector in the presence of diverging preferences) point into the same direction. The angle
γ between the two vectors is 0°, since they are parallel, and the former compensates in
part for the latter. In a two-region example, γ can only attain 0°and 180°, which is not
the case when a higher number of regions is involved.
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SG has a differential impact across different latitudes: Due to geophysical reasons, opti-
mal SG overcompensates for warming induced by CO2 in regions of low latitude and un-
dercompensates in regions of high latitude (e.g. Ban-Weiss and Caldeira 2010, compare
Table 5.2).6 Based on this differential SG impact and the structure of the scenarios, the
last part of the theoretical result suggests a certain pattern for the relationship between
residual damages and preference strength. Consider a two-region example, with one
high-latitude and one low-latitude region (compare Figure 5.3). When the high-latitude
region prefers a warmer climate and the low-latitude region a colder one relative to the
baseline climate, the diverging preference vector and the baseline residual vector point in
the same general direction. The perpendicular component and the baseline residual vec-
tor are then parallel (since the example is two-dimensional) and the former compensates
in part of the other, i.e. residual damages decrease due to the diverging preferences.
However, this is only the case when the perpendicular component is not too long, in
which case it overcompensates for the baseline residual vector. Residual damages are
then larger than in absence of diverging preferences.
The theoretical result mirrors the result from the two-region example. It states that,
for residual damages to decrease due to diverging preferences, the angle γ between the
perpendicular component of the diverging preferences vector and the baseline residual
vector has to be between −90° and 90°, while at the same time the former vector has to be
short enough relative to the latter. Taking into account that in the two-region example
γ is 0°, the theoretical result exactly predicts the outcomes in two-region example. The
theoretical result tells us that the pattern will qualitatively hold beyond two-region
examples if only γ is between −90° and 90°. It is self-evident that for two-region examples
γ is always in that range (even exactly 0°). Whether this is the case in a specific multi-
region example ultimately depends on the details of the scenario, such as which regions
are considered hiigh-latitude, which are considered low-latitude, how strong individual
regions’ preferences are and the differential impacts of SG along other dimensions than
latitude. However, for the type of scenario under consideration, it seems likely that γ is
in that range – at least for many scenarios. The implementation delivers the actual γ
for two specific such scenarios and delivers the range of preference strengths for which
residual damages are smaller than in the baseline scenario, i.e. for which the minimum
climate damage metric evaluates to below 100%. Lastly, the implementation may reveal
whether there are similar patterns concerning other aspects of SG performance.
Results of the Implementation
I report the angles ϕ, ϑ and γ and the optimal SG level in absence and presence of
diverging preferences. I report the results for the four metrics for several preference
6Note that potential non-uniform SG schemes optimized for latitude-dependent albedo reduction
may ameliorate latitudinal differences in outcomes (Ban-Weiss and Caldeira 2010, MacMartin et al.
2013).
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strengths between 0% and 100%. The angle ϕ and optimal SG in absence of diverging
preferences x∗ are independent of the scenario. Given x∗, ϑ and the strength of diverging
preferences determine the SG level in presence of diverging preferences. Optimal SG is
linear in the strength of preferences and it suffices to only explicitly report optimal SG
for for one particular strength. The optimal SG level x∗DIV reported refers to a preference
strength of 100%.7
Optimal SG Levels and Angles between Vectors
Baseline Model Scenario A Scenario B
x∗ ϕ M x∗DIV ϑ γ x
∗
DIV ϑ γ
1.03 2.9° 99.7 1.16 80.1° 22.6° 0.96 94.5° 38.2°
Table 5.3: The left columns state the optimal SG level x∗ in the baseline model, the
angle ϕ between the CO2 and the SG vector and the metric M (in percent) from the
baseline model. The middle columns and the right columns state, for the scenarios
A and B, respectively, the optimal SG level x∗DIV when preference strength is 100%,
the angle ϑ between the SG vector and the diverging preferences vector and the angle
γ between the perpendicular component of the diverging preferences vector and the
baseline residual vector.
The angle ϕ between the CO2 vector and the SG vector is small (2.9°). In the absence of
diverging preferences, optimal SG is therefore close to one and the relative effectiveness
of SG in reducing CO2 induced damages (metric M ) is close to 100%. In both scenarios,
the angle ϑ between the SG vector and the diverging preferences vector is close to
90° (scenario A: ϑ = 80.1°, scenario B: ϑ = 94.5°). Consequently, optimal SG differs only
moderately between the absence and presence of diverging preferences. Even for very
strong diverging preferences (100%), optimal SG is only 0.13 higher than in the baseline
model (+12.6%) in scenario A and only 0.07 lower than in the baseline model (−6.8%)
in scenario B. Optimal SG is larger in scenario A than in scenario B, corresponding to
the on net stronger preferences for higher temperatures in scenario B.
The total damage reduction metric M1 and the minimum climate damage metric M3
exhibit a similar pattern for both scenarios. According to both metrics, the performance
of optimal SG increases for weak diverging preferences relative to the baseline scenario
and then decreases again for strong diverging preferences. Minimum residual damages
are attained for a preference strength of 6.4% in scenario A and for a preference strength
of 4.7% in scenario B. Residual damages start to exceed baseline residual damages for a
preference strength of 12.8% in scenario A and for 9.4% in scenario B. The corresponding
preferences strengths for the total damage reduction metric are very similar (differences
< 0.2%). Residual damages become very large relative to baseline residual damages for
very strong diverging preferences, up to a factor of 184 and of 255 higher in scenario A
and scenario B, respectively. Relative effectiveness in compensating for total damages
7Optimal SG for other strengths of preferences can be obtained by linear interpolation. For example,
optimal SG for a strength of 50% is x∗ + 0.5 · (x∗DIV − x∗).
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is substantially lower than in the baseline scenario for very strong diverging preferences,
down to 72.9% and 56.9% in scenario A and scenario B, respectively. However, for both
scenarios, SG can compensate for at least 86.1% of total damages when the preference
strength is no higher than 50% and for at least 96.9% when the preference strength is
no higher than 25%.
Results for the Four Metrics
Preference Scenario A Scenario B
Strength M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4
0% 99.7 99.7 100.0 100.0 99.7 99.7 100.0 100.0
5% 99.9 100.0 18.7 101.2 99.9 100.0 38.5 99.3
10% 99.8 100.4 42.3 102.5 99.7 100.4 117.3 98.6
15% 99.5 100.7 170.7 103.8 99.1 100.8 336.5 98.0
25% 98.2 101.4 742.1 106.5 96.9 101.5 1196 96.6
50% 91.6 103.2 4005 113.1 86.1 103.6 5801 93.3
75% 82.4 105.1 9890 120.0 71.5 106.0 13915 90.1
100% 72.8 106.9 18396 127.1 56.9 108.7 25539 86.9
Table 5.4: The metrics are the total damage reduction metric M1, the CO2 damage
reduction metric M2, the minimum climate damage metric M3 and the gross value
metric M4. M1 and M2 are in percent of their respective damage baseline. M3 and
M4 are in percent relative to the respective outcome in the baseline scenario. Results
are given in incremental steps in the strength of diverging preferences. For example, a
strength of 50% means that one unit of diverging preferences corresponds to half the
average regional temperature change from climate change. If regional mean temperature
rises by 4°C in absence of SG, a strength of 50% corresponds to low-latitude regions
having a diverging temperature preference of −2°C and high-latitude regions having a
diverging temperature preference of +2°C in scenario A.
The changes in the CO2 damage reduction metric M2 and the gross value metric M4
are monotone in the strength of diverging preferences. The relationship between the two
metrics and preference strength is almost linear. Relative effectiveness in compensating
for damages caused by CO2 increases in both scenarios. For very strong diverging
preferences, it is 106.9% in scenario A and 108.7% in scenario B. Relative effectiveness
in compensating for damages caused by CO2 is at least 100% in both scenarios when
the strength of diverging preferences is at least 5%. The gross value of SG increases
in scenario A, but decreases in scenario B. For very strong diverging preferences, the
gross value of SG is 27.1% higher than the gross value of SG in absence of diverging
preferences in the former and 13.1% lower than the gross value of SG in absence of
diverging preferences in the latter.
Chapter 5. Diverging Regional Climate Preferences 118
Explanation and Interpretation of the Results
The minimum climate damage metric M3 measures the maximum climate welfare SG
can implement in a scenario relative to maximum climate welfare in the baseline scenario
and is determined by the ratio of the respective residual damages. Since γ = 22.6° in
scenario A and γ = 38.2° in scenario B, the minimum climate damage metric follows
the pattern presumed in advance: The metric is smaller than 100% for weak diverging
preferences and larger than 100% for moderate to strong diverging preferences in both
scenarios. In both scenarios, γ is well within the range of (−90°, 90°). One can therefore
expect γ to be within this range for many scenarios following the basic premise, implying
that one can expect the pattern to hold for many such scenarios. The values cos(γ)
attains in the scenarios are close to one (0.92 in scenario A, 0.78 in scenario B). The
preference strengths for which the minimum climate damage metric is smaller than
100% in scenario A are therefore close to the maximum of such strengths possible for any
scenario. For strong diverging preferences, the perpendicular component of the diverging
preferences vector is, irrespective of its direction, much larger than the baseline residual
vector. The residual vector is then almost identical to the perpendicular component.
Hence, the minimum climate damage metric becomes very large for strong diverging
preferences, irrespective of the scenario.
The total damage reduction metric M1 measures the relative effectiveness of optimal SG
in compensating for total damages. It can be expressed as
1− |TRES(x
∗)− T⊥DIV|2
|TCO2 − TDIV|2 .
In both scenarios, the relative effectiveness in compensating for total damages is higher
than in the baseline scenario for weak diverging preferences and lower for moderate to
strong ones. Since the CO2 vector is comparatively large, the relative change in total
damages (the denominator in the expression) from absence to presence of diverging
preferences is comparatively small, while the relative change in residual damages (the
nominator in the expression) is comparatively high. Therefore, residual damages govern
the qualitative behavior of the total damage reduction metric at least for weak and
moderate preferences, resulting in the observed pattern in both scenarios. This intuition
is valid except for the rather unrealistic case that the perpendicular component is trivial.
The CO2 damage reduction metric M2 measures the relative effectiveness of optimal SG
in compensating for damages caused by CO2. It can be expressed as
1 +
|TDIV|2 − |TRES(x∗DIV, TDIV)|2
|TCO2 − TDIV|2 − |TDIV|2 .
From this characterization, it is evident that the CO2 damage reduction metric evaluates
to 100% when the diverging preferences vector and the residual vector are of the same
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length, i.e. when SG restores the damage level of the baseline climate, thereby exactly
compensating for pure CO2 damages. In both scenarios, the CO2 damage reduction
metric exceeds 100% for even weak preferences. When γ ∈ (−90°, 90°), the residual
vector becomes shorter for weak preferences. The closer γ is to 0°, the faster the diverging
preference vector becomes longer than the residual vector with increasing preference
strength.8 Since the baseline residual vector is very short and γ is in both scenarios of
small to moderate size, the CO2 damage reduction metric becomes larger than 100% for
even weak preferences in both scenarios.
The gross value metric M4 measures the gross value of SG in a scenario relative to its
gross value in the baseline scenario. It can be expressed as
|TCO2 − TDIV|2 − |TRES(x∗)− T⊥DIV|2
|TCO2|2 − |TRES(x∗)|2 .
The gross value metric exceeds 100% for all preference strengths in scenario A and
is below 100% for all preference strengths in scenario B, coinciding with optimal SG
increasing in scenario A and decreasing in scenario B relative to optimal SG in the
baseline model. As a heuristic, the parallel component of the diverging preferences
vector and the CO2 vector can be considered as (anti)parallel, since the angle ϕ between
the SG and the CO2 vector is very small. Intuitively, the parallel component then
increases total damages when it causes optimal SG to rise and reduces total damages
when it causes optimal SG to fall, while not affecting the residual vector – in other words,
the parallel component increases the gross value of SG when it causes optimal SG to rise
and decreases the gross value of SG when it causes optimal SG to fall. However, this
reasoning leaves out the influence of the perpendicular component on the change in gross
value of SG. This means that, while a more positive change in optimal SG increases the
gross value of SG ceteris paribus, a positive (negative) change in optimal SG relative to
optimal SG in the baseline scenario does not necessarily correspond to a gross value of
SG higher (lower) than in the baseline scenario.
The numerical implementation and its discussion yield two main results. Firstly, the
performance of SG in presence of diverging preferences may increase or decrease relative
to the performance in absence of diverging preferences. Which one is the case depends
on the set of diverging preferences, the aspect of SG performance one is interested
in and, for the aspect of relative effectiveness of optimal SG, on the damage baseline
against which effectiveness is measured. In particular, this underpins the importance of
specifying the aspect of SG performance and, if applicable, the damage baseline, when
assessing SG in presence of diverging preferences: In the two scenarios, the absolute
8It can be easily be shown that the diverging preference vector always becomes longer than the
residual vector for strong enough preferences when γ ∈ (−90°, 90°): It holds that
|TDIV|2 − |TRES(x∗DIV, TDIV)|2 = |TDIV|2 − |TRES(x∗)|2 + TRES(x∗) • T⊥DIV.
The last term on the right-hand side is positive if γ ∈ (−90°, 90°), from which the statement follows.
Chapter 5. Diverging Regional Climate Preferences 120
damage reduction metric indicates a reduction in the relative effectiveness of SG for at
least moderately strong diverging preferences, while the CO2 damage reduction metric
indicates an increase in the relative effectiveness of SG for all preference strengths.
Depending on scenario and preference strength, the minimum climate damage metric
and the gross value metric both indicate an increase in SG performance, both indicate
a decrease in SG performance or one indicates an increase while the other indicates a
decrease. Therefore, how the maximum climate welfare that SG can implement and the
gross value of SG change in the presence of diverging preferences are in fact independent.
Secondly, there are patterns in the change of SG performance which hold for both
scenarios. The first pattern is that the relative effectiveness of SG in reducing absolute
damages and the maximum climate welfare that SG can implement increase for weak
diverging preferences and decrease for stronger diverging preferences. In particular, this
means that the maximum climate welfare that SG can implement increases relative to
the maximum climate welfare in the absence of diverging preferences, albeit only when
regions’ diverging temperatures preferences are small in magnitude compared to average
CO2 induced warming. The second pattern is that the relative effectiveness of SG in
reducing damages caused by CO2 is above 100% for all but very weak preferences. The
implication here is that optimal SG can implement a climate welfare higher than the
climate welfare in the baseline climate, i.e. in the climate before CO2 driven temperature
changes set in. These two patterns concerning maximum climate welfare demonstrate
that diverging climate preferences do not necessarily lower SG performance, at least
when optimal SG is feasible. I have argued that these pattern are very likely (in case of
the minimum climate damage metric even sure) to emerge when the angle γ is small.
Furthermore, scenarios in which high-latitude regions prefer a colder climate and low-
latitude regions prefer a warmer one, will often lead to a small γ, due to the differential
impact of SG across latitudes. Is is therefore likely that also other scenarios of that type
will often lead to the patterns observed in the implementation.
5.5 Conclusion
Solar geoengineering (SG) has the potential to compensate for increased temperatures
from climate change on a global level. However, SG has heterogeneous impacts at the
regional level. Until now, studies examining these regional differences have employed
the assumption that regions’ temperature preferences correspond to a common baseline
climate, e.g. to preindustrial or 1990 climate conditions. This assumption has been
criticized (Heyen et al. 2015) and conflicts with empirical evidence supporting globally
generalizable relationships between economic productivity and absolute temperature
levels (Burke et al. 2015).
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In this paper, I extended the Residual Climate Response (RCR) model (Moreno-Cruz
et al. 2012) for assessing regional SG differences by formally introducing the possibility
of regional temperature preferences diverging from the baseline climate, building on an
illustrative example by Heyen et al. (2015). In the key theoretical result, I showed that
the impact of these diverging preferences can be split into two components. The first
component changes the optimal SG level, but does neither change optimal climate wel-
fare nor affect regional disagreement over SG. The second component leaves the optimal
SG level unaffected, but changes regional disagreement over SG and optimal climate
welfare. This decomposition helps in understanding how specific diverging preferences
affect globally optimal SG and the disagreement over SG by different regions. I intro-
duced metrics for measuring three independent aspects of SG performance. The first
aspect is the relative effectiveness of SG in reducing damages, the second aspect is the
change of optimal climate welfare relative to the absence of diverging preferences and the
third aspect is the change in the gross value of SG relative to the absence of diverging
preferences.
I numerically implemented the extended RCR model, focusing on scenarios in which
high-latitude regions prefer a warmer climate and low-latitude regions prefer a cooler
climate relative to the baseline climate – a scenario structure which is both plausible
and supported by empirical evidence (Burke et al. 2015). The results of the imple-
mentation suggest two welfare implications. The first is that optimal climate welfare
may increase relative to the absence of diverging preferences. However, such a positive
change in optimal climate welfare only occurs when diverging temperature preferences
are small in magnitude compared to average climate change induced warming. The
second implication is that optimal climate welfare is often higher than climate welfare
in the baseline climate, i.e. in the climate before greenhouse gas driven temperature
changes set in. These implications demonstrate that diverging climate preferences do
not necessarily lower SG performance, at least when optimal SG can be implemented. I
argue that these welfare implications are likely to emerge more generally in scenarios in
which high-latitude regions prefer higher temperatures and low-latitude regions prefer
lower temperatures than in the baseline climate.
One should keep in mind that both the baseline and the extended RCR model are delib-
eratively simple in nature. They derive their usefulness from conceptual understanding
and from identifying first-order effects. Additionally, the results I obtained for the type
of scenario I considered are temperature specific and do not necessarily hold for other
climate variables, for which diverging preferences may be relevant as well, like precipita-
tion. Several lines of research should be pursued in the future for further increasing the
understanding of the relationship between diverging climate preferences and the assess-
ment of SG. Firstly, I concentrated on the outcomes for globally optimal SG. Examining
the potential impact on Pareto optimal SG levels and on SG levels in the free-driver
outcome (Weitzman 2015), as well as examining the respective welfare implications, will
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lead to a more complete picture regarding the relationship between diverging climate
preferences and the assessment of SG. Secondly, investigating the potential impact of
diverging preferences on coalition formation, in particular coalitions based on similar
latitudes, may lead to further insights into the strategic dimensions of SG. Lastly, a
further conceptual extension seems desirable: Regional damages may be conceptualized
as being a combination of damages deriving from the variability-adjusted temperature
difference to regional baseline climate temperatures and damages deriving from the ab-
solute temperature difference to some absolute temperature preference. A generalization
incorporating both, however, necessarily opens up the question of the relative weight of
both types of damages.
Appendix
Implementation of the Extended RCR Model Using Nor-
malized Temperatures
Here, I provide the results for the extended RCR model when using temperatures nor-
malized to regional interannual variability. The main difference in results between using
normalized and absolute temperatures in the presence of diverging preferences is that
optimal SG levels are substantially higher when using normalized temperatures (com-
pare Table 5.3 and Table 5.5). The differences in optimal SG between using normalized
and absolute temperatures is explained by low-latitude regions having on average a much
smaller interannual variability in mean temperature than high-latitude regions. Using
normalized temperatures, diverging temperature preferences of the same absolute mag-
nitude then translate into a much larger magnitudes in units of interannual variability
for low-latitude regions than for high-latitude regions, while this effect is not present
when using absolute temperatures.
Optimal SG Levels and Angles between Vectors
Baseline Model Scenario A Scenario B
x∗ ϕ M x∗DIV ϑ γ x
∗
DIV ϑ γ
0.99 2.5° 99.8 1.68 59.1° 23.2° 1.60 72.3° 32.7°
Table 5.5: Results for the implementation of the extended RCR Model using normal-
ized temperatures. Corresponds to Table 5.3. The left columns state the optimal SG
level x∗ in the baseline model, the angle ϕ between the CO2 and the SG vector and
the metric M (in percent) from the baseline model. The middle columns and the right
columns state for the scenarios A and B, respectively, the optimal SG level x∗DIV when
preference strength is 100%, the angle ϑ between the SG vector and the diverging pref-
erences vector and the angle γ between the perpendicular component of the diverging
preferences vector and the baseline residual vector.
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The results for the four metrics when using normalized temperatures (compare Table
5.6) are qualitatively the same as when using absolute temperatures. The same general
patterns can be observed when using normalized temperatures as when using absolute
temperatures, regarding the inversely U-shaped relationship between SG performance
as measured by metric M1, as well as metric M3 and preference strength, regarding M2
exceeding 100% for all but very weak diverging preferences and regarding the relationship
between the change in optimal SG and metric M4.
Results for the Four Metrics
Preference Scenario A Scenario B
Strength M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4
0% 99.8 99.8 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.8 100.0 100.0
5% 99.9 100.1 17.3 107.1 99.9 100.1 30.0 106.2
10% 99.9 100.7 58.4 114.5 99.7 100.6 134.7 112.7
15% 99.6 101.4 223.4 122.1 99.3 101.3 414.3 119.3
25% 98.7 103.1 924.9 138.0 97.9 102.7 1497 133.1
50% 95.3 108.7 4845 182.0 92.7 107.6 7265 170.8
75% 91.4 115.5 11863 232.2 86.9 113.4 17403 213.3
100% 87.7 122.9 21976 288.5 81.6 119.9 31911 260.5
Table 5.6: Results for the implementation of the extended RCR Model using nor-
malized temperatures. Corresponds to Table 5.4. The metrics are the total damage
reduction metric M1, the CO2 damage reduction metric M2, the minimum climate
damage metric M3 and the gross value metric M4. M1 and M2 are in percent of their
respective damage baseline. M3 and M4 are in percent relative to the respective out-
come in the baseline scenario. Results are given in incremental steps in the strength of
diverging preferences. For example, a strength of 50% means that one unit of diverging
preferences corresponds to half the average regional temperature change from climate
change. If regional mean temperature rises by 4°C in absence of SG, a strength of
50% corresponds to low-latitude regions having a diverging temperature preference of
−2°C and high-latitude regions having a diverging temperature preference of +2°C in
scenario A.
Proofs
Proof of the Theoretical Result.
1. Since the residual damages are convex in the SG level, the first equation from
the first part follows from computing the first order conditions of the residual
damages with respect to the SG level. The second equation follows because TDIV
is the projection of TDIV onto TSG.
2. Plugging in the optimal SG level into
TRES(x, TDIV) = (TCO2 − TDIV) + x · TSG
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yields
TRES(x
∗
DIV, TDIV) = (TCO2 − (T⊥DIV + TDIV)) + (x∗ +
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| ) · TSG
= (TCO2 + x
∗ · TSG)− T⊥DIV − TDIV +
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| · TSG
Because of
cos(ϑ) =
TSG • TDIV
|TSG| · |TDIV| ,
it holds that
TDIV =
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| · TSG
and the second part follows.
3. The third part follows from
|TRES(x∗)− T⊥DIV|2 < |TRES(x∗)|2 ⇔
|TRES(x∗)|2 − 2 · TRES(x∗) • T⊥DIV + |TRES(x∗)|2 < |TRES(x∗)|2 ⇔
1
2 · |T⊥DIV|2 < TRES(x∗) • T⊥DIV = |TRES(x∗)| · |T⊥DIV| · cos(γ).
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